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ABSTRACT  
   
In the fifteen years between the discovery of fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) in 
1973 and the passage of alcohol beverage warning labels in 1988, FAS transformed from 
a medical diagnosis between practitioner and pregnant women to a broader societal risk 
imbued with political and cultural meaning. I examine how scientific, social, moral, and 
political narratives dynamically interacted to construct the risk of drinking during 
pregnancy and the public health response of health warning labels on alcohol. To situate 
such phenomena I first observe the closest regulatory precedents, the public health 
responses to thalidomide and cigarettes, which established a federal response to fetal risk. 
I then examine the history of how the US defined and responded to the social problem of 
alcoholism, paying particular attention to the role of women in that process. Those 
chapters inform my discussion of how the US reengaged with alcohol control at the 
federal level in the last quarter of the twentieth century. In the 1970s, FAS allowed 
federal agencies to carve out disciplinary authority, but robust public health measures 
were tempered by uncertainty surrounding issues of bureaucratic authority over labeling, 
and the mechanism and extent of alcohol’s impact on development. A socially 
conservative presidency, dramatic budgetary cuts, and increased industry funding 
reshaped the public health approach to alcoholism in the 1980s. The passage of labeling 
in 1988 required several conditions: a groundswell of other labeling initiatives that 
normalized the practice; the classification of other high profile, socially unacceptable 
alcohol-related behaviors such as drunk driving and youth drinking; and the creation of a 
dual public health population that faced increased medical, social, and political scrutiny, 
the pregnant woman and her developing fetus.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior to the early 1970s, a causative relationship between alcohol and poor birth 
outcomes was largely unknown, and it was not uncommon for a pregnant woman to 
consume alcohol. That began to change in 1973 when pediatricians at the University of 
Washington coined fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) to describe a specific host of birth 
defects caused by prenatal alcohol exposure. David W. Smith and Kenneth L. Jones 
observed a group of children born to alcoholic mothers, children who shared similar 
symptoms: very low birth weights, visible birth defects along the midline of the face, and 
low IQs that resulted in cognitive and psychological issues. 
The newly coined syndrome met with substantial skepticism from physicians to 
the general public. Initial challenges in defining the syndrome were complicated by 
questions of a safe-level of alcohol consumption, and whether concomitant causes such 
as malnutrition or cigarette and illegal drug use were to blame. The spectrum nature of 
the defects caused by prenatal alcohol exposure also complicated the definition, with a 
variety of possible defects ranging in severity based on the mother’s pattern of drinking 
and the full blow syndrome representing the most severe expression of a group of 
potential symptoms.  
Despite the scientific ambiguities surrounding FAS, within three years of its 
initial description government agencies proposed the idea of requiring warning labels on 
alcohol to alert pregnant women to the risk of birth defects posed by consumption. The 
discussions represents the government’s first foray into public health measures aimed at 
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educating mothers in order to protect the well-being of the unborn. Private decisions, 
such as when and how much to drink, were transformed into very public social harms 
when the population under investigation was pregnant women. FAS is an illustrative 
example of how public health interventions are conceived of and implemented when 
pregnant women are the focus of such public health interventions. 
In this dissertation, I examine how actors operating amid different institutional 
traditions constructed the population-level risks and responsibilities surrounding FAS to 
propose specific policy interventions. As FAS became politicized in the two decades 
following it discovery, it became imbued with new meaning, making public latent ideals 
of pregnancy, motherhood, personal freedoms, and reproductive choices. Such values 
make FAS an excellent case study for constructing how we as a nation prioritize 
competing scientific, social, and moral evidence for public health policy decision making. 
The standard of public health policy is sound, evidence-based science, but often the 
evidence is conflicting, uncertain, and colored by the epistemic investments of the 
experts. That is especially true in a policy context when empirical research is legitimately 
shaped as much by moral and political constraints as by data. To such ends, this 
dissertation investigates the context and process by which scientific, social, moral, and 
political narratives dynamically interact to give rise to policy, in this case how agents 
constructed the risk of drinking during pregnancy in order to mandate health warning 
labels on alcohol. 
Surprisingly few robust historical accounts surrounding FAS exist, given the 
widespread modern understanding that drinking during pregnancy should be avoided. 
The interplay between social, medical, and regulatory understandings of FAS has been 
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addressed best by Elizabeth M. Armstrong and Janet Golden. Prior to the book-length 
research conducted by Armstrong and Golden, historical accounts related to FAS tended 
to focus on accounts of how drinking impacted pregnancy centuries ago. (Abel 1999) 
(Warner and Rosett 1975) Even in the literature review for articles published in the last 
five years, scientists have traced the history back as far as antiquity by appealing to 
biblical references, edicts in Carthage and Sparta forbidding alcohol use in newlyweds, or 
Plato and Aristotle’s appeals to maternal impression. Those authors that forgo antiquity 
in examining the history of FAS more than likely still mention classic descriptions of 
Great Britain’s 18th century Gin Epidemic or W.C. Sullivan’s observations of birth 
outcomes among imprisoned pregnant inebriates in the late nineteenth century. (Abel 
2001) (Sullivan 1899) Armstrong and Golden introduce these antiquated but popular 
concepts of FAS’s history, before quickly departing to focus on more recent history that 
examines the social construction of FAS. 
In Conceiving Risk, Bearing Responsibility: Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and the 
Diagnosis of Moral Disorder, Armstrong focuses on how the medicalization of FAS and 
the public response to the risks posed by drinking were shaped by the social contexts in 
which they occurred. (Armstrong 2003) Armstrong is a sociologist by training and 
approaches the narrative of how FAS was medicalized in the latter half of the 20th 
century using historical methods, qualitative surveys, and quantitative analyses of FAS’ 
epidemiology, which included an examination of drinking patterns, socioeconomic 
factors, and prenatal health care. Armstrong is particularly interested in how physicians’ 
conceptions of FAS and the risk of alcohol consumption during pregnancy have changed 
over time, and how those views are influenced by the social environment in which they 
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are embedded (e.g. pediatricians’ understanding and willingness to diagnose/discuss FAS 
differ when compared to family practice physicians). Armstrong’s work is aimed at 
examining how medical understanding became public knowledge, and ultimately how 
women who drink during pregnancy are publicly perceived as reflecting the social 
anxieties and moral failings of US culture in the late 20th century. 
Historian of medicine, Janet Golden, approaches the history of FAS’s emergence 
and integration into the cultural lexicon in a much different way in her book, Message in 
a Bottle: The Making of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome. Golden makes use of historical 
resources and interviews to present what she describes as “a biography of a diagnosis.” 
(Golden 2005) Golden describes the emergence of FAS as both a medical entity and a 
moral disorder that required intervention by the law, government, and general public. The 
emergence of FAS is contextualized through court decisions surrounding reproduction 
and a control over a woman’s body such as birth control and abortion. She focuses 
extensively on how FAS and drinking during pregnancy became publically recognized 
through broadcast and print media, and how women who flouted the emerging medical 
and public consensus that drinking while pregnant was unacceptable, were not only 
vilified but charged with child abuse in some instances. Although Golden deals briefly 
with the narrative of how FAS was regulated in the late 1970s and 1980s, it comprises a 
single chapter in her much larger book, and she does not rigorously delve into the topic of 
how FAS came to be constructed as a risk to public health. 
In this dissertation I examine how the emergent prenatal risk of FAS became 
transformed through federal policy interventions, moving from a medical diagnosis 
between practitioner and pregnant women to a broader societal risk imbued with political 
  5 
and cultural meaning. Toward that end, the dissertation examines how evidences and 
values prioritized in those decisions illustrate issues of authority and responsibility 
central to the process of governing public health risks. And by doing so, better reveal 
how we as a society engage with complex issues at the intersection of science and 
society. 
To accomplish that goal, I begin by examining how the regulatory responses to 
thalidomide and cigarettes in the mid-twentieth century set a precedent for later 
regulatory responses that arose in response to alcohol’s risk to development. I then 
transition into an examination of how the US had previously responded to the social 
problem of alcohol, from the colonial era through the mid-twentieth century. After 
engaging with the requisite history to contextualize the topic of my dissertation, I then 
approach the main historical narrative of my dissertation in three parts. The first part 
examines how the government approached a federal alcoholism agenda for the first time 
since Prohibition, and how the emergence of FAS in the early 1970s required the 
government to engage with a new public health demographic, the female alcoholic and 
the fetus she carried. The second part of the narrative focuses on the rise of alcohol 
warning labels as the solution to the public health problems of FAS, as labeling 
discussions dominated the legislative discussion for five years between the 1977 National 
Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism health warning and the 1981 Surgeon 
General’s warning that alcohol impacts pregnancy. The third part of the narrative 
examines how social and moral evidences began to be privileged in the 1980s, which 
expanded the focus of public health problems to include a wide variety of disordered 
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drinking such as drunken driving, youth drinking, and concomitant interaction with other 
drugs.  
In Chapter Two, “Thalidomide and Cigarettes: How Hazards to Pregnancy 
Became a Regulatory Concern of the Federal Government,” I examine how those 
historical precedents situated FAS within existing bureaucratic and legislative 
frameworks and how emergent fetal risks became public health concerns. Thalidomide, a 
popular over-the-counter sleep aid that originated in Europe, was used by many pregnant 
women to counteract morning sickness in the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, if 
taken during the first trimester of pregnancy, thalidomide causes dramatic limb defects, 
long-term neurological deficits, and at times fetal death. The United States avoided 
widespread thalidomide birth defects as a result of medical officers at the FDA who 
required more robust information regarding thalidomide’s side effects before approving 
the drug. As a result the FDA gained a legacy as a consumer protector for both pregnant 
women and fetuses, and the experience helped to expanded the FDA’s regulatory power 
over testing and approving drugs, food, and drink. That legacy is evidenced by the FDA’s 
integral role as an advocate for alcohol warning labeling as a response to the risk posed 
by FAS, and Congress’s acknowledgement throughout hearings that the FDA should be 
charged with regulating alcohol labeling.  
The second precedent examined in Chapter Two, the regulatory response to 
smoking both generally and specific to pregnancy, shares many similarities with the case 
study of FAS. One such similarity is how industry in both cases “manufactured 
uncertainty” by funding industry groups that released competing scientific studies in 
order to introduced a degree of doubt into scientific consensus on a topic. (Brandt 2007) 
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The tobacco industry created such uncertainty by funding researchers that repudiated 
claims that smoking caused cancer, while the alcohol industry had a preoccupation with 
finding as “safe” level of drinking for both pregnant women and recovering alcoholics. 
Advocacy organization for both substances also engaged in “moral entrepreneurship” as a 
means of defining and disseminating a social problem. In the case of cigarettes several 
decades of social response to the problem shifted smoking from an activity that the 
majority of Americans indulged in to a profoundly unsocial activity limited to specific 
places so as not to pollute the air of others. Likewise, in the mid-twentieth century it was 
common for women to drink during pregnancy, but following the identification of FAS, 
women drinking during pregnancy widely became associated with moral failure.  
Following the discussion of historical predecessors to FAS and public health, I 
then examine the broader historical landscape of alcoholism, in Chapter Three, “A Short 
History of How the United States has Defined and Responded to the Social Problem of 
Alcoholism.” In that chapter I trace the history of how the US has responded to issues of 
habitual heavy drinking from the colonial period through the mid-twentieth century from 
combined medical, social, and moral perspectives.  
I examine early definition of drunkenness from medical professionals, and the 
temperance advocacy groups that adopted those definitions to navigate early community-
level responses to the social issues of habitual drinking. The American Temperance 
Society, formed in 1826, is one of the first groups to attempt to address such concerns on 
a large scale, focusing on preventing such transgressions rather than reforming the 
inebriate. The success of that organization is due in large part to the mobilization of 
women who used the opportunity to preach the social gospel and engage in a socially 
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acceptable form of politics that bettered their community. The rise of temperance plays 
and the social and moral tropes within those tragic cautionary tales helped to proliferate 
and define such social values, particularly the role of the mother as the pillar of purity 
and morality within the family. Shortly thereafter, a group of reformed inebriates founded 
the Washingtonian Temperance Society that focused on shifting the social response to 
inebriety from prevention to reformation. The group introduced the idea of loss of control 
as a hallmark of inebriety, lobbied for the creation of asylums to treat the disorder, and 
sought to remove the religious and moral stigma associated with the disorder.  
Following those early temperance responses, the pressure for social reform 
continued in the post-war Reformation Era with the American Association for the Cure of 
Inebriety in 1870 and the formation of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union in 
1874. Doctors carved out a disciplinary niche with the creation of the American 
Association for the Cure of Inebriety and the Journal of Inebriety in 1876. The 
organization helped bolster the nascent field of psychology and created a national group 
to continue the work started by Benjamin Rush and researchers running inebriate 
asylums. Also, women post-Civil War became much more engaged with organizations 
like the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, which embraced a broad feminist agenda 
that extended beyond temperance. Social reform such as temperance impacted many 
aspects of women’s well-being, and they expanded to also petition for women’s suffrage, 
expanded access to education, and labor rights for women and children. 
That broad agenda allowed a new organization to hone the national agenda 
surrounding social control of alcohol, the Anti-Saloon League in 1895 that focused solely 
on the legal and legislative path to prohibition. By helping to elect politicians and judges 
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sympathetic to prohibition, the group succeeded in ushering in the passage of the 18th 
Amendment in 1919 which prohibited the sale, production, and transport of alcohol. 
Prohibition also gained popularity as medical and psychological attempts at long-term 
reformation continued to yield poor results, motivating some researchers to shift to 
examining the possibility of alcoholism being a hereditary trait. Prohibition also had the 
unintended effect of medicalizing access to alcohol, with doctors profiting from the 
restrictions by writing prescriptions for alcohol at unprecedented rates. 
As support for Prohibition evaporated, Congress reversed course and passed the 
21st Amendment at the end of 1933, ushering in an almost 40 year lull in federal alcohol 
control measures. Rather, the government ceded control to individual states and 
established a self-policing morality code for the alcohol industry. Social control of 
alcoholism shifted largely to the individual, and the self-help group Alcoholics 
Anonymous formed in 1935 to help alcoholics identify their disordered drinking and 
reform. Women remained an underserved and invisible population of alcoholics, even 
after Marty Mann introduced an accessible narrative of reform as the first female success 
story in Alcoholics Anonymous. 
Simultaneous with the formation of a support group for those navigating and 
defining their relationship with problem drinking, scientific research into problem 
drinking found renewed vigor with the Yale Center of Alcohol Studies. The Center acted 
as a national research, training, and treatment hub for alcoholism with one of the nation’s 
preeminent alcoholism researchers Elvin Morton Jellinek. He helped to define the 
alcoholism research agenda and in 1960 published the formative text in the field of 
alcoholism, The Disease Process of Alcohol. He advocated for measures to humanize the 
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alcoholic, and with the help of Mann formed the National Committee for Education on 
Alcoholism with the stated mission of educating the public that alcoholism is a disease, it 
can be treated, and that alcoholics are worthy of that investment. 
Chapter Four, “Reengaging with Alcohol at the Federal Level: Alcoholism as a 
Disease, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, and Female Alcoholics,” traces how alcoholism once 
again became part of the federal public health agenda. Alcohol in the mid-twentieth 
century had taken on a benign character in medicine compared to decades past. Many 
recommended alcohol to their patients to treat a variety of ailments, along with cigarettes 
and a variety of pills now deemed narcotic but commonplace in the housewife’s 
cupboard. (Pullar-Strecker 1952) Physicians routinely smoked and drank at the same 
rates as their patients, and they most certainly did not ask about patients drinking habits 
during check-ups. (American Medical Association 1973) That tendency is illustrated by 
Senator William Hathaway in a 1976 congressional hearing, “It seems ludicrous almost, 
doctors asking patients whether they are drinking or not.” (U.S. Senate 1976: 33) The 
public’s perception of alcoholics was skewed by almost 40 years of federal detachment 
from issues of alcoholism, and advocacy groups filled that gap by seeking to erase the 
stigma surrounding the disease of alcoholism. 
While AA worked at the local level via word of mouth, advocacy groups such as 
the National Council on Alcoholism opened a branch in Washington, D.C., specifically 
aimed at bringing alcoholism treatment into the mainstream. President Lyndon B. 
Johnson was one of the first federal officials to speak of alcoholism as a national problem 
in the mid-1960s, creating a task force to recommend federal action and signing 
legislation that created a humble federal research center. Soon after, Congress built on 
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those initial steps and passed the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 
Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act, creating the National Institute on Alcohol 
Abuse and Alcoholism with research, treatment, and educational outreach at its core.  
However, as with much of mid-twentieth century medicine they prioritized men 
over other affected groups such as women, minorities, the elderly, or youths. That began 
to change after the discovery of fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) made visible both the 
female alcoholic and the fetus she impacted by drinking. The chance that alcohol could 
cause birth defects rapidly politicized the discussion surrounding appropriate federal and 
social control of alcoholism. FAS also brought into question other victims of alcohol 
abuse, including those adversely impacted by drunk driving, youth drinking, and 
prescription drug interactions.  
FAS offered an opportunity for lawmakers and politicians to capitalize on a newly 
discovered public health concern as a placeholder, upon which they pinned many of the 
same arguments surrounding federal alcohol control in the US as the teetotalers from the 
mid-nineteenth century. Broad-reaching public health policy proposed to address the 
mental, physical, and social harms of alcohol consumption followed a similar trajectory 
as in decades past with the medical diagnosis taking on social and moral meanings as it 
moved from a primarily professional concern to the status of a public threat. That re-
medicalization of alcoholism as a disease process in the mid-twentieth century attempted 
to eliminate the stigma of seeking treatment, but within the decade legislation moved the 
federal agenda from treating and preventing alcoholism, to punishing alcoholics and 
protecting those harmed by the alcoholic’s behavior. 
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Chapter Five, “Alcohol Warning Labels as a Means of Addressing the Risk of 
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome” focuses on a five year period between when the government 
first released a warning regarding FAS in 1977 to when the Surgeon General’s warning 
against drinking during pregnancy arose in 1981. During that time period alcohol 
beverage warning labels in response to FAS dominated policy discussions. Between those 
two government warnings, uncertainty abound surrounding the bureaucratic authority 
over labeling, the mechanism and extent of alcohol’s impact on development, and 
whether labeling could accomplish anything of value or if it simply represented a neo-
prohibitionist response to alcohol control. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the complicated bureaucratic jurisdiction 
over labeling alcohol, which led to decades of infighting between the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF). The 
FDA’s history as a consumer protector, particularly during pregnancy caused many in 
legislative and administrative contexts to point to that agency as the logical choice to 
regulate alcohol warning labels. However, the BATF’s long-standing labeling jurisdiction 
was assured by a federal judge who interpreted previous congressional intent in creating 
the agency. That placed the BATF firmly in control of labeling, a concern for many as the 
agency was viewed as too close to industry interests and continually declined to include a 
health warning label on alcohol.  
Labeling arose hand-in-hand with congressional hearings on how to approach the 
emerging public health problem of FAS, with the first congressional hearing in 1978 
titled, “Alcohol Labeling and Fetal Alcohol Syndrome.” (U.S. Senate 1978) Surprisingly, 
industry and advocacy tended to align in their disapproval of alcohol beverage labeling, 
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for economic reasons in the case of industry and to prevent increased stigma in the case 
of advocacy. Although increasingly, the amount of industry support advocacy groups 
received led some to question how independent their decisions were from their corporate 
board members. The continued push for alcohol control measures by the NIAAA and 
FDA, of which labeling was just one initiative, had opponents of such public health 
measures decrying a neo-prohibitionist agenda. 
Industry had remained fairly disengaged from presenting at hearings and lobbying 
for an anti-labeling agenda, but that changed in 1979 when Senator Strom Thurmond 
appended a labeling amendment to a larger health bill. Administrative turmoil 
surrounding the Carter administration’s reorganization made any unified executive or 
bureaucratic front unlikely, making the legislative route to labeling a more successful 
possibility. When the bill passed in the Senate and advanced to the House of 
Representatives, a flurry of industry lobbyists crushed the amendment. Thurmond would 
have to wait almost a decade until 1988 to see labeling come to full fruition.  
After the Thurmond amendment failed, labeling suffered another major setback in 
1981 with the release of a joint report by the FDA and BATF. In the report the agencies 
set their disagreement over alcohol labeling jurisdiction aside and collectively agreed on 
a new platform: not labeling alcohol. Instead, the agencies suggested that the Surgeon 
General release a warning cautioning pregnant women of the risk associated with alcohol 
consumption and the agencies vowed to continue the industry-sponsored and NIAAA-
sponsored public education efforts already underway. Soon after, FAS retreated as the 
main public health concern surrounding alcohol and faced competition from driving 
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drunk and youth drinking. Not until the mid-1980s would labeling and FAS again return 
as issues of regulatory concern.  
Chapter Six, “The Moral Agenda: Federal Alcoholism Policy and the Final Push 
Toward Labeling,” examines that social shift to incorporate other areas of problem 
drinking, which arose in step with the election of President Ronald Reagan and the rise of 
social conservatism. Dramatic budgetary cuts rewrote the purpose of the NIAAA, 
creating a research agency and eliminating the majority of social research. That coupled 
with fracture among federal alcoholism advocacy groups weakened the formerly unified 
federal alcoholism agenda. In that turmoil, the social conservatism that characterized 
Reagan’s administration and the rise of the New Right wing of the Republican Party 
became increasingly preoccupied with the morality of the drinker and began to focus 
more on the victims of the alcoholic’s behavior than the personal agenda of reform and 
treatment. 
Among those issues that became a pressing concern in the mid-1980s, FAS and 
labeling were not well-represented. Rather, drunk driving, youth drinking, and FAS 
among indigenous populations emerged as issues that required engagement with social 
and moral evidence to craft appropriate public health policy. Controversy surrounded 
whether a safe level of drinking existed, both for recovering alcoholics and for pregnant 
women. The 1982 hearing that arose in response to that controversy “Effects of Alcohol 
Consumption during Pregnancy” best represents an example of industry “manufacturing 
uncertainty.” In this case, whether an unknown safe level of drinking during pregnancy 
meant that implementing alcohol beverage labeling was impossible.  
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That 1982 hearing represented the last time Congress engaged in a hearing related 
to FAS until a final legislative hearing titled simply, “Alcohol Warning Labels” in 1988. 
To reignite the federal concern with labeling, Strom Thurmond had to create of a 
bipartisan group of Senators in 1986 to advocate for labeling alcohol, which passed in 
1988 following that hearing led by Senator Albert Gore, Jr. The alcohol industry did not 
even attend that final hearing before labels were enacted, and instead embraced an 
example set by the cigarette industry, which used its label as a shield against possible 
legal challenges. By 1988, the alcohol industry preferred to accept the burden of 
implementing labels to gain a degree of protection from legal challenges.   
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CHAPTER 2 
THALIDOMIDE AND CIGARETTES: HOW HAZARDS TO PREGNANCY 
BECAME A FEDERAL REGULATORY CONCERN 
 
Inherent to discussions of how to regulate dangerous substances that can cause 
fetal injury are underlying tensions surrounding issues of authority and expertise, risk and 
harm reduction, and the nature of government intervention with respect to private choice 
and social responsibility. These tensions take on heightened meaning when the autonomy 
of a pregnant woman impacts the potential for life developing within her womb. This 
chapter will more deeply examine the construction of legislative and regulatory responses 
under those conditions by examining two historical case studies: how the government 
responded to the risks thalidomide and cigarettes posed to pregnancy in the mid-twentieth 
century. The case studies represent the US government’s first forays into crafting public 
health measures to address fetal risk, and set a precedent for the government’s later 
response to the risks of women drinking during pregnancy. 
The first case study surrounding the drug thalidomide in the early 1960s 
introduced the public to the possibility that what a woman imbibes during pregnancy can 
impact fetal development. In Europe, many doctors and researchers recommended 
thalidomide as an effective drug to combat the nausea of morning sickness for pregnant 
women, and considered the drug safe with no known limit of overdose. As such, 
manufacturers sold thalidomide over-the-counter in countries across Europe until 
realizing that thalidomide impacted fetal development during pregnancy in the first 
trimester, leading to infant mortality or life-long cognitive and physical abnormalities. 
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How the US government responded to the risk posed by thalidomide firmly entrenched 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as the entity responsible for protecting 
consumers against risks to fetal development. The proactive reforms strengthened 
existing regulatory frameworks, and had the effect of establishing the double-blind 
clinical trial as the hallmark of determining efficacy and safety. However, the swift 
regulatory response is at odds with the contentious, slow-moving regulatory apparatus 
surrounding the risk of cigarette smoke to development.  
The ongoing public health response to the harm posed by smoking, particularly 
that of passive (“second-hand”) smoke and smoking during pregnancy, is more 
comparable to how alcohol warning labels arose in response to women who drink during 
pregnancy. The fetal effects of prenatal exposure to tobacco are less well-defined than the 
strong causative relationship between thalidomide exposure and birth defects. That 
mechanistic and causative uncertainty called for rigorous scientific inquiry into the 
relationship between poor fetal health outcomes and pregnant women’s consumption of 
cigarettes. That also had the effect of allowing private industry to “manufacture 
uncertainty,” a term historian of medicine Allan M. Brandt uses to describe how the 
tobacco industry funded studies to intentionally obfuscate scientific consensus and blunt 
regulatory responses that may discourage consumers from engaging in potentially risky 
behaviors. (Brandt 2007) The regulation of social vices such as cigarettes also led 
advocacy groups to leverage the power of “moral entrepreneurship” to create and enforce 
concepts of social deviance that aligned with their mission and impacted the social 
acceptability of smoking during pregnancy. (Kagan and Nelson 2001) (Tuggle and 
Holmes 1997) The interaction of science, government, industry, and advocacy 
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surrounding the regulatory responses to thalidomide and tobacco served as informal best 
practices for the subsequent response to the risks posed by alcohol consumption during 
pregnancy. 
 
Thalidomide Establishes the FDA as a Consumer Protector during Pregnancy 
The regulatory response to thalidomide serves as an important predecessor to later 
legislative discussion surrounding the risks of alcohol to the developing fetus, by shaping 
the standard for regulatory responses to emergent maternal and fetal health risks. The 
response solidified the federal Food and Drug Agency (FDA) as the government entity 
charged with examining potential fetal risks that arise from what a pregnant woman 
imbibes. The regulatory response expanded the powers of the FDA to ensure that new 
drugs and food were effective and safe, both to the pregnant woman and to prenatal 
development, and set the precedent for the FDA as an agency that navigates and defines 
that public risk. The FDA’s legacy as a consumer advocate motivated members of 
congress to continually charge the agency with the authority to implement alcohol 
labeling in numerous bills proposed. Officials from the FDA also testified in 
congressional hearings from the beginning of legislative discussions through the 
culmination of a labeling initiative a decade later. That tradition of looking to the FDA as 
a consumer protector during pregnancy began when the risk of thalidomide emerged in 
the early 1960s. 
The case study of thalidomide is also important as it dramatically introduced the 
public to the concept that what a woman consumes during pregnancy breeches the 
placental boundary to impact the development of the embryo or fetus. Prior to the 
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thalidomide tragedy of the 1960s, few environmental agents had been substantiated as 
impacting embryonic or fetal development during pregnancy. In the early 1940s Norman 
McAllister Gregg, an Australian ophthalmologist, identified rubella as the first infectious 
agent to act as a teratogen. In mothers who contracted the rubella virus in their first 
trimester, Gregg observed ocular, auditory, and cardiac birth defects. (Gregg 1941) Soon 
after in 1945, the unprecedented, massive exposure of ionizing radiation following the 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, allowed scientists who had been researching 
the impact of x-rays on development since the early 1900s to expand their understanding. 
(Kathren 1964) (Yamazaki and Schull 1990) Despite research into those two teratogens, 
prior to the highly publicized and dramatic birth defects caused by thalidomide, few 
drugs had emerged as posing a risk to prenatal development. Although scientists 
recognized that chemicals could cross the placenta from mother to developing fetus 
decades prior to the case of thalidomide, much of the public operated under the 
assumption that the placenta provided a barrier to exposure from what a pregnant woman 
consumed. (Greek et al. 2011) 
That popular assumption of the placenta as a barrier to exposure shattered as 
large-scale birth defects began to emerge in Europe between 1959 and 1963 as a result of 
women taking thalidomide during pregnancy. Newspapers and broadcast news featured 
sensational pictures of children born with truncated or missing limbs, a rare birth defect 
called phocomelia, a Greek term that translates to “seal extremities.” While phocomelia 
was the most recognizable symptom of thalidomide’s impact on the fetus, unseen birth 
defects like damage to internal organs and the developing brain also occurred with 
regularity and often led to infant death. (Mellin and Katzenstein 1962)  The teratogen 
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responsible for those birth defects, thalidomide, was an over-the-counter sedative 
advertised as an anti-nausea drug, consumed by many pregnant women to counteract 
morning sickness. 
Produced by Chemie-Grünenthal in West Germany in 1957, thalidomide was sold 
over the counter and hailed as a safe and effective drug. Researchers had not encountered 
a known overdose level or adverse side effects in the pre-market, laboratory study on 
mice. And although Chemie-Grünenthal destroyed their records researchers have claimed 
it was likely those studies also included prenatal exposure in mice. (Greek et al. 2011) As 
a result, thalidomide was approved for use in over 46 countries by 1960, and the US drug 
company Richardson-Merrell submitted a new drug application to the FDA in 1960 to 
approve Kevadon, its brand name for thalidomide in US markets. The application was 
assigned to three reviewers at the FDA, chemist Lee Geismar, pharmacologist Jiro 
Oyama, and chemical pharmacologist Frances Oldham Kelsey, a newly hired medical 
review officer. (Watts 2015) All reviewers found issues with the structure and rigor of the 
laboratory studies testing safety, and Kelsey, acting as the primary contact with 
Richardson-Merrell, expressed those views to the company. She specifically required 
additional studies regarding the potential for prenatal impact and peripheral neuritis, lost 
feeling or tingling in extremities, which began to be reported in conjunction with 
thalidomide in medical journals in 1960. (Florence 1960) (Fullerton and Kremer 1961)  
Pending additional laboratory tests and clinical trials to establish Kevadon as safe, 
the FDA refused to approve the drug for US markets. Richardson-Merrell relented and 
Kelsey recalled that Merrell contacted the FDA’s Bureau of Medicine to circumvent her 
authority as a medical reviewer and approve the drug for American markets. However, 
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the complaints to both Kelsey and her superiors did not change the status of the drug, 
which was denied with each new drug application submitted. Kelsey held firm even when 
Richardson-Merrell threatened to sue her for libel regarding her claims that their testing 
did not meet the standards for safety. (Daemmrich 2002) At the same time, in part of 
what they claimed to be an investigational study, Richardson-Merrell distributed over two 
million samples of Kevadon to doctors across the US, a common practice by drug 
companies at the time. The company claimed that the drug was under investigation by the 
FDA and would soon be approved for market, citing its success abroad as a less risky 
sedative than other options on the market.  
That changed with the publication of two independent, concurrent studies toward 
the end of 1961 that claimed thalidomide caused birth defects in the first trimester of 
pregnancy. Physician Widukind Lenz from West Germany observed an increased number 
of birth defects among women taking thalidomide, and delivered his findings at a German 
Pediatric Society meeting November 18, 1961. He then published the full results on 
December 29, 1961. (Lenz 1961) (Lenz and Knapp 1962) Simultaneously, in the 
December issue of the British medical journal The Lancet, gynecologist and obstetrician 
William G. McBride from Australia published a letter detailing birth defects among 
patients who took thalidomide. (McBride 1961) Several months later, American pediatric 
cardiologist Helen Taussig traveled through West Germany observing the birth defects 
caused by thalidomide and returned to the US an advocate for banning thalidomide, later 
testifying in front Congress on her observations and the need for heightened new drug 
testing. (Taussig 1962) 
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Despite the independently corroborated risk of thalidomide’s teratogenicity, and 
the fact that thalidomide began to be withdrawn from the European market as early as 
December 1961, Richardson-Merrell continued to petition the FDA to approve Kevadon. 
For an additional three months they kept the new drug application open, until March 
1962 when they withdrew Kevadon’s appeal in the face of overwhelming evidence of 
thalidomide’s teratogenicity. As a result of the FDA’s intervention, only 17 cases of 
phocomelia were reported in the US from pregnant women receiving the drug abroad or 
taking part in the investigative trials in the US. Upward of 10,000 children had been born 
abroad with defects by the time thalidomide had been removed from the worldwide 
market. (Daemmrich 2002) 
Concurrent with the FDA’s examination of the drug Kevadon, Estes Kefauver, a 
Democratic senator from Tennessee and chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust 
and Monopoly, recognized the thalidomide crisis as a political opportunity. Kefauver had 
been holding hearings to investigate price fixing by the pharmaceutical industry, 
specifically price gouging on the part of companies that held proprietary patents on drugs. 
(Hunter 1962) He had initiated that series of congressional hearings and legislative 
investigations beginning in 1959. In response to those early hearings, the FDA wrote and 
presented a bill, “Factory Inspection and Drug Amendments of 1960,” to the Senate for 
legislative consideration in July of 1960. (McFayden 1973) The amendments 
recommended changes that bolstered the agency’s authoritative power to require more 
extensive drug testing, to better report side effects, and inspect drug factories. And after 
the birth defects of thalidomide arose, the FDA revised the language to include efficacy 
testing in addition to safety regulations. 
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In April of 1961, prior to the thalidomide controversy, Kefauver presented a drug 
regulation bill to amend the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and allow for more 
competition among drug manufacturers with cross-licensing agreements. (Daemmrich 
2004) The bill was met with ambivalence by both President John F. Kennedy’s 
administration and the department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), which 
houses the FDA. Both the Kennedy administration and HEW preferred the FDA-authored 
amendments. However, following a series of political maneuvers drug lobbyists working 
in conjunction with other congress members all but stripped the bill of its original 
provisions by June of 1962. 
As the narrative of thalidomide began to unfold in Europe, and Kevadon remained 
tied up in the new drug approval process, major news organizations began to cover the 
high number of birth defects recorded in Europe with the first story appearing in April 
1962. (Plumb 1962) Even after those initial editorials in publications like The New York 
Times, it was not until July of 1962 that a story emerged linking FDA reviewer Kelsey to 
the denied Kevadon application in the US. (Associated Press 1962) (New York Times 
1962) Kefauver’s associates leaked the heroic story of how Kelsey prevented thalidomide 
from being approved in the US in an effort to breathe life into Kefauver’s bill, which had 
stalled given the wider support for the still stymied, industry-friendly version of the 
legislation. (Carpenter 2010) As the thalidomide tragedy became sensational news in the 
United States, President Kennedy pushed Congress to reexamine Kefauver’s original bill. 
Given the anxieties surrounding thalidomide, the bill was rewritten to include much of 
the safety provisions stripped in previous congressional hearings, and better reflect the 
FDA’s earlier recommendations rather than the appeal to drug companies. Kefauver 
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attempted to petition for the inclusion of one last amendment to reflect his original patent 
and pricing aims, but the proposal was subsequently tabled and discarded. (Fontenay 
1980) The bill passed unanimously in both the House and Senate, and on October 10, 
1962, President Kennedy signed the “Drug Efficacy Amendments” into law. 
The amendments transformed the accountability of the FDA to the American 
people and strengthened their regulatory power to ensure the safety and efficacy of new 
drugs, particularly related to potential fetal risk. The bill also required a retrospective 
analysis of previously approved drugs from 1938 onward, which resulted in the removal 
of about 600 drugs on the basis of unproven effectiveness. (Greene and Podolsky 2012) 
The passage of the Drug Efficacy Amendments also protected consumers from pressures 
exerted by the pharmaceutical industry or doctors willing to prescribe sample drugs prior 
to FDA approval. That practice was relatively common prior to the amendments being 
passed, a tradition that motivated the American Medical Association to petition the initial 
efficacy requirements in Kefauver’s amendments, as they argued only rigorous clinical 
application could adequately demonstrate efficacy. Additionally, the amendments granted 
the FDA the ability to tour places of drug manufacturing and research, protected generic 
drugs from being sold under more expensive trade names, and strengthened the reporting 
of side effects by doctors to the central government. 
The amendments also had the effect of lengthening how long it took for new 
drugs to be approved for sale. One provision of the amendments lengthened the new drug 
application process from 60 to 180 days to avoid rushing and allow adequate time to 
review new standards. The requirements also resulted in higher drug development costs 
because of efficacy regulations and the need to rigorously test safety during prenatal 
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development. As an unforeseen result, the standards set forth by the FDA led to a reliance 
on clinical pharmacology and cemented the randomized, double-blind clinical trial as the 
gold standard for determining efficacy and safety. That burden of proof on drug 
developers eventually resulted in pharmaceutical companies pushing for extended patent 
protections to recoup the cost of drug development, an ironic result fundamentally at odds 
with Kefauver’s original intention to limit drug costs. 
The FDA’s increased political voice in the legislative process is evident in the 
public health discussions surrounding fetal alcohol syndrome and alcohol beverage 
warning labels a decade after the FDA amendments passed. (Hilts 2003) The thalidomide 
incident increased the involvement of FDA officials testifying before Congress, a trend 
that continues as the FDA routinely presents at congressional hearings as the voice of a 
consumer protector. (Hutt 2007) That reputation is reflected in how often congressional 
representatives consistently presented bills to amend the Federal Alcohol Administration 
Act and grant the FDA authority to establish and monitor alcohol warning labels.  
The high profile case of thalidomide also introduced the field of teratology and 
birth defects research to the public, and prompted broader research funding to investigate 
possible environmental causes of developmental defects. That rapid growth and 
legitimation of the field of teratology as a result of the thalidomide scare motivated 
research into a wide variety of drugs and environmental stimuli. The teratogenicity of 
both cigarettes and alcohol were soon called into question, followed by legislative 
hearings surrounding the government’s responsibility to warn the public about such 
teratogens. 
 
  26 
Tobacco Regulation, Manufacturing Uncertainty, and Regulating Risk 
The history of tobacco regulation serves as an informative precedent for the 
regulatory discussions surrounding alcohol beverage labeling, an example of how society 
regulates legal substances with the potential to cause social harm. Both substances are 
regularly consumed by adults, despite their addictive nature and proven health risks to the 
user, and both also pose broader risks to health and well-being beyond the primary user. 
Cigarette smoke causes cancer and other health problems even in second-hand form, 
from the smoker to those in the surrounding area or to in utero development. Alcohol is 
responsible for a host of social issues, from motorist deaths due to driving while drunk, to 
interpersonal violence and fetal alcohol syndrome. Both substances are also legal for 
adult consumption, raise a substantial amount of tax revenue for their states to fund 
public and social programs, and are subject to varying degrees of regulation depending on 
the will of constituents in a particular locality. 
The federal regulatory narratives in response to the health risks posed by tobacco 
and alcohol also share similarities, and include agency and congressional pressure to 
include warning labels, limits on advertising, and broad public health initiatives. The role 
of industry is also intrinsic to the proceedings, as they lobbied for minimal federal 
oversight and manufactured scientific uncertainty surrounding the risk posed by both 
substances to the health of the user and those impacted by the user’s behavior. Grassroots 
groups mobilized in each case, in response to the social risks with the formation of local 
branches of advocacy organizations like Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), Groups 
Against Smoking Pollution (GASP), and Mothers/Students Against Drunk Driving 
(MADD/SADD). Those organizations acted as moral entrepreneurs and served to 
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redefine socially acceptable behavior surrounding tobacco and alcohol use, thereby 
changing the public will for particular legislative measures to address such risks. 
However, the legislative trajectory surrounding both tobacco and alcohol are 
much different in several respects, particularly as the prenatal risks identified with 
tobacco use were decades separated from the initial push for general health warning 
labels. Even though federal research into the health risks of tobacco use arose as early as 
1956, the concerns surrounding smoking during pregnancy began in earnest in the late 
1970s. (Oaks 2001) That inquiry into the risks of cigarette smoke to prenatal 
development occurred at the same time as congress discussed whether to mandate health 
warning labels on alcohol to address the risks of FAS.  
Additionally, the federal agencies involved in pushing for warning labels and 
prenatal health warnings were different in each case, with heavy Surgeon General and 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) involvement with tobacco legislation. The Surgeon 
General served as an important figure in the public health campaign against tobacco use, 
and published thousands of pages on the matter in annual reports on the health risks of 
smoking, with an entire 1980 report dedicated to the specific risks of women who smoke. 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1980) However, reorganizations within 
the Department for Health, Education, and Welfare conflated and then separated the 
positions of Surgeon General and Assistant Secretary for Health in the 1970s and 1980s, 
complicating the authority and scope of the Public Health Service during that time period. 
Instead, the National Institute on Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse served as the primary 
voice of research and legislative advocacy within the government. Also, while the FDA 
served as the consumer protector in the alcohol case study, the FTC was the first 
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organization to question tobacco companies’ responsibility to their consumers, their 
truthfulness in advertising, and the need for health warning labels on cigarettes.  
The FTC began that work in 1955 when the agency met in several informal 
meetings with cigarette manufacturers to explain their revised guidelines for advertising 
that banned unproven health claims about the benefits of smoking, guidelines passed 
September 15, 1955. Advertisements claiming that cigarettes had a positive impact on 
respiratory, digestive, and nervous function were banned, along with other 
unsubstantiated claims regarding nicotine content and the relative health of one brand 
over another on the market. (U.S. Bureau of Economics 1985) In their annual report, the 
FTC took an optimistic perspective to meeting directly with cigarette companies, stating 
those meetings, “probably will result in closer cooperation of the cigarette industry with 
the Commission and a substantial decrease in the use of questionable advertising claims 
for cigarettes.” (U.S. Federal Trade Commission 1955) 
Uncertainty surrounding such health claims were compounded by the work of the 
Tobacco Industry Research Committee, founded in December 1953 after tobacco 
corporations began to notice scientific studies claiming that cigarettes caused cancer. In 
an effort to take control of the scientific narrative and public relations related to the 
health issues associated with cigarettes, 14 tobacco companies united to form the 
Tobacco Industry Research Committee. (Brandt 2007) The organization announced their 
mission in a 1954 “A Frank Statement To Cigarette Smokers,” stating that the companies 
believed their product to be safe for consumers and pledging financial assistance to 
research the health impacts of tobacco moderated by an “Advisory Board of scientists 
disinterested in the cigarette industry.” (Tobacco Industry Research Committee 1954)  
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However, that assurance of impartiality never materialized as industry-funded 
research used the perceived objectivity of the scientific process in order to manufacture 
controversy and uncertainty surrounding the health risks of cigarettes. Those studies 
casted doubt on the need for robust public health measures and served to reify the risks 
each individual assumed when they chose to smoke, rather than addressing corporation’s 
responsibilities to the health of their consumers. (Brandt 2012) The need to establish that 
individual risk occurred at an opportune time, as the industry faced its first substantive 
lawsuit over a consumer’s death later that same year. The effort allowed the industry to 
shape the scientific evidence being released about tobacco’s health impacts and spin their 
public identity as an industry concerned with the health of its consumers. (Staros 2008) 
The Tobacco Industry Research Committee’s motives for founding the 
organization proved prescient when shortly thereafter the Surgeon General began to 
research the risk of cancer posed by smoking. The Surgeon General was the first federal 
official to identify cigarettes as cancer causing, an endeavor that began in June 1956 
when Surgeon General Leroy E. Burney formed a coalition to examine the scientific 
findings on cigarette smoke and cancer. Burney brought together interest groups such as 
the American Heart Association, the American Cancer Society, the National Cancer 
Institute, and the National Heart Institute to comb through 16 published health studies 
across 5 countries to determine if smoking caused cancer. A year later, on June 12, 1957, 
Burney served as the first federal official to declare that causative link in a statement: 
“The Public Health Service feels the weight of the evidence is increasingly pointing in 
one direction: that excessive smoking is one of the causative factors in lung cancer.” 
(U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1964) Two years later, a subsequent 
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publication to the Journal of the American Medical Association strengthened that 
statement and identified smoking as the “principal etiological factor in the increased 
incidence of lung cancer” with a recommendation to quit smoking, as non-smokers had a 
much lower risk of developing lung cancer. (Burney 1959)  
In 1960 the FTC followed up on their advertising ban on unsubstantiated health 
claims in tobacco ads, meeting with tobacco companies to discuss a voluntary ban on 
advertising claims comparing the effectiveness of cigarette filters. Those scientific claims 
were largely unsubstantiated and used to market one brand of cigarettes as more health 
conscious than others, contentious claims difficult to scientifically verify. (Brandt 2007) 
Tobacco executives across multiple companies agreed to a voluntary ban of those claims 
in advertising, while maintaining that the negative health impacts of tobacco remained 
unproven. While the FTC and others initially considered that concession to be a success 
of federal pressure on the tobacco industry, it had the troubling effect of also doing away 
with the FTC monitoring a public discussion of nicotine, tar, and additives in cigarettes. 
As companies agreed to halt even peripheral or implied health claims in advertising, they 
also withheld those metrics regarding ingredients and composition of cigarettes, a 
successful strategy in the ongoing efforts of the tobacco industry to manufacture 
scientific uncertainty surrounding its product. (Brandt 2007) 
Following the FTC discussion of cigarettes and health, the American Lung 
Association and the American Heart Association urged President John F. Kennedy to 
further investigate the scientific evidence for cigarette smoke causing lung cancer. In 
1961, Kennedy charged then Surgeon General Luther Terry with the task of expanding 
upon Surgeon General Burney’s previous inquiries to determine the full health impact of 
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cigarette smoking. Although most non-industry funded science had already arrived at the 
conclusion that cigarette smoking caused cancer, industry-funded studies still impeded 
robust government action on the matter. To bolster those initial claims and insulate the 
Surgeon General’s conclusions and policy recommendations from industry criticism, 
Terry developed what Brandt calls “procedural science,” a robust, objective, and 
transparent method of inquiry. (Brandt 2007) Terry accomplished that by querying 
evidence-based medicine in a manner whereby the process of arriving at the final results 
was done so in a way that could not be construed as being vested in the financial interests 
of the tobacco corporations. To do so, he chose representatives from across disciplines 
and institutions not associated with the tobacco industry, and spent years allowing those 
respective experts to examine the evidence for cigarette’s carcinogenicity. 
The experts, about half of whom were smokers, examined all epidemiological, 
laboratory animal models, and histological evidence, and concluded that cigarette smoke 
caused cancer. While many scholars cite the transparency and thoroughness of the 
process as a means of acquiring the best scientific evidence for a legislative decision, 
historian Robert Proctor claims that scientists by and large had already reached the 
conclusion that cigarettes caused cancer. (Proctor 2011) He argues instead that such 
procedural science had less of an impact on reaching scientific consensus than it did 
arriving at an administrative consensus on a politically contentious topic in order to 
justify federal intervention. The procedural science techniques developed by Terry and 
the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General went on  to serve as a model for how 
subsequent government-run scientific endeavors were conducted, both within tobacco 
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research (over 30 more smoking studies following a similar protocol in its wake) and in 
other contentious public health arenas.  
The result of those exhaustive studies culminated in the 1964 report “Smoking 
and Health: Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the United 
States.” The authors determined that seventy percent of smokers died earlier than non-
smokers; that smoking increased the risk of bronchitis, emphysema, and heart disease; 
that there was a causative relationship between lung cancer and smoking; and that 
smoking during pregnancy was correlated with underweight infants. (U.S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare 1964) The conclusion of the report recommended that the 
FTC require warning labels on cigarette advertisements and packages of cigarettes. In 
March 1964, the FTC held hearings to address the issue of both labeling cigarette packs 
and requiring cigarette advertising to carry the label: “Caution: Cigarette smoking is 
dangerous to health and may cause death from cancer and other disease.” After a very 
short period to solicit public comment on the proposed legislation, the FTC passed the 
requirement on January 1, 1965. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1989) 
Upon hearing of the FTC’s decision to require labeling on both cigarette packs 
and advertising, the tobacco corporations began courting congressmen in their districts to 
bring forward legislation that would precede that of the FTC. Brandt describes the move 
as an, “unprecedented attack on the federal regulatory structure of consumer protection.” 
(Brandt 2007) Congress mobilized in response to industry pressure and passed the 
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 a mere seven months later in 
July 27, 1965. The act superseded the requirements of the FTC and changed the label 
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language to express a degree of scientific uncertainty: “Caution: Cigarette smoking may 
be hazardous to your health” (emphasis added). 
 The congressional act further weakened the FTC’s original proposal by not 
requiring warning labels be displayed on advertisements, and prohibited government 
intervention in cigarette advertising for a period of four years until July 1, 1969. The Act 
also required that the Surgeon General present annual reports on the health issues 
associated with smoking to Congress beginning in 1967, including any public health 
recommendations based on the changing research. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act of 1965, went into effect on January 1, 1966, and demonstrated the 
power of a private interest like the tobacco companies to influence national-scale 
legislation, going so far as to censure the FTC for its attempts at regulation trends. 
At the time, government agencies and industry still advocated for research into 
cigarettes for the purpose of creating a safer cigarette. The government’s Tobacco 
Working Group was tasked with that responsibility, researching the components of 
cigarettes to discover which ingredients were unsafe. (Staros 2008) The group arose as a 
result of a 1967 task force created by President Lyndon Johnson to investigate lung 
cancer. The task force created a subcommittee, the Less Hazardous Cigarette Working 
Group in 1968, later renaming it the Tobacco Working Group. Housed in the National 
Cancer Institute, the Tobacco Working Group routinely collaborated with industry-
funded scientists of the Tobacco Research Institute under the direction of their chairman 
Gio Batta Gori, Deputy Director of the National Cancer Institute’s Division of Cancer 
Cause and Prevention. (Gori and Lynch 1978) The group routinely assayed cigarette 
components with the goal of creating a safer cigarette, which remained a high priority 
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until 1978 when that group abandoned that research priority, and soon after the Tobacco 
Working Group disbanded, the chairman forced to resign at the request of his superiors. 
(Staros 2008)  
Smoking rates held steady in the wake of labeling, but cigarette consumption 
levels began to drop as anti-smoking public service announcements flooded the airwaves 
in an effort to discourage smoking rather than craft a “safer cigarette.” The man who 
spurred such action was John Banzhaf, who formed ASH (Action on Smoking and 
Health) in 1967 a grassroots anti-tobacco association. Banzhaf petitioned the Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC) to honor the tenets of the Fairness Doctrine with 
respect to anti-tobacco advertisements, which would run counter to the $227 million 
dollars of tobacco advertising appearing on television and the radio. (Bayer and Colgrove 
2004) The fairness doctrine required that a plurality of viewpoints be expressed for 
controversial issues in an honest and equitable manner, and six months following 
Benzhaf’s application, the FCC granted free time for anti-tobacco advertisements on 
FCC-licensed radio and television channels in June 1967. The tobacco industry appealed, 
and in 1968 the case was decided in the District of Columbia US Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which reinforced the FCC’s jurisdiction to apply the fairness doctrine for anti-
tobacco public service announcements. (Banzhaf v. FCC 1968)  
Three months following the court ruling, the FCC banned all radio and television 
advertisements with the passage of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. 
Although contentious, the tobacco industry supported such an initiative as it eliminated 
the free advertising for anti-tobacco public service announcements. The Act also 
strengthened the language of the health warning label to insert the authority of the 
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Surgeon General: “Warning: The Surgeon General has determined that cigarette smoking 
is dangerous to your health.” As ads dropped from radio and air waves, the number of ads 
in magazines and newspapers increased 400 percent, and the decrease in smoking which 
resulted from the anti-tobacco PSAs ceased. (Bayer and Colgrove 2004)  
In 1969 the Surgeon General published their annual report on the health risks of 
smoking, and turned to the risks to prenatal development for the first time, with an entire 
chapter devoted to the current state of the science. Whereas previous Surgeon General’s 
reports had reported low maternal birth weights or prematurity—if they reported anything 
at all about smoking and pregnancy—the 1969 report referenced epidemiological and 
experimental studies. The findings reported a statistically significant increase in 
spontaneous abortion, stillbirth, and neonatal death among women who smoked during 
pregnancy. (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1969) While scientists 
had been examining the correlation for years, the procedural science technique pioneered 
by the Surgeon General’s office helped to define a causative relationship instead of just 
correlations in the data. 
Beginning in the 1970s, the influence of anti-tobacco activists turned from large-
scale federal reform to more local regulation, particularly surrounding smoking bans due 
to the risk of second-hand cigarette smoke to the non-smoker. In 1971 Surgeon General 
Jesse L. Steinfeld addressed the Interagency Council on  Smoking and Health and began 
that line of investigation stating that, “Nonsmokers have as much right to clean air and 
wholesome air as smokers have to their so-called right to smoke, which I would redefine 
as a ‘right to pollute’.” (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2014) That 
increasingly included smoking by pregnant women and the risk to prenatal development, 
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and the Surgeon General continued to examine the causative relationship between 
smoking and poor birth outcomes in the next two annual reports. The reports in 1971 and 
1972 mirrored the information presenting in the 1969 report. (U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare 1971) (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1972) 
However, by the 1973 report, the research expanded from short chapters to a 54-page 
discussion of cigarette smoke’s impact on birth weight, fetal and infant mortality, sex 
ratio, congenital malformations, lactation, and preeclampsia. (U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare 1973) The chapter was selectively republished in the 1976 report, 
which served as a reference manual aggregating the best available scientific information. 
(U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1976) 
By the late 1970s, the federal government began to focus heavily on the specific 
risks to women who smoke, instead of generalizing the data collected from men. In the 
following year, the 1977-1978 report that resulted in the Surgeon General recommending 
warning labels appear on oral contraception for sale warning of the cardiovascular risks 
of smoking while taking the drug. (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
1979a) The report also makes the first mention of requiring specific public health 
measures geared toward women who smoke, stating that “A dose-response relationship 
exists between smoking and the incidence of low birth weight, preterm delivery, perinatal 
mortality, abruptio placentae, placenta previa, bleeding during pregnancy, and prolonged 
and premature rupture of the membranes,” but that 40 percent of women remained 
unaware of those risks. 
That same year, the Surgeon General, acting with the 12 other agencies of the US 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, published a 15 year anniversary report 
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following the original 1964 report that aggregated information surrounding public health 
information missing from the original report. In particular, it addressed concerns specific 
to a particular demographic, making clear not only that “Women who smoke like men, 
die like men who smoke,” but also that women who smoke place their pregnancies at risk 
of increased morbidity and mortality. (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare 1979b) The chapter dealing with pregnancy used the same procedural science 
framework as the original 1964 report, citing in excess of 200 medical studies to review 
the most current scientific understanding of how cigarettes impacted pregnancy and 
prenatal development. (Oaks 2001) 
The public health impacts of women smoking took prominence the next year, in 
“Health Consequences of Smoking for Women: A Report of the Surgeon General.” 
Following the 15 year retrospective, the Surgeon General began to focus on one specific 
public health smoking concern in each subsequent year, beginning with the risks posed to 
one of the most vulnerable populations, the pregnant woman and her developing fetus. 
Described in the foreword as “one of the most alarming in the series” of annual reports, 
the publication described the health risks in indisputable terms: “cigarette smoking is a 
major threat to the outcome of pregnancy and well-being of the newborn baby.” (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 1980) The authors reported that smokers 
birthed infants that weighed 200 grams less on average than comparable non-smokers, a 
trend that existed in spite of potentially conflicting demographic, economic, and life 
history differences. The authors also reported the most dramatic growth restrictions in 
chest and head circumference, suggesting possible long-term cognitive and behavioral 
impacts based on smaller brain size. Placental size was reported much larger than average 
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and its function as a fetal support system was reported as compromised, leading to a 
variety of life-threatening conditions to both the pregnant woman and developing fetus. 
The authors also reported a higher number of deaths among fetuses, neonates, and infants 
of women who smoked during pregnancy compared to nonsmokers, with an increase in 
“sudden infant death syndrome” and long-term morbidity for children. From what they 
observed across medical studies, those health issues existed in a dose-response 
relationship, whereby the more a woman smoked during pregnancy, the worse an effect it 
had on prenatal development. Despite that preponderance of evidence, Surgeon General 
Julius B. Richmond still took a position of education and individual accountability on the 
issue, stating that, “Each individual woman must make her own decision about this 
significant health issue.” (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1980) 
As the late 1970s ushered in a robust analysis of the risks of cigarette smoking to 
special populations like the pregnant woman, the government also ended its attempts at 
advocating for a safer cigarette. The Tobacco Working Group disbanded in 1978 and 
Gori from the National Cancer Institute published the group’s final report to the Journal 
of the American Medical Association. In the report he claimed that while they had not 
discovered a safer cigarette, they had identified the level of smoke inhalation for six toxic 
chemicals below which there were no observable health problems. (Gori and Lynch 
1978) The claim that some low tar cigarettes could be considered “tolerable” to health 
generated political uproar within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Gori 
soon found himself all but pushed out of his position in the National Cancer Institute, 
unable to secure funding or administrative approval for his work. He resigned shortly 
thereafter to serve as a consultant for a research institute funded by tobacco companies, 
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and later continued the tradition of obfuscating scientific consensus surrounding issues of 
tobacco’s risk by publishing reports against the risks of second hand smoke, including 
Passive Smoke: The EPA’s Betrayal of Science and Policy. (Gori and Luik 1999)  
That disapproval of Gori’s agenda can be traced all the way up to Secretary 
Joseph Califano, the top administrator within the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare. Califano disapproved of discovering a safer way to smoke a cancer-causing 
substance, and instead favored efforts to reduce the number of people who smoked. 
(Staros 2008) Califano sought to increase taxes on cigarettes, ban smoking in airplanes, 
and increase the research allocations of the public health service from $1 million to $6 
million to examining techniques to discourage smoking and to treat smoking as a chronic 
disease. An ex-smoker, Califano called smoking “slow motion suicide,” a position 
echoed by the newly appointed Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, who stated that “there 
is no benefit; cigarette smoking is all risk.” (New York Times 1978) (Fairchild and 
Colgrove 2004) 
Government agencies shifted their public health approaches from educating the 
individual smoker on risks to actively discouraging their choice to smoke, and Congress 
followed suit. Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts presented the first 
piece of legislation that adhered to that agenda, the Smoking Deterrence Act of 1978. The 
proposed bill died in committee but attempted to establish smoke-free federal facilities 
and require non-smoking signs. The bill also provided incentive for industry to develop 
safer cigarettes or face higher tax rates on their products, with lower tax rates for 
cigarettes with less tar and other levels of dangerous substances. (Staros 2008)  
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However, the federal discussion of how to regulate cigarettes tends to run 
secondary to the more successful grassroots efforts to organize at the local level and pass 
restrictions on the where individuals could legally smoke. In 1973, Arizona became the 
first state to enact restrictions on smoking in public places, followed closely by 
Minnesota’s Clean Indoor Air Act of 1975. (Brandt 2007) Those acts were outliers 
compared to the majority of pre-1980 non-smoking laws, which were established to 
protect workers and products from issues of flammability or contamination than from the 
toxic chemical in tobacco smoke. (Fielding 1986) While passionate and well-entrenched 
local advocacy networks began to organize and experience a degree of success with local 
and state ordinances addressing the public health risks of cigarette smoke, scientists 
began to coalesce around how tobacco smoke acts as a risk to non-smokers. 
That risk to others was established in the early 1980s with the first reports 
substantiating respiratory damage in nonsmokers chronically exposed to tobacco smoke. 
(White 1980) One particularly impactful researcher, Takeshi Hirayama of the Tokyo 
National Cancer Center Research Institute had been collecting data on the phenomenon 
since 1965. He examined whether the risk of lung cancer increased among the non-
smoking wives of heavy smokers, and published his results in 1981. He discovered a 90 
percent increased risk of developing cancer in non-smokers habitually exposed to tobacco 
smoke. (Hirayama 1981) The robustness of that study spurred federal-level research, and 
in 1981 the National Research Council also released a report that further bolstered the 
growing scientific consensus that passive smoke was a health hazard to nonsmokers. 
(National Research Council 1981) In this same time frame, smoking began to be referred 
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to as addictive, with the National Institute on Drug Abuse likening tobacco to the same 
feedback loops and addictive cravings experienced by drug users. 
Issues of smoking during pregnancy, the addictive nature of cigarettes, and the 
risk of cigarette smoke to non-smokers spurred federal agencies and Congress to revise 
the original warning label language on cigarettes to reflect the new risks. In 1981 
Democratic Representative Henry Arnold Waxman of California’s 24th District presented 
a bill to require more federal research into smoking risks and to modify the warning 
labels on cigarettes. (Brandt 2007) Different iterations of the bill continued to be shuffled 
between the two chambers of Congress as the object of hearings and continual 
modification until September 22, 1983, when Senator Waxman introduced 
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act (H.R. 3979), which was referred to the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce. A year later, in September 1984 the bill passed by 
voice votes in both the House and Senate with minimal amendments and President 
Ronald Reagan signed the bill into law on October 12, 1984. 
Provisions of the act became effective one year from the date of signing, and 
included increased research into the health risks of smoking and amended cigarette 
warning label language (Comprehensive Smoking Education Act 1984). The bill called 
for the creation of an agency to coordinate smoking research and led to the creation of the 
Interagency Committee on Smoking and Health that publishes reports to Congress on the 
issue. Additionally, four rotating warning labels were approved, all of which referenced 
the authority of the Surgeon General as the highest medical official in the country. Two 
of the labels specifically mentioned the risk to pregnancy, although the language still 
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included a modicum of doubt with the modifier “may” tempering the severity of the 
warning:  
“SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart 
Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy. 
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking by Pregnant Women May Result 
in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight. 
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon 
Monoxide. 
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces 
Serious Risks to Your Health.” (Comprehensive Smoking Education Act 1984) 
Concurrent with discussions of warning labels, Congress began to discuss the 
issue of raising excise taxes on cigarettes both to lower the federal budget deficit and 
possibly lower consumption levels, an increasing public health focus of the Surgeon 
General and Secretary of Health and Human Services. The 1982 decision to raise the 
excise tax from 8 to 16 cents a pack was made permanent in 1986. (Bayer and Colgrove 
2004) States responded in kind to the federal decision to raise cigarette taxes, and 
throughout the 1980s nineteen states elected to increase taxes by more than double. 
(Kagan and Nelson 2001) That trend increased even more in the 1990s with 38 states also 
choosing to raise taxes substantially on cigarettes, primarily through legislation and ballot 
initiatives.  
The public attitudes regarding cigarettes had changed drastically within the 20 
years since Congress’s initial warning label requirements, with smoking prevalence 
dropping from about fifty percent of the population to only 36 percent. (Kagan and 
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Nelson 2001) The anti-tobacco advocates had enacted dramatic change from the status 
quo, and by 1985 the American Medical Association set its goal for a “smoke-free 
America.” That goal was supported by the American Heart Association, the American 
Lung Association, and Surgeon General Koop who proposed a total ban on tobacco 
advertising and promotions. The efforts ultimately proved premature, however, and failed 
to garner political support. In the subsequent decade, the argument was reframed to target 
a ban on youth advertising, a measure that proved successful. In 1986, Surgeon General 
Koop also released a report on second hand smoking that placed the estimated number of 
deaths of nonsmokers at about 3,000 per year. (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 1986) That was followed by the National Academies of Science report on 
children of smokers who were dramatically more likely than those of nonsmoking 
households to contract pneumonia, bronchitis, and respiratory infections. (National 
Research Council 1986)  
Concurrent with those federal efforts, numerous grassroots activist organizations 
called GASPs (Groups Against Smoking Pollution) began to form. Those grassroots 
efforts helped to pressure government primarily at the local level to institute smoking 
bans, a move that avoided involving the state legislature which was more influenced by 
tobacco industry funding. By the end of the 1980s, the number of local smoking bans 
shifted from less than 100 to over 500, and affecting about 70 percent of the nation’s 
population. (Kagan and Nelson 2001) Additionally, over 41 states had enacted public 
smoking restrictions by 1986, and as of 1988 Congress had banned smoking on domestic 
flights less than two hours, a measure extended two years later to all flights less than six 
hours. (Bayer and Colgrove 2004) The social acceptability of smoking in public 
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dramatically dropped, and even without ordinances in place, a high level of voluntary 
compliance began. 
In response to the overwhelming scientific evidence about the damage 
nonsmokers can incur due to exposure, and the social shift in the acceptability of 
smoking, the tobacco industry founded the Center for Indoor Air Research in 1988. 
Although the stated goal was to examine the scientific evidence surrounding the negative 
health outcomes of exposure to tobacco smoke, just like the Tobacco Industry Research 
Council decades prior, the acting goal appeared to be undermining the preponderance of 
evidence and framing the debate as one of personal liberties rather than potential threats. 
(Bayer and Colgrove 2004) Despite Big Tobacco’s best efforts, by the end of the 80s, 
only 28 percent of the population smoked cigarettes, a number that dropped further 
throughout the years with only 16.8 percent of the population as of 2014. (Jamal et al. 
2015) And among pregnant women, between 10 and 12 percent report smoking in the last 
trimester of pregnancy according to the CDC’s Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring 
System. (Jones et al. 2009) (Ward et al. 2014) Coincidentally, the Centers for Disease 
Control reports similar numbers of women who drink during pregnancy, a statistic that 
tends to hold steady at ten percent. (Tan et al. 2015) 
Federal regulation of cigarettes served as an informative example for how 
government agencies, congress, industry, and activists approached the question of 
whether to require health labels on alcohol in response to fetal risk. However, more than 
a decade separated the initial passage of cigarette warning labels, and substantial federal 
inquiry into the impact of cigarette smoke on prenatal development. As such, legislative 
discussions surrounding cigarette warning labels to address risk to pregnancy occurred 
  45 
simultaneous with discussions of requiring alcohol health warning labels for the same 
purposes. In congressional hearings discussing the possibility of requiring health warning 
labels on alcohol, cigarettes were often cited as the model for how to enact such a 
measure, with both advocates and cynics citing aspects of the cigarette labeling narrative 
to support their position.  
 The alcohol industry learned from the example of cigarettes, particularly with 
regard to advertising, which was banned in the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 
1969 but remained prevalent with alcohol. The alcohol industry communicated with the 
FTC to create a self-regulating code of ethics in order to avoid congressional and agency 
interference. In 1985 the FTC received the “Omnibus Petition for Regulation of Unfair 
and Deceptive Alcoholic Beverage Advertising and Marketing Practices,” submitted by 
the Center for Science in the Public Interest along with 28 other co-sponsoring 
organizations. (U.S. Federal Trade Commission 1985) The organizations argued that 
while alcohol advertisements were not expressly deceptive, like cigarette ads with 
unproven health claims, the marketing campaigns were inherently deceptive in the 
manner in which they portrayed alcohol use. By portraying alcohol consumption in such 
a positive manner the ads sought to increase consumption and the potential for abuse. As 
such the authors of the petition recommended that the alcohol industry be banned from 
advertising in venues with young audiences, and required to display warning labels on 
advertisements and fund public service announcements warning about problem drinking. 
After reviewing the petition, the FTC denied its standing and dismissed the petition’s 
claims as not being based in facts, especially regarding the causal relationship marketing 
and alcohol abuse. Additionally, the FTC cited jurisdictional conflicts with the Bureau of 
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Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, which had been collaborating with alcohol industry 
since 1978 on an advertising code of ethics. Compared to the cigarette industry, alcohol 
has been incredibly successful in navigating FTC requirements in order to avoid official 
advertising censure. 
 Industry concern with researching the health of their product is similar in both 
cases as well, with inquiry into a safer cigarette sharing similarities with researchers 
seeking to find a “safe level” of drinking. Instead of the National Cancer Institute, the 
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) funded major 
investigations into safe levels of drinking. Similarly, the role of Gori as the primary 
official investigating those safe levels in cigarettes through the National Cancer Institute, 
and his subsequent dismissal and shift to pro-industry consulting parallels the 
administrative history of Morris Chafetz, first director of the NIAAA. Chafetz served as 
director from the inception of the NIAAA in 1971 until his resignation in 1975 under 
allegations that he had unduly influenced the institute’s grant review process. Following 
his resignation, Chafetz continued to be active in the area of alcohol policy and later 
advanced the pro-industry position of responsible drinking over abstinence, similar to 
Gori’s switch to a pro-industry position following his resignation. Chafetz also served on 
the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving as chair of the Education and Prevention 
Committee beginning in 1982 and described the recommendation to raise the minimum 
drinking age to 21 as “the single most regrettable decision of my entire professional 
career.” (Chafetz 2009) 
That focus on individual accountability is something highlighted in the discussion 
of cigarettes as well, when expert witnesses like Chafetz cast doubt on the need for 
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warning labels and efforts. The alcohol industry used that argument to insulate 
themselves from critics, suggesting that each individual assumed the known risks when 
they drank. That knowing acceptance of the risks, called contributory negligence in tort 
lawsuits, is what tobacco corporations argued across hundreds of lawsuits leading up to 
the Tobacco Master Settlement of 1998. In that settlement, tobacco companies were 
charged with $206 billion in the first 25 years for damages caused by their products. 
Those lawsuits leading up to that massive class action settlement are what motivated the 
alcohol industry to eventually accept warning label provisions in 1988, as the label 
clearly outlined the risks of consuming alcohol and helped to protect industry from legal 
challenges. The Tobacco Master Settlement also prompted the release of thousands of 
proprietary industry documents that illuminated the cigarette industry’s heavy hand in 
manipulating their products to be more addictive, and to obstruct public health efforts that 
would hurt sales. Some documents released in that settlement were from Miller Brewing 
Company, a holding of Phillip Morris which acquired the brewery in 1977. The 
documents hint that alcohol companies adopted a similar strategy to that of cigarette 
companies. They groomed underage individuals to become regular consumers and 
petitioning against warning labels as a stigma to the brand, although without a similar 
class action lawsuit details on the extent of such actions is impossible to determine. 
(Bond et al. 2009) (Bond et al. 2010) 
The role of activism in shifting the social and moral acceptability of cigarette and 
alcohol consumption, particularly when it impacts the well-being of others, also served as 
an important motivating factor in the passage of warning labels for each. Grassroots 
organizations such as GASPs helped to pass ordinances eliminating smoking in public 
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places shared with non-smokers, and served to turn smoking into a dramatically 
antisocial activity. The formation of MADD in 1980, by comparison, and their local 
chapters also shifted the acceptability of drinking and driving through powerful 
storytelling and organizing at the local level, which influenced national conversations. In 
both cases local level activism translated to federal legislation addressing the issues of a 
constituency that had re-conceptualized social mores surrounding the use of tobacco and 
alcohol. In the case of alcohol, the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving and the 
push toward a federal minimum age for alcohol consumption, combined with 
increasingly indisputable evidence surrounding the risks of fetal alcohol syndrome 
created a moral issue surrounding atypical drinking problems. That shift in what was 
considered socially acceptable in terms of cigarette and alcohol consumption led to the 
passage of comprehensive warning label legislation in both cases. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A SHORT HISTORY OF HOW THE UNITED STATES HAS DEFINED AND 
RESPONDED TO THE SOCIAL PROBLEM OF ALCOHOLISM 
 
This chapter will examine the history of social responses that arose as solutions to 
the problem of excessive drinking in the US, starting with colonial America and 
progressing through the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century. One of 
the first medical figures in the nation to examine the disease of drunkenness, colonial-era 
physician Benjamin Rush, identified in his writing many of the difficult decisions 
surrounding alcoholism that the US has grappled with for centuries. Is drunkenness a 
habitual compulsion, a weakness of will, a progressive disorder? Does all alcohol lead to 
the same symptoms when consumed in excess, is there a safe level of drinking, and can 
habitual excessive drinkers ever resume moderate drinking or must they remain 
abstinent? Can they be reformed through medical intervention alone, or are punitive legal 
and social measures required? And what responsibility do the community and 
government have to reform or punish those individuals?  
Many of the concerns voiced by Rush were later adopted by temperance 
organizations with varying social agendas and solutions for the problem of drunkenness, 
and many of their same concerns are echoed in modern public health discussions on the 
topic. Should groups focus on prevention or reform, embrace moral or medical solutions, 
or enact legislation to limit the sale of alcohol? Those questions remain relevant two 
centuries later as America defines and redefines what constitutes acceptable patterns of 
social drinking, what deviation from that norm looks like, and how to grapple with those 
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social transgressions. Because I am examining the changing identity of habitual drinking, 
the definitions of that behavior changed over time, from drunkenness to inebriety and 
alcoholism. Within each time period I discuss, I strive to remain current with the medical 
terminology used. 
This chapter traces the ebb and flow of America’s response to the risks posed by 
drinking, examining the medical, social, and moral movements that arose to address the 
public health risks presented by those who habitually drank to excess. The first part of 
this chapter, “From Prevention to Reform: Defining Drunkenness and Early Temperance 
Initiatives,” examines the early medical and social responses beginning with the colonial 
era through the Civil War. The discussion starts with colonial era America and Benjamin 
Rush’s medical contribution to the field, before progressing into an examination of early 
temperance societies. Those organizations such as the American Temperance Society and 
Washingtonian Temperance Society had dramatically different solutions for the same 
problem of drunkenness, whether to preach prevention or provide self-help groups for 
reform. 
The second part of this chapter, “When Reform Fails: Temperance Measures 
Post-Civil War and the Remedy of Prohibition,” examines the time period post-Civil War 
through Prohibition. From those early reform efforts new medical and social 
organizations arose with the focus of reforming the alcoholic, including the American 
Association for the Cure of Inebriety and the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union. 
Those medical and social efforts failed to create long-term, sustained reform among 
alcoholics, and as the social problems caused by habitual drinkers continued to amass, the 
issue-specific Anti-Saloon League arose. That group abdicated the arguments over the 
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morality and reform of alcoholics and instead focused on a legislative solution to 
inebriety. By helping teetotaling legislators into office, the solution of Prohibition arose 
as a means of addressing drunkenness in the population. 
The third section of this chapter, “Collective Amnesia: Repeal and the 
“Rediscovery” of Alcoholism as a Disease,” examines the medical and social responses 
that arose in the wake of Prohibition’s repeal. The federal government limited their 
involvement with alcohol to primarily trade and taxation, ceding social control of alcohol 
to the states. In the absence of strong national advocacy organizations with a mission of 
reform, the self-help group Alcoholics Anonymous arose and allowed its members to 
collectively define their experience with alcoholism. The Yale Center of Alcohol Studies 
also gained a following, becoming a national research hub for alcohol-related science and 
creating a robust discipline of study. Those medical researchers soon branched into the 
realm of advocacy with the creation of the National Committee for Education on 
Alcoholism, formed by the preeminent alcoholism researcher in the US and the first 
female to succeed in the Alcoholics Anonymous treatment program. That alignment of 
mission between medical and advocacy interests led to the reengagement of the federal 
government with alcoholism research and treatment in 1970. 
Such a robust historical understanding will enrich the chapters which follow and 
help to illuminate how we continue to repeat well-worn tropes in our response to the 
social problems that arise from alcoholism. The interplay between community health 
measures and organized medical interventions ebbed and flowed throughout history with 
one constant, a frustratingly low long-term success rate for reforming the alcoholic. 
Additionally, the groups that arose in response to alcohol-related social issues tended to 
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be well-populated by women exerting a socially acceptable form of political agency to 
better their communities. Engagement with such groups defined women’s relationship 
with alcohol early in the history of the US, creating an idealized stereotype of the mother 
and wife as a moral compass for the family and overlooking those who failed to adhere to 
such standards of temperance and domesticity. Those gender expectations of women 
generally excluded female alcoholics from early historical consideration, an historical 
trend that continued well into the twentieth century. That shifted with fetal alcohol 
syndrome, which increased female-centric research in alcoholism and the mechanism of 
how alcohol impacted fetal development, in order to craft appropriate public health 
policy to address the problem of women who drink during pregnancy. 
 
From Prevention to Reform: Defining Drunkenness and Early Temperance Initiatives 
While the medical definitions and community health responses have changed over 
time, the social response to “drunkards” in the US has existed since before its creation as 
a nation. The increased availability of hard alcohol “spirits” in the eighteenth century led 
much of that intemperance, rather than fermented beverages with lower alcohol content 
such as cider, beer, and wine. Early in America’s history, community leaders held a 
position of power in proscribing appropriate social behavior, particularly as early 
colonies existed in the tradition of religious reformation. Those early social views of how 
to address overindulgence of alcohol adhered to social class distinctions, and drunkenness 
was not considered a problem among the landed social class with the means of supporting 
such a habit. (Levine 1978) For the higher class drunkard, their indulgence was often 
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viewed as a love of excess to the point of drunkenness, rather than a weakness of will as 
in those without such economic privilege. 
The idea of weak men succumbing to spirits is addressed early in the writings of 
noted New England theologian, Jonathan Edwards, who uses the example of the drunkard 
in his 1754 Freedom of the Will. Edwards references the plight of the drunkard 
throughout the work stating that “Nothing is wanting but a will” in the case of why an 
individual would choose to drink. (Edwards 1754: 27) That example demonstrates the 
commonplace nature of overindulgence in alcohol prior even to the foundation of the 
United States as a nation. For habitual drunkards in Edwards’ time, those without the 
same safety net as their more moneyed counterparts, that decision to drink to excess was 
viewed as a personal, moral deviance without any biological or psychological impetus. 
One of the first Americans to integrate the biological and social aspects of heavy 
drinking was Benjamin Rush, early American physician, signer of the Declaration of 
Independence, and collaborator with some of the finest intellects in the newly formed 
democracy. Rush defined what constituted abnormal alcohol consumption in his 1784 
Effects of Ardent Spirits on the Human Body and Mind. (Rush 1790) He felt a deep 
personal drive to educate others of the health effects of alcohol consumption and to push 
for social control of hard spirits. (Katcher 1993) Rush discussed the effects of “spirits” 
(hard alcohol) on the physical and emotional constitution of early Americans, including 
how drinking resulted in a gradual production of symptoms over time, and the social 
impacts of drinking to excess. In the US, that professional recognition of alcohol as a 
causal agent, responsible for a variety of physical and social problems began with Rush 
and helped to inspire the first wave of temperance advocates in the following decades. 
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Many of Rush’s observations of the impact of drunkenness align with later 
biological descriptions of alcoholism. In the text, Rush lists a series of symptoms and 
conditions that arise from addiction to spirits that are quite similar to the symptoms 
observed by modern clinicians. (Rush 1790: 3-4) He cites nausea and tremors that 
dissipate when the patient resumes drinking in the morning, and makes note of the “small 
red flecks” across the drunkard’s cheeks that suggest the spidery burst capillaries that 
arise from sustained heavy drinking. Another common malady he elaborates on is dropsy, 
which he describes as a swelling in the lower limbs that then spreads, and could indicate 
edema of the limbs caused by cirrhosis of the liver. He also cites “obstruction of the 
liver” directly, which he references as causing inflammation, jaundice, and “dropsy of the 
belly,” which suggests abdominal distention caused by alcohol-induced pancreatitis. 
Rush also claims that spirits cause a variety of psychological and neurological conditions, 
including madness, palsy, apoplexy, and epilepsy, although he does not elaborate much 
on those conditions in the text. 
In transitioning to describing the social impacts, Rush takes the opinion that 
“spirituous liquors destroy more lives than the sword” and offers social and medical 
solutions to the problem of individuals losing their ability to moderate drinking habits. In 
describing the social conditions of drunkards, Rush calls the offspring born to those who 
indulge in spirits “half clad dirty children, without principles, morals, or manners.” (Rush 
1790: 4) Such a description mirrors that made by fellows of the British Royal College of 
Physicians in 1726 describing the behavior of children birthed to women in the throes of 
gin addiction in the 17th and 18th century, as alcohol was “too often the cause of weak, 
feeble and distempered children, who must be, instead of an advantage and strength, a 
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charge to their country.” (Royal College of Physicians 1987) Some scholars have pointed 
to this as evidence for fetal alcohol syndrome in medical texts, while others argue that 
such interpretation constitutes revisionist history. (Abel 2001) (Warner and Rosett 1975)  
Rush goes on to describe the poor moral faculty of the drunkard’s temper, 
veracity, and integrity, as “they fill our church yards with premature graves, they fill the 
Sheriff’s docket with executions, they crowd our jails,” and as such they should be 
publicly accountable for their actions through “some mark of publick (sic) infamy.” 
(Rush 1790: 5) To treat drunkenness, Rush suggests sudden and total abstinence from 
spirits (“taste not, handle not, touch not”), substituting cider, beer, wine, or vinegar with 
water as more appropriate. While an odd definition of abstinence compared to later 
teetotaling agendas, such a distinction does accurately reflects the ubiquity of alcohol use 
at the time and was a position that aligned with some early temperance advocates that 
focused more on abstaining from spirits. 
Rush continued to espouse his views on the cause and reformation of heavy 
drinkers and the appropriate medical remedies in subsequent treatises. He expanded his 
initial inquiry into a much longer four volume book, and in that 1805 publication he 
expands upon the physical and mental symptoms of drunkards, reiterates the progressive 
nature of the disease (“no man ever suddenly became a drunkard”), and recommends new 
medical and social interventions. (Rush 1805: 366) His social solutions included limiting 
the number of taverns in operation, more heavily taxing spirits, securing the property of 
habitual drunkards in a trust to protect their families, and publicly shaming or revoking 
the civil rights of unreformed drunkard. Beyond those social recommendations, he 
invokes a wide variety of physical treatment options to induce sobriety and reformation, 
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including corporal punishments from dunking inebriates in cold water to literally 
whipping sense into them.  
In one of his final publications before his death, Rush delves into the mental 
maladies that affect the heavy drinker, and calls for the formation of “sober houses” to 
help reform inebriates. Throughout Rush’s 1812 Medical Inquiries and Observations 
upon the Diseases of the Mind he advocates for more humane treatment of those with 
mental illness, including those addicted to alcohol. Within the text he calls for “the 
establishment of a hospital in every city and town in the United States, for the exclusive 
reception of hard drinkers,” as that group of individuals can be even more detrimental to 
society than “deranged patients” of mental institutes. (Rush 1812: 267) Rush firmly 
establishes the physician as the arbiter of drunkenness as a disease, by proposing the 
formation of a court consisting of a physician and civil magistrates to determine whether 
a drunkard should be committed. Physicians and alienists (early psychologists) adopted 
many of Rush’s suggestions in their creation of early hospitals to treat heavy drinkers, but 
Rush’s public persona and influence in the medical field also inspired organized 
responses to the social problem of alcohol abuse at the level of community health.  
One such individual, evangelical preacher Reverend Lyman Beecher, helped to 
establish the American Temperance Society in 1826, which aimed to prevent alcohol 
abuse rather than reform heavy drinkers. The Society organized at the local and state-
level to distribute literature and hold lectures on alcohol control, with Beecher delivering 
some of the most widely distributed speeches. In particular, his “Six Sermons of 
Intemperance” helped to establish the tone of community-level health initiatives in 
subsequent decades, characterizing the drunkard as corrupt in moral, spiritual, and a 
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physical sense. (Beecher 1827) In those sermons, Beecher outlines a similar set of 
physical maladies as Rush, echoing some of Rush’s well-known proclamations such as 
“taste not, handle not, touch not” and suggesting such a declaration be included as a 
warning label on alcohol for sale. (Beecher 1827: 40) Although Beecher agreed to an 
extent with Rush, his brand of abstinence was much different, relying on total abstinence 
rather than moderation with a focus on preventing drunkards from arising rather than 
reforming those already in the throes of addiction. 
Beecher’s characterization of the drunkard as a sick man, both spiritually and 
physically, found a sympathetic audience among rapidly industrialized urban population 
centers and as a result membership swelled for the American Temperance Society. In that 
setting, maintaining social order was integral to economic and community interests, as 
sober husbands led a strong working class and held stable families. In that respect, the 
focus shifted to alcohol as a moral evil leading to “sullen and disrespectful employees, 
runaway husbands, paupers, Sabbath breakers, brawlers and theatergoers,” all 
demographics that threatened social stability. (Hallberg 1988) To eliminate the social 
risks of alcohol, community-level health organizers through the American Temperance 
Society began to recruit members using an abstinence pledge.  
To become a member, the organization required individuals to sign a temperance 
pledge recognizing that intoxicating liquor was “hurtful to the social, civil, and religious 
interests of men” and that the signee intended to abstain from using or handling 
intoxicating liquor. Additionally, the pledge included language promoting the 
proselytizing of such community-health measures, to “discountenance the use of it 
[alcohol] throughout the community.” (American Temperance Society 1836: 12) Such 
  58 
recruitment measures worked well, and ten years after its formation, more than 6,000 
local branches of the American Temperance Society existed with membership ranking 
over a million strong. (American Temperance Society 1836: 270) 
The swelling rosters of the American Temperance Society owed much of their 
expansion to middle class women in the social sphere, who acted as moral representatives 
of the community. For both mothers and volunteers in community-reform measures, early 
temperance work represented a rare opportunity for women to use their stereotypical 
caregiving and nurturing aptitudes to expand beyond their domestic responsibilities and 
engage in acts of political importance. (Baker 1984) The women impacted by 
intemperance are featured almost exclusively in historical literature as pious and loyal 
spouses of drunkards, to the detriment of recording the narrative of women inebriates at 
the time. That silence speaks volumes about the ideal role of women in society, as a 
caregiver whose worth is defined by her value to her family and more broadly to creating 
and instilling values into the next generation of moral citizens that will comprise a 
productive society. In that respect, women who violated the sacred covenant of 
motherhood and domesticity by indulging in alcohol were stigmatized. They were 
particularly looked down upon by the growing contingent of female alcohol reformation 
workers who extended compassion toward male inebriates and scorn toward their female 
counterparts. (Hallberg 1988)  
Such a narrative is reflected in the public visibility of temperance ideals as 
entertainment, with over 100 temperance-related plays written in the nineteenth century 
expounding on the domestic melodrama of men succumbing to ardent spirits. Those plays 
ranged from simple morality tales to be performed in an amateur setting to elaborate 
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stage productions. And while the theatre was often characterized as lurid and frivolous by 
religious authorities, temperance plays quickly became the exception to the rule, as 
morality plays presented an allegory that reinforced appropriate social behavior. 
(McArthur 1989) Most of the plays capitalized on melodrama situated within the family 
dynamics of the time period, with wives fulfilling the role of the pious and pure family 
role model and the innocence of children often leading the male protagonists to embrace 
abstinence. The standard format of those plays further demonstrates the stereotypical 
everyman affected by alcohol, and the then prevalent notion that he needed moral and 
religious reformation—modeled by a pious wife—over medical assistance in order to 
abstain. 
However, the increasing moral focus of many community-level health initiatives 
did not exclude physicians from continuing to define abnormal alcohol use as a disease 
and pursue medical solutions to the problem. In 1830, the head of the Connecticut State 
Medical Society, Eli Todd, released a publication proposing the creation of inebriate 
asylums to take on the task of reforming and not just preventing or punishing drunks. 
(Todd et al. 1830) Another author of that paper was Samuel Woodward, the first 
superintendent of the Worcester State Hospital in Massachusetts. In 1938 Woodward 
continued to press for the creation of asylums with Essays on Asylums for Inebriates, in 
which he expounding upon the need for special institutions specifically to treat alcohol 
abuse as a disease of the mind. (Woodward 1838) Later in 1844, Joseph E. Turner 
continued the argument that inebriety was a disease, and began advocating for inebriate 
asylums to treat the malady. Two decades later Turner achieved that goal after years of 
advocacy when he became the superintendent for the New York State Inebriate Asylum 
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in 1864. (Lender and Martin 1987: 120) The medical focus of those early asylum options 
to treat drunkenness helped shift temperance groups from a focus purely on prevention to 
a more reform-driven response to the addressing the social problems of alcohol abuse. 
The need for reform soon manifested as the focus of the newly founded 
Washingtonian Temperance Society in 1840. Founded by six former drunkards sharing 
their experiences of reformation and recovery in a secular environment, the founders’ 
admission to former inebriety was remarkable. Before then such public declarations were 
uncommon, but a united and organized group of middle and upper class gentlemen 
admitting their weakness helped to remove the stigma surrounding inebriety. (Griffin 
2000) The Washington Temperance Society also helped to shift the popular temperance 
agenda from prevention to reform, and personal narratives from reformed drunkards 
helped to introduced loss of control as a rationale for why a man chose to habitually drink 
to excess. (Ajzenstadt and Burtch 1990) That mirrored some of the explanations being 
presented in the medical profession, and led to the formation of the Washingtonian 
Homes to treat inebriates that in some cases outlasted many branches of the 
Washingtonian Temperance Society, which dissolved less than a decade after its 
formation because of a fragmentation in the social advocacy mission and discord among 
leadership. (White 2001)  
The focus on reform instead of prevention motivated even more women to 
become involved in temperance movements. The roster of volunteers expanded from 
primarily women of the middle classes to working and lower middle class women more 
directly impacted by the social strain of inebriety, often the wives and daughters of 
reformed inebriates. “Martha Washingtonian” auxiliaries, comprised of women, formed 
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alongside male branches with the goal of providing material support for families 
impacted by inebriety. The auxiliaries also trained, inspired, and supported mothers to 
advocate for temperance as the bedrock of their family’s salvation. (Alexander 1988) 
Initially, joining the Society was as simple as signing a pledge of abstinence, although the 
material support provided by the group later required members to demonstrate good 
moral standing in order to be accepted, prioritizing assistance to demographics identified 
as more socially deserving. (Alexander 1988) An influential female presence in the 
temperance crusade, the Martha Washingtonian auxiliaries presented a foil to previous 
temperance efforts by freeing women from the confines of home life to advocate for a 
more widespread community-level health. However, all of the Washington Temperance 
Society groups soon experienced a gradual decline and by 1847 had practically 
disappeared. Although the ideas driving such a reformation society seeded a new round 
of temperance movements in the latter half of the 1800s following the Civil War. 
(Hallberg 1988) 
The success and eventual downfall of Washingtonian Era temperance occurred 
alongside a variety of other optimistic social experiments of the 1830s and 1840s, 
including abolition of slavery, women’s rights, and education reform. (Griffin 2000) 
However, with little agreement among professionals as to the best treatment for 
inebriation, and few asylums to absorb the population physicians had identified as in need 
of treatment, the ideals of reform and recovery remained out of reach. In the latter half of 
the twentieth century, that frustration at the community level with enacting lasting change 
in the behavior of the alcoholic shifted the efforts of temperance groups from medical 
reform and moral salvation to state-mandated abstinence. 
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When Reform Fails: Temperance Measures Post-Civil War and the Remedy of 
Prohibition 
In the Reconstruction period following the end of the Civil War, the institutional 
organization of the temperance movement renewed with vigor. Practitioners focused on 
the development of treatment and cures as much as theoretical identification of how such 
a compulsion emerges. Scholars continued to catalog the physiological and psychological 
symptoms of the disease and hinted at causes, identifying different types of alcohol abuse 
and appropriate interventions to manage what they viewed as an increasingly chronic 
condition. Inebriate asylums and reform homes were insufficient compared to the high 
demand for such services. In response to that demand, physicians and directors of 
inebriate homes met in 1870 to form the American Association for the Cure of Inebriety, 
whose name later changed to the American Association for the Study and Cure of 
Inebriety in 1888. (Weiner and White 2007) The organization published the biannual 
Journal of Inebriety beginning in 1876, under the tagline “the first and only journal 
devoted to spirt and drug neurosis.”  
The journal served as a means of carving out disciplinary space around the study 
of inebriety in the area of psychiatry, but the professional response to the venture was 
slow. Lower participation in researching inebriety owed to the moral stigma of the 
disorder many still believed arose from a lack of will. That led to disagreement about 
whether to use public funds for inebriate institutions staffed by psychologists, a 
profession that suffered already low public esteem among the medical professions. 
(Schneider 1978) Despite reservations, inebriate asylums that had tried and failed to gain 
traction in the first half of the nineteenth century experienced a boom, with over eleven 
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not-for-profit inebriate hospitals emerging by 1874 and over fifty in the US by the 1900s. 
However, treatment models could differ dramatically between institutions with some 
focusing more on punitive measures than reform. 
The mobilization of temperance groups at the community level also surged as 
many women joined progressive era reform initiatives, continuing their increased 
responsibilities outside of the home which had been required with husbands away at war. 
The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union is one such group, established in 1874 from 
earlier efforts in women’s anti-saloon crusades from 1873 to 1874 in Oxford, Ohio. 
(Stevenson 1907) After three months of grassroots mobilization, the group of women had 
successfully eradicated saloons and the sale of liquor in that community, inspiring 
women across the nation to followed suit. Housewives mobilized to host pray-ins at local 
saloons to stop the sale of alcohol, and temporarily succeeded in shutting down many 
establishments. From there, the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union organized to 
expand that agenda beyond praying outside saloons and petitioning for their shut down.  
The reforms advocated by the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union focused on 
their motto “For God and Home and Native Land,” and included as much in the way of 
proselytizing against intemperance as advancing feminist ideals of suffrage, child 
custody, child labor protections, establishing age of consent, and labor rights for women 
in sweatshops. (Donovan 1995) The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union placed 
blame on the will of the individual who chose to drink and required moral suasion and 
support from the female head of house as a model of temperate behavior and morality. 
Beyond that traditional approach the group extended such moral censure to the saloons 
and distributors profiting from social vice. The overlap between politics and the saloon 
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was also notable, as matters of politics were often discussed behind saloon doors and 
beyond the reach of respectable women, who instead asserted their social and political 
power by shuttering saloons in their communities.  
While the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union focused on the widespread 
decline in morality, they also advanced a feminist agenda as the largest women’s 
organization in the nation. In 1879, under the tenure of then President Frances Willard 
who was a noted feminist, the group expanded to take on new areas of reform outside of 
inebriety and vice, with the understanding that social change in one sector crossed over to 
influence reform in other areas. For instance, the push for temperance was viewed as 
influencing all sorts of social ills impacting those of low socioeconomic means and by 
addressing a broader cross-sector of those concerns it improved the family as a whole. 
(Gusfield 1955) Willard also began to push for more of a political presence in advocating 
for temperance reform and other progressive agendas. By 1894, the Woman’s Christian 
Temperance Union had almost forty departments and over half of those were dedicated to 
non-temperance issues. (Stevenson 1907) Temperance ideals still drove a good portion of 
the group’s efforts though, and they increasingly lobbied for Prohibition at the national 
level. 
The Anti-Saloon League, founded nationally in 1895, quickly eclipsed the more 
established Woman’s Christian Temperance Union to become the most influential 
Prohibition advocates of the early twentieth century. To put their political clout into 
perspective, the Anti-Saloon League spent millions to lobby for legislative action in 1919 
(not adjusted for inflation), and focused their efforts more on courting legislators with 
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anti-alcohol voting records than embracing a more varied moral agenda such as the 
Woman’s Christian Temperance Union. (Kerr 1985)  
As the name suggests, the Anti-Saloon League focused their resources on 
opposing the commercial sale of alcohol at the level of the drinking establishment, 
instead of preoccupying themselves with the morality of those who drank. That focus on 
commercial sales instead of personal choice regarding alcohol consumption allowed the 
League to find a way around the accusations of their agenda impinging on personal 
liberties. (Donovan 1995) To that end, they also did not require a pledge of total 
abstinence from their members. The Anti-Saloon League’s near exclusive focus on 
legislative action at both the state and federal level, using local and national resources, 
resulted in the election of “dry” politicians who worked to impact a teetotaling agenda. 
That push toward banning the sale of alcohol through legislative action was supported by 
many with a temperance-focused agenda because it had the same effect of limiting 
drinking and achieving their social and moral agenda. 
Toward the end of the century, research into the heredity of inebriety also peaked 
alongside eugenic solutions to the hereditable problem of alcoholism, to keep parental 
drunkenness from being inherited by the next generation. Medical discussions of 
eugenics and “germ poisons” entered the public sphere, casting intemperance as a public 
health concern because of the risk of alcohol-induced germ degeneration tainting the 
genetic stock of the US. (Courtwright 2005) Those ideas arose as Darwinian ideas 
infiltrated the social realm, creating hypotheses surrounding how some races were more 
susceptible to alcoholism than others through generations of breeding. (Pauly 1996) 
Studies began to proliferate surrounding the inheritance of criminality and vice across 
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generations of families, and those ideas rapidly shifted discussions surrounding alcohol 
abuse into the realm of eugenics, with prohibition as a solution for preventing the social 
disease of alcoholism.  
However, those social reactions also tended to focus primarily along a division in 
class, with higher and middle class individuals being diagnosed with psychological 
mania, where as a lower class inebriate would be considered “feeble minded” and more 
subject to eugenic reactions. (Valverde 1997) That divide is particularly notable among 
women, who at the higher levels of society enlisted in female-only treatment houses that 
more resembled countryside retreats than madhouses. For those without the same social 
polish and financial means, such as prostitutes and hereditary degenerates, the asylum 
experience greater resembled punitive incarceration than a reformative, restorative 
retreat. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, social support began to erode for medical 
reformation of the alcoholic because of poor long-term recovery numbers, leading social 
activists to advocate for prohibition as a means of ensuring abstinence. That critical mass 
of discontent shifted the discussion from searching for a cure to simply removing alcohol 
to prevent broader social ills. Frustration with medical and public health attempts to 
reform alcoholics helped drive such a dramatic shift. (White 2005) The study of alcohol 
prevention turned from personal reform to examine the broader issues of social reform, 
with the idea that abnormal alcohol use arises from a combination of poor social 
conditions and faulty heredity. (Ajzenstadt and Burtch 1990) The confluence of those two 
effects is evidenced by eugenic programs which surged in popularity following the 
“rediscovery” of classical Mendelian inheritance at the turn of the twentieth century. 
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(Henig 2001: 8) Increasingly, alcohol reform groups argued that intemperance and 
alcoholism were passed down through generations and constituted a form of “heritable 
idiocy” or “feeble-mindedness” that could be rectified through the use of eugenic 
principles. 
Evidence of such heritable degeneration was examined by psychologist Henry H. 
Goddard in his 1912 examination of the “Kallikak” family, an infamous case study in 
which he examined the genealogy and psychological defects of an anonymous family. 
(Goddard 1912) Some have suggested that the number of alcoholics reported and heavy 
habitual drinking by the family may be an expression of the executive functioning defects 
that characterize fetal alcohol syndrome. (Karp et al. 1995) Goddard sought to rectify the 
inheritance of such undesirable mental traits across generations through compulsory 
sterilization to cease what he described as a cycle of poverty, criminality, and feeble-
mindedness. Also in the same time period, medical professionals began to examine the 
results of alcohol’s impact on the germ line. Between 1910 and 1930, several researchers 
examined how alcohol impacted reproduction and development, and came to the 
conclusion that there was no measurable impact. (Pauly 1996) Their failure to see even a 
correlation reflects the trouble with turn of the century scientific protocol in designing 
multigenerational experiments, and also of an inherent gender bias. The researchers 
focused almost exclusively on how alcohol affected the paternal genetic contribution 
instead of the pregnant animal. 
The turn of the 20th century also represented a demographic shift in America from 
rural to urban, and the influx of immigrants was causing xenophobic and nationalistic 
political unrest. The existence of only a few state-sponsored social welfare systems and 
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financial problems among the urban poor were remedied by institutions like “tied 
houses,” which gained popularity with the immigrant working class. Owned directly by 
brewers and distillers, tied house offered perks like a free lunch to those that purchased 
alcohol, giving rise to the idiom, “there’s no such thing as a free lunch” based on the 
number of return customers. (Lawson 2008: 59) The number of individuals drinking was 
exacerbated by cultural affiliation with ethnic groups like the Germans or Irish, for which 
alcohol use was standard.  
In response, Progressive-era moral crusaders like the Woman’s Christian 
Temperance Union, American Temperance Society, and the Anti-Saloon League, seized 
on the idea of abstinence as a means of personal and societal betterment. Women 
leveraged the social acceptability of their involvement in community health work to 
progress even further into the political sphere, characterizing intemperance as a threat not 
only to the home, but to nationwide productivity and citizenship. (Hallberg 1988) 
Temperance proponents drew heavily upon the fields of science, law, and moral authority 
to justify their solution to the social ills of increased alcohol consumption. Claiming 
moral authority in a precipitous time, the “dry” movement lobbied for a prohibition on 
the sale of alcoholic beverages as a means of addressing the nefarious public conduct of 
inebriates. The ratification of the 18th Amendment on 16 January 1919 prohibited the 
sale, production, and transport of “intoxicating liquors,” but it was the separate passage of 
the Volstead Act later that year that contained the specifics of the arrangement. 
While Prohibition did not ban the consumption or possession of alcohol, in Great 
Depression America, the demand for alcohol was such that many entrepreneurs were 
drawn to the monetary incentives for breaking the newly passed laws. Prohibition’s 
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unintended effect was the strengthening of organized crime in the US. As alcohol sales 
ceased, career criminals raced to fill the power vacuum for alcohol control. The well-
organized, well-funded criminal organizations monopolized already meager federal 
resources during the Great Depression. (Jurkiewicz and Painter 2008) A government used 
to regulating the sale of alcohol instead needed to develop methods of trying to enforce 
the tenets of Prohibition and the Volstead Act, which proved functionally impossible.  
In light of the illegality of alcohol trafficking, bootlegging and speakeasy 
operations flourished, as organized crime ensured that alcohol deliveries remained 
constant. To illustrate the relationship between government regulation and private 
production, in 1921 95,933 illegal distilleries were shut down by the federal government, 
a number that had almost tripled to 282,122 by 1930. Speakeasies numbered more than 
500,000, and federal courts found themselves hopelessly overwhelmed by the burden of 
enforcing Prohibition. (Jurkiewicz and Painter 2008: 5)  
A notable exception to Prohibition was alcohol use for medicinal and religious 
purposes, which had the odd effect of making physicians alcohol distributors. Use of 
prescription alcohol was inexpensive, easily accessed, and recommended by medical 
professionals for a wide variety of ailments. In 1921, doctors wrote $40 million of 
whiskey prescriptions, a figure not adjusted for inflation. (Jurkiewicz and Painter 2008: 
5) As those numbers suggest, the medical profession was less than single-minded in 
enforcing temperance as a means of moral and social betterment. 
In effect Prohibition represented a failure to fully medicalize atypical drinking 
patterns, due to a wide variety of factors, among them the role of medicine in carving out 
addiction as a scientific field of study and treatment. Problems included the nascent 
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disciplinary authority of public health and medical groups, coupled with the punitive 
nature of the majority of inebriate asylums, and the confusing often contradictory medical 
ideas surrounding addiction and the agency of the alcoholic. As such, in the time period 
prior to WWI, disagreement existed about where to focus resources to best address the 
social problem of alcoholism. Should doctors focus on a single substance like ardent 
spirits or demon rum, incorporate drug addiction into the same framework, have different 
class and gender distinctions to the disease process, or focus more closely on heredity and 
degeneration? (Valverde 1997) Or were evangelical preachers closer to the truth in 
characterizing the alcoholic as a sinner capable of reformation only through salvation? In 
light of the plurality of opinions, the unwavering and familiar morality narrative of being 
framed by temperance workers gained the most support, shifting the focus from 
reformation of the alcoholic to the outward social harms inflicted on victims of the 
alcoholic’s behavior. 
 
Collective Amnesia: Repeal and the “Rediscovery” of Alcoholism as a Disease 
The Repeal of Prohibition by the 21st Amendment on 5 December 1933 ushered 
in an era of detachment and exhaustion at the prospects of regulating alcohol. Society 
seemed to collectively reverse course and disavow their former zealotry by enforcing a 
code of silence surrounding the social controls of alcohol. In reverting legislative control 
over alcohol to the states, the federal government washed its hands of a very expensive 
and unpopular decision, and seemed to regard Prohibition as an episode of madness. 
Indeed, not until 1970 would legislation regarding alcohol pass congressional muster, 
creating an almost 40 year vacuum at the federal level. In that time frame, medical and 
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scientific studies began to emerge that again began to characterize alcoholism as a 
disease that required medical intervention. Likewise, community health initiatives 
recalibrated their motivations with some such as the Anti-Saloon League all but 
disappearing, while others like the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union redirected 
their social efforts toward other endeavors that benefitted their constituents. 
Following Repeal, the federal government needed some sort of protocol for 
ensuring that the transfer of power between federal and state progressed in a smooth 
manner. Integral to that transition was the publication of Toward Liquor Control in 1933, 
a data-driven and scientific assessment of alcohol use that sought to provide a pragmatic 
approach to state-regulated alcohol by addressing it as a commodity but trying to limit 
potential alcohol abuse. (Fosdick and Scott 1933) Written by Raymond Fosdick and 
Albert Scott, and funded by philanthropist and teetotaler, John D. Rockefeller, the 
objectives of the report were asserted by Rockefeller to be twofold in nature: the 
“abolition of lawlessness” with a focus on how the state can continue to promote “self-
control and temperance” because “public standards as a basis for law can only be 
improved as private standards are improved.” (Fosdick and Scott 1933: 9) 
The publication ushered in an era of laissez faire federal regulation, as politicians 
and social scientists tried to distance themselves from the divisive “dry” and “wet” 
perspectives that exemplified contentious pre-Prohibition debates. Rather, the 
ambivalence regarding alcohol consumption was expressed by the authors of the book-
length treatise, which characterized pre-Prohibition debates as relying too heavily on an 
appeal to emotion. Toward Liquor Control sought to examine the goal of alcohol reform 
from the objective, non-ideological perspectives of science and social statistics. After 
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interviewing experts across a wide range of fields including judicial, religious, 
bureaucratic, journalism, industry, and local and federal law enforcement among others, 
the authors identified a variety of initiatives the majority wanted to pursue. Those 
included a return to more local control to better reflect the desires of the community, and 
an end to bootlegging, racketeering, and the poor social influences of tied houses on the 
community. (Diamond 2008) The report also identified the hope that brewers, vintners, 
and distillers would adopt a self-policing morality code that did not outright violate 
established social norms.  
The examination recommended that states implement a state-owned and operated 
monopoly system for hard liquor, and a three-tiered system to control the distribution and 
sale of alcoholic beverages. (Fosdick and Scott 1933) The three-tiered system was 
intended to ensure that wholesalers served as an intermediary between distillers and 
customers to avoid the possible reemergence of tied houses where distillers offered deep 
discounts on their product to entrench a customer base. Taxation, tariffs, and licensing 
processes were all discussed at great length in the treatise as well, although it was left to 
the states to determine how, or even if, states should permit and implement alcohol 
regulation. In addition to presenting an objective and dispassionate assessment of options 
related to alcohol regulation, Fosdick and Scott also counseled that it was alcoholism and 
not moderate alcohol consumption that should be the focus of alcohol research. (Daniels 
2008) 
The foundation of Alcoholics Anonymous in 1935 exemplified that spirit of 
apolitical involvement in alcohol-related issues by focusing on individual personal 
reformation and refusing to take a stance on any legislative or social controls. Such a 
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focus filled the gap in terms of individuals seeking personal help, destigmatized the title 
of alcoholic, and legitimized alcoholism as a medical concern. (White 2004) Alcoholics 
Anonymous and their guide for success in the program, The Big Book, represents a 
throwback to the testimonial-driven efforts of early reform groups like the Washington 
Temperance Society comprised of reformed drunks seeking to better themselves and 
teach others how as well. That focus speaks to the personal utility of defining a collective 
experience by creating the language to describe one’s illness as a personal struggle, 
which allows the alcoholic to define his or her own substance abuse relationship within 
the context of their own lives. 
Alcoholics Anonymous looked to both the future and the past in their approach to 
treating the disorder, integrating moral and biological frameworks. However, they do not 
characterize it in those terms, as one of their founding tenets is that “AA has no opinion 
on outside issues; hence the AA name ought never be drawn into public controversy.” 
(Kurtz 2002) Among the “Twelve Steps” converts must achieve in the program is the 
idea of repentance or “making amends” and releasing oneself to the guidance of a higher 
spiritual power. Likewise, the framework of the program emerged from the idea of 
biological addiction to alcohol, with alcoholics experiencing a loss of willpower over the 
desire to drink, and their members often describing themselves as afflicted with the 
disease of alcoholism. While Alcoholics Anonymous did not create or explicitly 
disseminate such a disease framework, their members were instrumental in spreading the 
idea of biological addiction and alcoholism as a disease into the public sphere.  
However, women who approached Alcoholics Anonymous for help reforming 
remained largely underserved and overlooked, just as they had throughout history. Those 
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women who found themselves addicted to alcohol had “failed” at womanhood, extending 
back to the well-entrenched cultural expectations of women as the nurturing, moral 
bedrock of the family, and few in Alcoholics Anonymous believed women capable of 
even completing the program. (Hallberg 1988) Indeed, Lil, the first woman who 
approached the founder of Alcoholics Anonymous, “Dr. Bob,” to solicit help with her 
drinking problem was described as unfeminine, coarse, profane, promiscuous, and the 
reason Dr. Bob was “leery of anything to do with women alcoholics for a long time 
thereafter.” (Hallberg 1988) Likewise, Florence’s story of recovery, “A Feminine 
Victory,” was cataloged in the 1938 version of The Big Book before being removed when 
Florence relapsed and died of complications from alcoholism two years later. (Brown and 
Brown 2005: 114) But when Marty Mann joined Alcoholics Anonymous in 1939, an 
articulate upper middle class woman of good breeding who had attended finishing school 
in Florence, Italy, her status and class helped to secure her position as the lauded “first” 
woman to complete the Alcoholics Anonymous program. Mann published her personal 
story of reform, “Women Suffer Too,” in the 1939 edition of The Big Book and used her 
position of authority from within the organization to reform how Alcoholics Anonymous 
served the women who approached the organization looking for help. 
That focus on heavy drinkers, or alcoholics, instead of moderate or light imbibers 
made the research less controversial and motivated a reengagement with alcohol research. 
During Prohibition, much of the alcohol research had evaporated in the face of a social 
solution of enforced abstinence as a cure for alcohol-related maladies. Alcoholism as a 
disease was nothing new, having been coined in 1849 by Magnus Huss, a Swedish 
physician who used the term to describe individuals in a near chronic state of intoxication 
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who had psychological and social impacts in additional to physiological damages. (White 
2004) Researchers further refined that definition of alcoholism in the subsequent century, 
and what arose in the mid-twentieth century demonstrates the rhetorical power of the 
classification of alcoholism. Separating a group of heavy drinkers and singling them out 
as suffering from a disease that erodes their willpower to not drink provided both the 
individual and society with an adequate vocabulary to describe the condition in a way 
that de-stigmatized the heavy drinker as a sick individual in need of treatment instead of a 
morally unsound reprobate.  
Work toward that eventual classification began with the reengagement of 
scientists in alcohol research, including the foundation of the Research Council on 
Problems of Alcohol following Repeal. With few federal, state, and philanthropic entities 
willing to fund alcohol studies post-Repeal, physicians and researchers had difficulty 
obtaining funds in the field and largely relied on teetotaling friendly philanthropists such 
as Rockefeller. (Schneider 1978) However, when the Research Council on Problems of 
Alcohol emerged from an alcohol interest group of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, they became a highly influential organization funding alcohol-
related research.  
The Council solidified that reputation after providing the funds to help court one 
of the most influential alcohol researchers in America to enter the field: Elvin Morton 
Jellinek. (Roizen 2000) They provided a grant to conduct a literature review examining 
the biological impact of alcohol on humans conducted by Jellinek, and helped to shift his 
research focus into the emergent, science-driven field of alcohol studies. (Schneider 
1978) With the initial monetary support of the Research Council, the nexus of alcohol 
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science soon shifted from the council’s New York City location to the Yale Center of 
Alcohol Studies in New Haven, Connecticut, where Jellinek worked to define the 
problem of alcoholism and devise solutions for the disorder. 
The Center of Alcohol Studies emerged from the Yale University Laboratory of 
Applied Physiology and Biodynamics, which was directed by Howard W. Haggard and 
researched the biological and physiological mechanisms of alcohol addiction. In 1941 
Jellinek accepted a position as Associate Professor of Applied Physiology at Yale, where 
he headed the Section on Alcohol Studies and helped Haggard with the new publication, 
Quarterly Journal on Studies of Alcohol. (Schneider 1978) The journal and the Center 
both sought to integrate evidence across a variety of fields of study, examining both 
physiology in addition to psychology and later social science to define how alcohol 
advanced as a disease and other risk factors of alcohol addiction. (Metlay 2010: 27)  
The journal did not shy from publishing content that argued for increased state- 
and federal-level oversight, however. That included a 1945 piece published that 
introduced a proposed Massachusetts alcohol warning label that arose from a 1943 
committee to investigate the problem of alcoholism and the role of warning labels for the 
purposes of education. That early proposed alcohol warning label read: “Directions for 
use: Use moderately and on successive days. Eat well while drinking, and if necessary, 
supplement food by vitamin tablets while drinking. Warning: if this beverage is indulged 
inconsistently and immoderately, it may cause intoxications (drunkenness), later 
neuralgia and paralysis (neuritis) and serious mental derangement such as delirium 
tremens and other curable and incurable mental diseases, as well as kidney and liver 
damage.” (Haggard 1945) 
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Under Jellinek’s direction, programs for practitioners and patients expanded in the 
Center to include a Summer Course on Alcohol Studies starting in 1943, and the Yale 
Plan Clinics in 1944. The summer course offered practitioners and researchers the 
opportunity to attend lectures and workshops at the Section on Alcohol Studies to learn 
the most recent information in scientific advancement being studied at the Center. While 
Yale Plan Clinics arose from a relationship with the Connecticut Prison Association to 
provide treatment to community members referred by courts or seeking support for a 
personal problem with alcohol, offering students the opportunity to put into practice the 
skills they had been learning and community members to access treatment options. 
(Haggard and Jellinek 1944) Both programs sought to advance the disease model of 
alcoholism and teach frameworks and skills that attendees could use in the future. 
Alongside those institutional courses and clinics, Jellinek joined Mann to found 
the National Committee for Education on Alcoholism in 1944, initially housed in 
Jellinek’s Section on Alcohol Studies. Charged with expanding the narrative of 
alcoholism as a disease, the National Committee for Education on Alcoholism crafted a 
national agenda for expanding public health efforts addressing alcoholism and relied on 
local branches of volunteers to broadly disseminate such positions. (Roizen 2004) Such a 
network also served as a means of reaching a broad audience of local supporters to solicit 
financial and moral support for the work being conducted with Yale’s alcohol research 
program. The organization exemplified the long term reform goals pursued by Mann, 
who as a reformed alcoholic herself, sought to influence the public’s understanding that 
the alcoholic is sick and deserving of treatment. The formation of that program, which 
would later become the highly respected alcoholism advocacy group, National Council 
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on Alcoholism in 1956, helped to cement necessary institutional frameworks for a future 
public health and legislative response to the problem of alcoholism.   
Scientific and institutional support for the disease concept began to gain traction 
and become the dominant paradigm for explaining heavy, sustained drinking through the 
mid-twentieth century. While the Public Health Service had alcoholism and alcohol 
addiction in their manual for coding illness since 1944 proper use of nomenclature moved 
to humanize the alcoholic. (Keller 1976) In 1956, the American Medical Association’s 
Committee on Alcoholism moved toward that destigmatization by passing a resolution 
which urged hospitals to accept alcoholics in need of treatment for their inebriety 
alongside regular patients. (Schneider 1978) Following that, a 1958 joint report was 
issued by the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association that 
suggested alcohol be treated as a medical problem of addiction rather than a criminal 
issue.  
Shortly thereafter, Jellinek published his highly influential work The Disease 
Process of Alcohol in 1960, a publication that defined the best practices for research up to 
that point and firmly established biological and physiological mechanisms as responsible 
for alcoholism. (Jellinek 1960) In the book, Jellinek begins by examining social factors in 
a cross-cultural perspective to demonstrate that in spite of differences in drinking patterns 
and acceptability of alcohol consumption, biological and physiological metrics to gauge 
the disease process remain consistent. He then moves on to establishing the different 
physiological and psychological factors required for a drinking problem to be considered 
alcoholism, establishing different types of alcoholism but only recognizing certain 
patterns at true alcoholism. In order to be considered alcoholism, Jellinek establishes that 
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the disease process and symptoms must progress to clear physiological dependence that 
consists of increased tolerance, changes at the level of cellular metabolism, withdrawal 
symptoms, insatiable cravings, loss of control, and marked psychological issues and 
behavioral changes. Those psychological and behavioral issues manifest as anxiety, 
frustration, inability to cope, intolerance, neurosis, and the rapid alleviation of that host of 
problems simply by taking a drink. 
 Jellinek’s assessment of alcoholism was a formative publication in the field and 
ushered in a host of new professional and paraprofessional programs addressing 
alcoholism as a condition to be treated, and alcoholics as sick men in need of treatment. 
Women, even with the influence of Mann in an advocacy capacity, continued to be 
largely overlooked in most treatment and research contexts. Until 1973, when fetal 
alcohol syndrome introduced the nation to a neglected population and created two distinct 
classes of patients in need of treatment and protection, women who drink and the fetuses 
they affect.
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CHAPTER 4 
REENGAGING WITH ALCOHOL AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL: ALCOHOLISM AS A 
DISEASE, FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME, AND FEMALE ALCOHOLICS 
 
The rise of federal public health efforts to treat alcoholism in the 1960s and 1970s 
built on the groundwork established in the mid-twentieth century, with medical and 
advocacy groups converging in their agreement that treatment and rehabilitation be made 
more accessible to the alcoholic. Branching out from the work being conducted at the 
Yale Center for Alcohol Studies by Elvin Morton Jellinek and associates, a growing field 
of professional treatment options emerged as society began to embrace the idea of 
alcoholism as a disease. Likewise, the prominence of Alcoholics Anonymous and the 
power of shared experience and personal narrative inspired a new wave of alcoholism 
advocacy organizations. Lobbyists pressured Congress and the federal government to 
craft legislation and public health programs that recognized alcoholism as a disease and 
the alcoholic as a sick individual worthy of treatment. At the federal level, medical and 
advocacy groups found themselves trying to change the collective consciousness of an 
America that had largely detached from the previous generation’s cultural obsession with 
social control of alcohol.  
However, within a decade of federal involvement the social concern with 
alcoholism and the victims of the alcoholic’s behavior had resulted in legislation 
addressing numerous problems that arose from the use of alcohol. Fetal alcohol syndrome 
(FAS) was the first among those social issues identified and addressed, and offered an 
opportunity for lawmakers and politicians to engage in arguments similar to those of the 
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teetotalers from the mid-nineteenth century. This chapter will examine how fetal alcohol 
syndrome motivated broad-reaching public health policies proposed to address the 
physical, social, and moral harms of alcohol consumption. 
The chapter begins with an examination of how alcohol research and advocacy 
missions aligned to petition the federal government for alcoholism research, training, and 
treatment support in “Research and Advocacy Align: Re-Establishing Federal 
Involvement with Alcoholism.” In the mid-1960s the federal government under President 
Lyndon B. Johnson began to discuss the problem of alcoholism and the appropriate 
federal response for the first time since Prohibition. As advocacy groups and medical 
organizations worked to erode the stigma surrounding alcoholism, reformed alcoholic 
Senator Harold E. Hughes acted as a figurehead for federal intervention and petitioned 
for the creation of a new organization to address the national problem of alcoholism. The 
passage of the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, 
and Rehabilitation Act of 1970 accomplished those goals by creating the National 
Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA). That organization marked the 
federal government’s reengagement with research and treatment surrounding issues of 
alcoholism, and soon transitioned to address the social harms of alcohol use. However, as 
those measures arose they prioritized the male experience over other affected groups such 
as women, minorities, the elderly, or youths. 
That began to change after the discovery of FAS made the female alcoholic 
visible in new ways, and introduced another population impacted by drinking, the fetus 
she carried. The second part of this chapter, “Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: Establishing a 
New Public Health Risk,” outlines the history of how physicians identified FAS in 1973 
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and reacted to the possibility that alcohol acted as a teratogen during development. The 
chance that alcohol could cause birth defects rapidly politicized the discussion 
surrounding appropriate federal and social control of alcoholism, with the third 
publication on the subject going so far as to recommend abortion to pregnant alcoholics. 
FAS also brought into question other victims of alcohol abuse, including those adversely 
impacted by drunk driving, youth drinking, and prescription drug interactions.  
While researchers were attempting to ascertain how alcohol impacted 
development and the extent of that damage among the population, the NIAAA was busy 
carving out disciplinary authority and trying to keep from being dissolved or absorbed by 
other federal organizations. “The NIAAA Carves Out Disciplinary Authority: 
Establishing a Federal Alcohol Agenda,” examines the early organizational history of the 
NIAAA as it fought for funding and navigated federal bureaucracy. Resignations and 
political turn-over plagued the agency, with a grant funding scandal causing the 
resignation of the first director Morris E. Chafetz, who promptly shifted to embrace a 
pro-industry perspective on many alcohol-related policy issues. 
The last section of this chapter, “The Pregnant Alcoholic: Expanding the Research 
Agenda to Include Women and Their Fetuses,” elaborates on how the discovery of FAS 
and the focus on female alcoholics both complicated and aided the NIAAA in 
establishing its importance as a federal public health organization. The push for alcohol 
warning labels to educate about the risk of FAS also began in this time period, and 
prompted heavy congressional involvement in the form of bills proposed and subsequent 
hearings to discuss the risks of FAS and the appropriate public health measures. After 
decades of work to remove the stigma of alcoholism and expand treatment options, FAS 
  83 
and the pregnant woman who drank redefined what constituted deviant social behavior 
surrounding alcohol, and reinvigorated the social concern with protecting the victims of 
the alcoholic’s behavior. 
 
Research and Advocacy Align: Re-Establishing Federal Involvement with Alcoholism  
Alcohol research and treatment continued to surge in the 1960s, a result of 
research and advocacy efforts to classify a group of individuals with the compulsion to 
drink as patients worthy and deserving of treatment. Jellinek’s highly influential work at 
the Yale Center on Alcohol Studies had cultivated and trained a growing number of 
professionals in the field of alcohol research and treatment. Simultaneously, the voice of 
the alcoholic also helped to define the need for social services, through advocacy efforts 
supported by the National Council on Alcoholism and the growing popularity of 
Alcoholics Anonymous. As the stigma surrounding alcoholism diminished, increasingly 
prominent public figures began to divulge their own problems with alcoholism, 
demonstrating that addiction cut across all socioeconomic boundaries and further 
normalizing the alcoholic. That combination of research and active patient involvement 
helped to establish alcoholism as a social problem in need of a federal public health 
solution. 
Research and advocacy interests found a sympathetic figure in then President 
Lyndon B. Johnson, who considered alcoholism a disease and brought federal awareness 
to the overwhelming need for treatment services. In keeping with those principles, in July 
of 1963 the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) held the first federal-
level conference to address the problem of alcoholism since Prohibition. (Schaffer 1965) 
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The National Conference on Alcoholism brought bureaucrats together with professionals 
from medical, judicial, correctional, psychiatric, and social welfare backgrounds to 
discuss the problem of alcoholism. Although no formal recommendations arose from the 
meeting, the panel agreed that too little was currently being done to address the problem 
and federal public health measures began to manifest. (Schaffer 1965) The Secretary of 
HEW, Anthony J. Celebrezze, formed the Committee on Alcoholism within HEW shortly 
thereafter to advocate for increased federal and state assistance to alcoholism treatment 
programs. (New York Times 1964) The committee supported several conferences 
surrounding vocational rehabilitation, drunk in public cases, and the legal issues specific 
to chronic alcoholics. 
Among those HEW-sponsored conferences, “Legal Issues in Alcoholism and 
Alcohol Usage,” did the most to help erase the social stigma surrounding alcoholism. 
Suggestions that arose from that meeting included a recommendation that the executive 
branch increase its involvement, and that the American Bar Association and American 
Medical Association release a joint missive urging those in medicine and law to act with 
fairness when dealing with alcoholics, both of which came to fruition. (Chayet 1965) 
Shortly thereafter President Johnson presented a “Special Message to the Congress on 
Domestic Health and Education,” in which he announced his intent to establish an 
alcoholism health advisory committee, a center for alcoholism research within the Public 
Health Service, and to advocate for increased public education efforts and assistance for 
local and state treatment options. In the speech he declared that, “The alcoholic suffers 
from a disease which will yield eventually to scientific research and adequate treatment.” 
(Johnson 1966: 243) Following that initiative, Johnson established by executive order an 
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advisory committee on alcoholism to counsel the Secretary of HEW. Political control of 
alcoholism had once again infiltrated the highest branches of government.  
With a firm disease concept and actionable treatment options for alcoholism on 
the rise, the American Civil Liberties Union began to search for a court case to argue for 
decriminalization of public drunkenness on the grounds that a person who is sick in 
public is not breaking the law. (Kurtz 2002) The legal argument was first tested with 
DeWitt Easter in 1965 and Joe Driver in 1966, both of whom had their convictions for 
public intoxication reversed upon appeal because both men were found to be 
involuntarily displaying symptoms of their disease, alcoholism, in public. (Easter v. 
District of Columbia 1966) (Driver v. Hinnant 1966) In 1968, the American Civil 
Liberties Union argued a similar case for Leroy Powell before the US Supreme Court, 
which in a 5 to 4 decision upheld his conviction because Powell was not homeless and 
therefore did not need to be drunk in public as a condition of his disease. But in doing so 
the US Supreme Court established the firm legislative precedent that alcohol was a 
disease and that the criminal justice system exists to punish acts, but not statuses such as 
disease states. (Powell v. Texas 1968) 
The legal decision was followed by the American Medical Association in 1967 
passing a resolution that clearly identified alcoholism as a disease and with President 
Johnson’s “Special Message to the Congress on Crime and Law Enforcement” in 1968. 
In that message, he identified alcoholism as one of the highest medical, legal, and 
economic priorities in the US. (Johnson 1968: 189) In the speech he called for the 
expansion of alcoholism research and treatment programs within HEW and advocated for 
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the creation of an Alcoholism Rehabilitation Act to help states address the need for 
reform and not just punishment among those afflicted.  
On October 15, 1969, President Johnson strengthened federal involvement in 
alcohol programs with “Alcoholic and Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Amendments of 
1968.” (Public Law 90-574) The legislation called for the foundation of alcoholism 
treatment facilities in an attempt to reform instead of punish the alcoholic, and included 
grant money for states to construct and staff specialized facilities to diagnose, treat, and 
rehabilitate alcoholics within their populations. In addition to construction grants, the 
legislation called for the creation of the National Center for Prevention and Control of 
Alcoholism within the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), which itself had 
separated from the National Institutes of Health in 1967. (Institute of Medicine 1991) The 
National Center for Prevention and Control of Alcoholism served primarily as a federal 
research institute, and doled out $6.4 million dollars in grants and fellowships by 1969 
for the purposes of research and training. (Stimmel 1983: 16) Although the Center 
represented the first government foray into funding federal alcohol control studies since 
Prohibition, the meager funding left much to be desired by advocates for alcoholism 
treatment programs. 
Congress continued to increase the visibility of alcoholism as a social problem, 
and in May of 1969 the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 
Ralph Yarborough (D-TX), created a Special Subcommittee on Alcoholism and 
Narcotics with the stipulation that little budget existed for the subcommittee’s operational 
costs. (Hewitt 1995) Yarborough was convinced to establish the committee at the urging 
of a very persistent junior senator, Harold E. Hughes (R-IA), who became the head of the 
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subcommittee and used his connections in the alcoholism advocacy realm to find 
volunteers willing to help operate the special subcommittee. (Hughes 1979: 278) Hughes, 
a reformed alcoholic, fervently advocated for expanded access to alcoholism treatment 
programs and broad educational reforms to destigmatize the condition.  
In its first act, the special subcommittee held a series of hearings on the 
“Examination of the Impact of Alcoholism” in July of 1969 to examine the current state 
of affairs surrounding alcohol treatment in the US and determine recommendations going 
forward. (U.S. Senate 1969) Hughes was very forthright about his former alcohol abuse 
problem, and sought other prominent figures in recovery to share their personal narratives 
in testimony before the subcommittee. He did encounter difficulty convincing others to 
go public with their problem as few were willing to chance the potential repercussions 
that might arise from such an admission. (Olson 2003) In the end, the subcommittee 
heard from several well-established reformed alcoholics and individuals in Alcoholics 
Anonymous and Al-Anon, the support group for family members of alcoholics.  
Hughes relied so heavily on instances of personal narrative from recovered 
alcoholics active in advocacy work during the hearings because his first stated goal was 
to “dramatize to the Congress and the public the magnitude and urgency” of the problem 
of alcoholism in the US. (U.S. Congress 1969: 2) Among those testifying were “Bill W.,” 
William Griffith Wilson, co-founder of Alcoholics Anonymous who testified under his 
AA moniker to honor the anonymity of the organization. Bill W. described Hughes’ work 
toward widespread federal alcoholism research as the “Big Twelfth Step,” alluding to the 
final step of AA’s program. (Olson 2003) Also on hand to testify was, Marty Mann, co-
founder of the National Committee on the Education of Alcoholism, later re-named the 
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National Council on Alcoholism. Mann had since abdicated her position in the 
organization to speak broadly at the federal level about alcoholism advocacy. She 
outlined her well-established advocacy position: alcoholism is a disease, alcoholics are 
sick, they can be treated, they are worthy of treatment, and the widespread social nature 
of the disease requires a widespread public health response.  
Hughes also sought to use the hearings as an opportunity to present new 
approaches to the problem and envision a federal-level response “not previously dreamed 
of by this government.” (U.S. Congress 1969: 2). To begin examining how to devise such 
a broad response, Hughes held 14 hearings across the US in the summer of 1969 to speak 
with individuals from different backgrounds and areas of expertise who agreed on one 
principle—alcoholism presented a major public health problem and something needed to 
be done to address it. (Hewitt 1995) 
Building on the momentum of those hearings, Hughes worked to draft and 
introduce the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and 
Rehabilitation Act, presenting it before the Senate on May 14, 1970. (Hughes 1979) 
Nicknamed the Hughes Act, the far reaching federal legislation established the 
foundation of the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) to be 
overseen by the Secretary of HEW, who would be advised by an newly established 
National Advisory Council on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. The NIAAA would be 
tasked with organizing an expanding federal agenda surrounding alcohol, and enacting 
provisions of the Act like broader federal assistance for states through formula grants, 
project grants, and contracts. The Hughes Act also mandated the creation of a treatment 
program for alcoholic federal civilian employees (non-civilians were already being 
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served by a military plan), and required that all hospitals receiving federal funds admit 
alcoholics “on the basis of medical need” without discrimination (P.L. 91-616: 1852).  
The Hughes Act passed the Senate by unanimous assent on August 10, and faced 
with the year-end deadline for congressional action and a packed House of 
Representatives docket, slight modifications were made to the legislation and an 
influential congressman fast-tracked the Act to a vote on December 15, 1970. (Hewitt 
1995) The congressionally approved federal alcohol legislation advanced to President 
Richard Nixon’s desk for approval, where it faced an unknown fate as rumors circulated 
that President Nixon intended to veto the Act. Nixon reportedly did not want to create the 
NIAAA, and more broadly was opposed to expanding programs within the National 
Institute for Mental Health where the nascent NIAAA would be housed. (Hewitt 1995) 
Despite his opposition, and with the urging of influential business men, President Nixon 
quietly signed the legislation into law December 31, 1970, without public fanfare or 
ceremony. Despite the relative quiet surrounding the passage of the act, alcoholism 
advocacy and research circles were abuzz with the return of broad-reaching federal 
oversight to public health measures surrounding alcoholism. 
Although the act had passed, implementation of the measures proved slow, 
leaving some wondering whether the Nixon administration planned to slowly smother the 
act by refusing to enact the requirements of the legislation. (Olson 2003) On March 3, 
1971, Senator Hughes held a hearing of the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics 
to inquire into the progress surrounding federal implementation of the act which carried 
his name. During a heated hearing, Hughes remained “convinced there must be some 
miscarriage of high executive intent.” (U.S. Senate 1971: 10) Among the Nixon 
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administration appointees called to testify was Morris E. Chafetz, who ran the then 
current iteration of federal alcohol grant management within the National Institute for 
Mental Health which had been established under President Johnson. At points during the 
testimony Chafetz and Hughes heatedly argued, with Hughes demonstrating open 
contempt for the administrator and questioning whether Chafetz was devoted to seeing an 
increase in federal alcohol funding. Years later, Hughes’ assistant Nancy Olson revealed 
that bit of statesmanship to be political theater that Chafetz and Hughes worked out ahead 
of time to stir the passions of those in attendance. (Olson 2003)  
That particular bit of fiction worked out well for Chafetz, as the NIAAA became 
an operational institute two months later with Chafetz at the helm as director. In one of 
his first acts as director, Chafetz organized the NIAAA’s First Annual Alcoholism 
Conference that attracted 300 attendees. That same month the government released the 
1972 fiscal year budget numbers for the NIAAA at $84.6 million, more than six times 
what Chafetz worked with in his first year as Director of the NIAAA, and 13 times what 
he worked with as former director of the National Center for Prevention and Control of 
Alcoholism. Alcoholism research, treatment, and prevention had once again achieved a 
substantial federal presence. 
With the establishment of the NIAAA, an institute devoted to coordinating federal 
funding and research on alcoholism, the problem of alcoholism took on new public 
prominence, and the social narrative surrounding appropriate alcohol use began to 
change. The “First Special Report to the US Congress on Alcohol & Health,” from the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare even garnered its own news conference, and 
made the front page of the New York Times presenting facts from the report, that alcohol 
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abuse “warps nine million lives” at the cost of 15 billion dollars a year. (Schmeck Jr. 
1972) Although it went largely unnoted in the media, the report also found that the 
demographic of heavy drinkers experiencing the fastest growth was women, particularly 
women drinking distilled spirits over beer and wine. (U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare 1971: 9, 12) The newly emboldened NIAAA used that press 
conference to help launch their $200,000 public service campaign to “encourage more 
responsible, controlled drinking patterns in healthier social contexts.” (Schmeck Jr. 1972) 
Concurrently, the NIAAA’s Clearinghouse for Alcohol Information began operation, 
responding to solicitations for information and disseminating educational materials 
throughout the country and fulfilling 900,000 requests for information in the first year of 
operation. (Olson 2003) 
 
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: Establishing a New Public Health Risk  
As alcoholism treatment programs became more established, physicians began to 
identify a new at risk demographic impacted by alcoholism, the pregnant woman and the 
fetus she carried. Called fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS), the birth defects that could result 
when pregnant women consume alcohol ushered in a whole new arena of research and 
public health response. Publication of possible birth defects arising from prenatal alcohol 
consumption arose in 1973, but had been hinted at in the literature since the late 1960s 
with different research groups examining independent aspects of fetal alcohol syndrome 
such as stunted growth and developmental delays. (Ulleland 1970) (Lemoine 1968) 
Scientists had also rigorously examined issues of reproductive fitness and alcohol among 
chicks, rats, and guinea pig litters between 1910 and the mid-1930s with mixed results. 
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(Pauly 1996) (Pearl 1917) (Stockard 1913, 1922) That line of research ended as the 
reflective lens of Prohibition gathered all the conflicting results among those scientists, 
and declared the association unsubstantiated. (Fosdick and Scott 1933) Those studies of 
the early twentieth century went largely unidentified, buried in history, reliant on dated 
scientific ideas, and tainted by eugenic justifications. 
The duo responsible for piecing together the causative relationship between 
alcohol and developmental defects, David Weyhe Smith and Kenneth Lyons Jones, 
practiced pediatrics at the University of Washington and specialized in an emergent field 
called dysmorphology. Coined by Smith, dysmorphology represented a field of study that 
focused on the identification and diagnosis of the underlying causes of birth defects and 
anomalies, bringing together the fields of pediatrics, embryology, and genetics to explain 
morphological deviations from the norm during development. (Smith 1968) In 1973, 
Smith and Jones were contacted by a physician at the University’s Harborview Medical 
Center to examine a group of eight children and try to determine the cause of their 
developmental delays. (Golden 2005) During their initial visit, Smith and Jones observed 
that four of the eight children shared similar growth deficiencies, abnormally small heads 
(a condition called microcephaly), and delays in cognitive development.  
The case histories of the affected infants cut across racial groups and therefore 
made a similar genetic anomaly unlikely, and the only environmental commonality was 
that each infant was born to an alcoholic mother. Two of those mothers were even 
hospitalized for delirium tremens and one gave birth in an “alcoholic stupor.”  (Jones et 
al. 1973) Smith and Jones suspected that alcohol may be the teratogen responsible for the 
developmental defects, even though medical evidence at the time did not fully support the 
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idea that alcohol acted directly on development. Instead, researchers tended to blame 
maternal nutritional defects and poor home environment for the type of “failure to thrive” 
that Smith and Jones observed in the cohort of children. 
In 1973, Smith and Jones consulted with colleagues and presented the collective 
evidence observed among those eight children in a publication to the British medical 
journal The Lancet titled, “Pattern of Malformation in Offspring of Chronic Alcoholic 
Mothers.” (Jones et al. 1973) The normal process of peer review and revision were 
waived or rushed by the journal, and the article was accepted for publication a week after 
being submitted. (Golden 2005: 4) The authors discussed morphological abnormalities, 
cognitive defects, and growth deficiencies affecting children whose mothers heavily 
consumed alcohol during pregnancy, citing a possible partial expression of symptoms in 
mothers who drank less during pregnancy.  
The medical community’s overwhelming response to the possibility of a link 
between alcohol consumption and pregnancy prompted Jones and Smith to publish a 
follow-up five months later. “Recognition of the Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in Early 
Infancy,” represents the first time the name of the syndrome appeared in press, and the 
article presented three new cases of possible FAS, including the results of one autopsy, 
and an historical survey of possible cases of birth defects caused by prenatal exposure to 
alcohol. (Jones and Smith 1973) However, instead of pointing to American ideas of how 
alcohol impacted reproductive capabilities, the authors focused on historical evidence 
from Roman and Greek mythology and British reactions to the Gin Epidemic in 18th 
century England. That appeal to deep history as a means of retrospectively examining 
potential evidence often appeared in early publications, presumably in an attempt to 
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figure out how the relationship between alcohol use by a pregnant women and birth 
defects had gone unclassified if not unnoticed for so long.  
Those two articles sparked a firestorm of activity in the medical community, with 
physicians writing in to medical journals both to present individual case studies of 
patients they suspected of having fetal alcohol effects, and to criticize the certainty of 
suggesting a causative relationship. (Ferrier et al. 1973) (Bianchine and Taylor 1974) 
(Tenbrinck and Buchin 1975) One year after the initial publication, Smith, Jones, and 
colleagues examined a repository that contained the health outcomes of pregnant women 
called the Collaborative Perinatal Project, which had previously been used to substantiate 
the teratogenicity of thalidomide. (Golden 2005: 7) Among the 55,000 women listed in 
the database, researchers had confirmed maternal alcohol use in the medical charts of 
only 23 alcoholics, speaking to how infrequently doctors even discussed the topic of 
alcohol use with their patients in the mid-twentieth century.  
Alcohol use was considered a substance benign to pregnancy and was not 
inquired about in the Collaborative Perinatal Project’s questionnaire, with researchers 
noting maternal alcohol use in the case of severe alcoholics. The authors published their 
findings in the paper, “Outcome in Offspring of Chronic Alcoholic Women,” published 
in The Lancet in 1974. Among those 23 women who drank during pregnancy, a 
significant correlation was noted between maternal alcohol consumption and perinatal 
mortality or severe birth defects. The article ended on the suggestion that chronic 
alcoholics should be counseled by practitioners as to whether the “magnitude of this risk” 
warranted “serious consideration be given to early termination of pregnancy in severe 
chronically alcoholic women.” (Jones et al. 1974) Such a suggestion echoed similar 
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themes exposed by proponents of eugenics a century prior, bringing into question the 
responsibilities of the pregnant woman to create the next generation of productive 
citizens and firmly situating FAS as a public concern at the intersection of medicine and 
society. 
Research related to prenatal birth defects as a result of exposure to alcohol had 
also been conducted in France in 1968, several years prior to Smith and Jones’ papers. 
Paul Lemoine examined 127 children from 69 French families with chronic alcoholism 
noted in at least one parent. The facial abnormalities described in the French study were 
similar to those noted by other researchers defining FAS, and a similar range of cognitive 
defects were also included that manifested as low IQ, hyperactivity, and developmental 
delays in motor coordination and language skills. (Lemoine et al. 1968) Despite its 
publication five years prior to the observations made by Smith and Jones in their series of 
three articles, Lemoine’s work went largely unrecognized in the US and medical 
communities abroad, even after the abstract was translated to English. 
Both Jones and Lemoine followed their initial cohorts into adulthood in order to 
ascertain the long-term effects of FAS, and corresponded at length in 1974 after learning 
of their convergent observations of alcohol-impacted birth defects. (Golden 2005: 6) 
Among the eleven original children examined by Jones and colleagues, four were 
severely mentally handicapped, and another four were moderately handicapped. 
(Streissguth et al. 1985) Of Lemoine’s original 127 children, 105 had been 
institutionalized as a result of psychological issues or mental handicaps. (Golden 2005: 8)  
The three articles published by researchers from the University of Washington to 
The Lancet, provided an initial correlation between maternal alcohol exposure and a host 
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of developmental abnormalities, while Lemoine’s independent corroboration of these 
results helped to substantiate the characteristics of FAS. Despite two dramatically 
different research groups arriving at the same conclusion, many in the medical 
community remained skeptical of the association between drinking during pregnancy 
causing a specific compendium of birth defects. 
A new era of alcohol control, that of broad-reaching public health policy to 
address mental, physical, and social harms of alcohol consumption began to subsume the 
agenda of medical and addiction treatment. While medical communities were publishing 
on the risks of drinking during pregnancy, the preoccupation with maternal responsibility 
toward a healthy pregnancy was latent in the early scientific source materials. Authors 
used “embryotoxins,” “acute fetal poisoning,” and “harsh intrauterine environment” to 
describe the womb, and while technical in nature the language chosen to describe 
women’s bodies passed clear moral judgment on those who drank during pregnancy. 
(Armstrong 1998) The same habit would be mirrored in the congressional hearings that 
identified FAS as a public health risk, adopted by various members of Congress and 
expert witnesses offering testimony on the best means of prevention and treatment for 
women who drink during pregnancy, and whether alcohol beverage labeling acted as a 
means of alerting the public to the potential risk. 
 
The NIAAA Carves Out Disciplinary Authority: Establishing a Federal Alcohol Agenda 
As scientists and physicians collected case studies and amassed scientific 
evidence toward establishing the symptoms of FAS, government agencies and Congress 
were largely just trying to keep the newly formed NIAAA functional. In the early 1970s 
  97 
the NIAAA faced an increasingly uncertain future in a Nixon administration that 
preferred to distance the federal government from providing alcoholism treatment 
services. The administration went so far as to propose the idea of dissolving the Health 
Services and Mental Health Administration, which housed the NIAAA, by allowing the 
funding provisions to expire. (Institute of Medicine 1991)  
However, Senator Hughes and other alcoholism treatment advocates doubled 
down on their investment in federal programs and instead increased the fiscal provisions 
for such services, much to the dismay of newly appointed Secretary of HEW, Caspar W. 
Weinberger. A lawyer by training, he had no formal experience in the health arena and 
instead sought to reorganize the department to cut spending, earning him the nickname 
“Cap the Knife.” (Kovach 1973) Although Congress determined appropriations for the 
NIAAA, the Nixon administration had essentially impounded the grant money for project 
grants in 1973, leaving over 115 federally approved project grant proposals unfunded. 
(Olson 2003)  
Several months later in September of 1973, Hughes held a Senate hearing to craft 
amendments to the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, 
Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act, using the opportunity to inquire into the executive 
block on approved congressional appropriations. The amendments passed and had the 
effect of releasing those $218 million of impounded funds to the NIAAA for fiscal year 
1974, and ensuring continued funds to the program. (Public Law 93-282) Despite 
substantial administrative opposition, Nixon even held a signing ceremony for the 
Amendments to the Hughes Act on May 14, 1974. 
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Concurrent with the uncertainty surrounding continued funding to the NIAAA, 
were attempts at administrative reorganization to consolidate programs, pushed by 
Secretary Weinberger. His Assistant Secretary, Charles Edwards, organized the Mental 
Health Task Force in 1973 to examine the institutional requirements for alcohol, drug, 
and mental health organizations at the federal level. The task force met with individuals 
within the existing trifecta of research institutes (National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 
Alcoholism, National Institute on Drug Abuse, and National Institute on Mental Health) 
and branching out to professionals outside of the government in order to determine how 
best to structure such organizations that balanced research and treatment. (Institute of 
Medicine 1991) Despite the administrative desire to combine the three institutes, the task 
force determined that an institutional presence at the federal level served the alcohol and 
drug institutes in helping to legitimize treatment and research into such conditions and 
continue to eliminate stigma. (Institute of Medicine 1991) 
Among the several restructuring solutions offered by the task force, the 
administration chose to create the Alcohol Drug Abuse and Mental Health 
Administration (ADAMHA) that would act as an administrative oversight body to three 
independent research institutes: the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 
the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and the National Institute on Mental Health. The 
controversy surrounding tenure of Secretary Weinberger continued after the formation of 
the ADAMHA, predictably related to issues with adequate funding. In an article 
published to The New York Times, prospective director of the new administration, Daniel 
Freedman, elaborated on his reasons for turning down the opportunity. He did not mince 
words in explaining his decision to decline the position, citing “cut-backs in health funds, 
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made with no understanding of the long-range effects of such cuts” that he saw as 
“producing ‘chaos’ in mental health research, training and services.” (Hicks 1974) 
Instead, James D. Isbister accepted the position as director of the ADAMHA, the former 
deputy director of the NIMH and acting administrator of the ADAMHA had no formal 
scientific training but extensive managerial experience and was formally appointed 
September 1974. (Lewis 1976b) The NIAAA had arrived on the federal stage as a wholly 
independent institute, but its future remained uncertain.  
Despite institutional uncertainty surrounding the NIAAA and organizational 
attempts to limit its operation, the agency continued to establish a federal research 
agenda. In June of 1974, the NIAAA released the Second Special Report to the US 
Congress on Alcohol & Health, which generated substantial public interest. The report 
was released in a press conference and the results were heavily covered by health and 
science journalists, with NIAAA officials and Director Chafetz traveling the country for 
about 100 days giving talks and holding press conferences to popularize the problem of 
alcoholism and the federal response. (Olson 2003) The publication also represents the 
first time a government agency addressed the fetal risk posed by maternal use of alcohol 
during pregnancy.  
In their section of the report addressing the problem of “Alcoholism: Heredity and 
Congenital Effects,” the authors also briefly discussed newly discovered fetal alcohol 
effects. In that section, they discussed whether alcoholism could be passed down through 
generations, at times sounding much like their temperance era predecessors concerned 
with the repercussions of demon rum on germ plasm. The authors cite as far back in 
history as Benjamin Rush, eighteenth century physician and the first to work toward a 
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medical understanding of alcoholism, noting that Rush observed the process of 
alcoholism as a condition that “resembles certain hereditary, family, and contagious 
diseases.” (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1974: 49). The authors 
also addressed the recent observations by physicians in the United States and Great 
Britain of alcoholic women birthing “maldeveloped or malformed infants,” although the 
authors remained uncertain as to whether the observed effects were caused by alcohol or 
a result of more traditionally understood causes such as “poor intrauterine environment” 
combined with malnutrition and poor prenatal care. (US. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare 1974: 49) The authors concluded with the recommendation that 
more work be conducted to discern the impact of maternal drinking on fetal development, 
and that working more closely with pregnant women could be a beneficial investment of 
resources for the NIAAA. 
As those sorts of widespread research and education initiatives continued to be 
enacted by the NIAAA, a series of resignations changed the shape of the organization. 
The administrative pressure on the NIAAA abated somewhat as President Nixon resigned 
on August 9, 1974, and Gerald Ford, Jr., was sworn in as the new Commander in Chief. 
Ford accepted Secretary Weinberger’s resignation shortly thereafter. (Ford 1975) 
Weinberger’s successor, F. David Matthews, was reported by administrative staff to be 
“far more open to suggestion and more interested in discussing options than his 
predecessor.” (Hicks 1975) That was followed in the spring of 1975 by the resignation of 
the NIAAA’s first director, Chafetz, in a move many viewed as a means of avoiding 
censure for improperly using federal tax dollars and demonstrating favoritism in the grant 
review process. (Anderson 1974) Three NIAAA officials including Chafetz had charged 
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the government for a trip to Palm Springs in order to visit an NIAAA contractor, Grey-
North Advertising. However, the contractor had already paid for the costs of the trip, and 
soon after received a multi-million dollar extension of their contract. Administrator of the 
ADAMHA, Jim Isbister, appointed John Deering as Acting Director of the NIAAA until 
Ernest P. Noble was chosen as the new head of the NIAAA in February of 1976. Noble 
faced the prospects of dramatically decreased funding through the Ford administration, at 
“a time of great flux—a point in the road where a wrong direction might signal the 
eclipse of a national effort just beginning to prove itself.” (Lewis 1976c) 
At the same time as that organizational turmoil, alcoholism advocacy lost their 
staunchest congressional supporter when Senator Hughes decided to step down from 
Congress to enter the seminary. (Hughes 1979) Senator William Hathaway (D-ME) 
replaced Hughes as the chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics 
fourteen months after Hughes’ resignation, and his appointment seemed odd to some 
advocates for federal alcoholism treatment programs. (Olson 2003) He initially failed to 
introduce the reauthorization bill to fund the Hughes Act, and early in his capacity as 
chair, he questioned the classification of alcoholism as a disease in public speeches, 
despite the NIAAA’s firm assertion to the contrary. (Lewis 1976a) However, while 
Hathaway faced a rocky start, he ended up defending the NIAAA from severe budget 
cuts proposed by the Ford administration, and expanded the topics addressed in 
subcommittee hearings to explore new realms of alcohol-related issues, including 
regulations on alcohol advertisements, the particular problems facing women alcoholics, 
and whether the risks of FAS required the adoption of alcohol beverage warning labels. 
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Those advocating for health warning labels to alert the public to the risk of FAS 
found a staunch ally in Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC). Thurmond was a lifelong 
teetotaler and long-standing advocate of health warning labels to educate the public to the 
dangers of alcohol. (Bass and Thompson 2006: 151) He first introduced warning label 
legislation in a bill before the Senate in 1969, and had continued to present independent 
labeling bills or amendments appended to virtually every health-related act that passed 
through the Senate, until the Alcohol Beverage Labeling Act of 1988 finally delivered on 
almost twenty years of dogged effort.  
In the early 1970s, Thurmond’s warning label bills focused primarily on the broad 
assessment that alcohol caused health problems, and he pushed primarily for labeling 
distilled spirits and other alcohol with greater than 24% alcohol by volume. The early 
label read, “Caution: Consumption of alcoholic beverages may be hazardous to your 
health and may be habit forming” (S.895, S. 356). He had not yet adopted the specific 
focus of warning pregnant women in his labeling initiatives, but that soon changed as the 
Senate began to discuss the experience of an historically overlooked group of alcoholics, 
women, and by proxy the fetal effects of alcohol consumption during pregnancy. 
 
The Pregnant Alcoholic: Expanding the Research Agenda to Include Women and the 
Fetuses They Endanger 
Five years after the passage of the Hughes Act, with alcoholism firmly established 
as a medical concern with expanding treatment options, research and advocacy began to 
depart from the standard white male alcoholic to make room for other life histories and 
demographics affected by alcoholism, such as the elderly, women, minorities, and youth 
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drinkers. By the mid-1970s, even with the increase in treatment options proliferating at 
the state level, very little was known about how many women were classified as 
alcoholics and whether they sought treatment at a level equivalent to that of men. The 
NIAAA did know that women were the fastest growing demographic of alcohol users, 
with 61% of women drinking by 1974 and an increase in alcohol-associated death rates 
increasing yearly. (U.S. Senate 1976: 3) That coincided with a push for women’s rights 
and equality in the 1970s, as equality surrounding alcoholism treatment and research 
became a topic pursed by advocacy organizations and congressional hearings. 
The series of female-centric programs arising at the federal-level in Washington, 
D.C., included the 1975 formation of an alcoholism recovery group called Women for 
Sobriety. The group, created by Jean Kirkpatrick, presented a secular, gender-specific, 
individualized approach to maintaining sobriety. As a sociologist who had tried and 
failed in other male-dominated self-help settings such as AA, Kirkpatrick sought to create 
a cognitive therapy-based program that addressed what she considered to be the primary 
cause underpinning women’s problems with alcohol, their low self-esteem. (Fenner and 
Gifford 2012) Women for Sobriety expanded in the US and internationally through the 
end of the twentieth century, and while it never reached near the prominence of AA, the 
group functioned as a smaller, more intimate alternative that could be pursued as an 
alternate in additional to other treatment options. Indeed, some women with drinking 
problems arising from more gender-specific issues such as a history of male aggression 
and violence, found better success pursuing sobriety in an all-female environment. 
(Kaskutas 1994) The creation of a recovery group specifically for women is reflective of 
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a larger push toward female-centric research and support initiatives pursued in the mid-
1970s.  
The advocacy-driven group National Council on Alcoholism also made the 
female experience a point of examination in March of 1976, creating an Office of 
Women and hiring Jan DuPlain to be the Program Director. That was a wise move 
considering the vast number of initiatives she accomplished in her first seven months on 
the job. DuPlain had previously worked at the NIAAA’s National Clearinghouse for 
Alcohol Information and in her new position was responsible for developing and enacting 
objectives with the organization’s National Steering Committee on Women and 
Alcoholism. (Olson 2003) In one of her first initiatives, DuPlain created a two-day track 
specifically focused on the topic of women and alcohol during the annual May 
conference of the National Council on Alcoholism in Washington, D.C. In addition to a 
women’s forum, the conference also served as the inaugural meeting of the National 
Congress of State Task Forces on Women and Alcoholism, which organized advocates 
from across the country to push for the integration of women’s issues into more local 
treatment and research schema. (U.S. Senate 1976: 10) 
Later that summer, DuPlain also helped to organize the annual Summer School on 
Alcohol Studies at Rutgers University that focused on issues related to female alcoholics 
for the first time in its 34 year existence. With little preexisting research on the topic, the 
course served as an opportunity to both aggregate and conduct original research in the 
area. (U.S. Senate 1976: 10) In the wake of her success advocating for the integration of 
women into alcoholism treatment and research programs, DuPlain called on her previous 
connections at the NIAAA to urge Senator Hathaway to hold a congressional hearing in 
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the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics devoted to issues facing female 
alcoholics. (Olson 2003) 
Hathaway acted on that suggestion and in September of 1976 the Senate 
Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics of the Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare met to hear testimony specific to women, “Alcohol Abuse among Women: 
Special Problems and Unmet Needs.” The hearing represented the first time the 
Subcommittee addressed the specific concerns facing female alcoholics, including the 
first inquiries into FAS. Testimony consisted of representatives from the NIAAA, the 
National Council on Alcoholism, and a variety of practitioners and professionals engaged 
with alcoholism treatment programs. Senator Hathaway began the testimony by 
articulating the purpose of the hearing, to “end the male dominance of substance abuse 
treatment, prevention, and rehabilitation” and to alleviate the stigma of seeking treatment. 
(U.S. Senate 1976: 2) 
The first witness, Ernest Noble, director of the NIAAA, testified on many health 
and social issues related to alcoholism in women, and briefly addressed FAS. He outlined 
the work being conducted by the NIAAA which included eleven research studies devoted 
to women since 1972, but only four of those studies he listed were behavioral, with the 
remaining seven studies focused more on fetal alcohol effects, demonstrating a research 
agenda skewed in favor of examining how alcohol impacted the mere potential for life 
over how it directly impacted the life of the female alcoholic. He also outlined the scope 
of the problem, explaining that some studies place the number of female alcoholics in the 
same proportion to their representation in society, but that women comprised only 17% of 
the NIAAA’s clients in alcoholism treatment programs. (U.S. Senate 1976: 5) Noble 
  106 
stressed that while the symptoms associated with FAS may be caused by alcohol, 
significant uncertainty still remained as to whether other factors such as poor maternal 
nutrition were responsible for the symptoms observed. To that end, he promised NIAAA 
resources to examine alcohol-related effects in pregnant animal models to see if the 
teratogenic effects reported across medical journals were indeed alcohol-dependent. (U.S. 
Senate 1976: 4) Noble also reminded the subcommittee of the language which had 
changed in the most recent amendments to the Hughes Act which had passed in 1976 and 
allocated preference to grants examining women’s issues. (Public Law 94-371) 
The advocacy contingent, headed by Antonia D’Angelo of the National Council 
on Alcoholism, followed Noble’s testimony and pointed out the shortcomings of the 
NIAAA in addressing the problem of female alcoholism. She characterized the 
organization’s research agenda of 574 programs with only 14 grants dedicated to 
women’s issues as reflective of the predominant assumption that, “what is discovered 
about male alcoholics will also be true for female alcoholics.” (U.S. Senate 1976: 12) She 
followed up that assessment with a series of suggestions for improvement, ranging from 
hiring a full-time staff position in the NIAAA devoted to women and alcoholism, to 
expanding the type of treatment accommodations for mothers, and calling for educational 
materials that “stress the nonsexual aspects of alcoholism.” (U.S. Senate 1976: 13) That 
requirement is no doubt in response to the long-standing stigma that accompanies female 
alcoholics, who for generations have been characterized as impure, promiscuous, and by 
extension, less worthy of treatment. Those stereotypes not only existed in the social 
realm, but saturated scientific studies as well, as demonstrated by a publication to the 
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Public Health Reports  of the Centers for Disease Control that describes women who use 
alcohol as self-medicating for problems with sexuality. (Roman 1988) 
The 1976 hearing also represents the first time Henry L. Rosett, a professor of 
psychiatry at Boston University School of Medicine, testified before Congress on FAS, 
although he would return on numerous occasions to address the syndrome. In his first 
appearance Rosett discussed the preliminary results of Boston City Hospital’s long term 
study on the impact of alcohol on prenatal development. In the hearings, Rosett explained 
that about 9% of the women in the study qualified as heavy drinkers and were responsible 
for the majority of congenital abnormalities observed in infants born, including a 
significant reduction in the length, weight, and circumference of the head in those infants. 
(U.S. Senate 1976: 21) The hospital warned all women of the risks drinking may pose to 
pregnancy and offered the women counseling and prenatal vitamins with their routine 
check-ups, noting that among those women who abstained or dramatically reduced their 
intake of alcohol, their infants were born with much fewer birth defects. Rosett also cited 
confounding maternal factors that may obscure the clear relationship of alcohol as a 
teratogen, including maternal smoking, malnutrition, nutrient absorption, and 
metabolism. In disclosing the United States Brewers as one of the funders at the end of 
his testimony, Rosett also foreshadowed the later controversy he would become 
embroiled in with accusations of industry funding impinging upon his scientific integrity. 
Following the special topic testimony of Rosett, Edward J. Khantzian, assistant 
professor of psychiatry at Harvard University Medical School, spoke to another special 
topic affecting female alcoholics—adverse drug interactions between tranquilizers and 
alcohol. Khantzian describes a common situation in which a woman reluctant to disclose 
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her alcohol problems to the doctor, instead complains of nerves or some other related 
malady and is in turn prescribed mood altering drugs. Those drugs when combined with 
the alcohol use present an increasing public health problem, and Khantzian recommended 
that physicians needed to improve their means of screening for alcohol problems among 
their patients, training that could begin in medical school. The response of the 
Subcommittee chairman, Hathaway, clearly illustrates how different the conversations 
surrounding substance abuse were compared to now, stating that “It seems ludicrous 
almost, doctors asking patients whether they are drinking or not.” (U.S. Senate 1976: 33) 
A marked departure from the near mandatory inquiry now asked by general practitioners.  
The final panel drew on their collective experience running treatment programs 
for alcoholics and witnessing first-hand the underserved population of female alcoholics. 
The panel of practitioners consisted of LeClair Bissell, medical director of the Smithers 
Center treating alcoholism in New York City's Roosevelt Hospital; Martha Ganis, a 
paraprofessional in the Akron Health Department; and Cecilia A. Graham, assistant 
director of a rehabilitation center. The three women expanded upon their personal 
experiences administering treatment programs to female alcoholics, arguing for the need 
to break down gender boundaries and stigma surrounding female alcoholics. 
Shortly after the introduction of FAS to congressional testimony, Noble followed 
up on the goal of examining the science of FAS. The NIAAA held a workshop attended 
by doctors and alcohol researchers with the goal of determining what evidence existed for 
FAS, and if the strength of that evidence warranted action. On June 1, 1977, the NIAAA 
released the first government warning of alcohol’s effect on birth outcomes that 
cautioned against drinking during pregnancy. (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
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Services 2010) The warning established the risk of FAS as substantiated in women who 
consume between three and six drinks per day, and that while no safe level of 
consumption had yet been determined, those consuming between one and three drinks per 
day should exercise caution. Oddly enough at that news release Noble later recalled that 
he did not think recommending a warning label regarding FAS would “impact too much” 
on the national discussion. (Lewis 1980a) Noble, head of the NIAAA, then forwarded a 
copy of the notice to every medical school chair and state medical association. (U.S. 
Senate 1978) Two days later the Center for Disease Control and Prevention published a 
similar version of the caution in the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. (U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1977) 
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CHAPTER 5 
ALCOHOL WARNING LABELS AS A MEANS OF ADDRESSING THE PUBLIC 
HEALTH RISKS OF FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME 
 
In the years between the passage of the Hughes Act in 1970 and the government’s 
first warning on fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) issued by the National Institute on Alcohol 
Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) in 1977, the focus on problems specific to female 
alcoholics had taken a prominent role in public health discussions. In particular, the risks 
posed by drinking during pregnancy and FAS had helped the NIAAA carve out 
disciplinary authority to enact a robust federal public health agenda on the scale not seen 
since Prohibition. Among those public health responses, health warning labels on alcohol 
became a heavily contested topic that dominated congressional engagement with issues 
of alcoholism, as proponents and detractors engaged in heated conversations about social 
control of alcohol. 
This chapter will examine how alcohol beverage warning labels arose in response 
to FAS, and dominated policy discussions in the five years following the NIAAA’s 1977 
warning that women should limit their consumption of alcohol during pregnancy. At the 
end of those five years in 1981, the Surgeon General released a warning that abstaining 
from alcohol during pregnancy was the safest course of action. Between those two 
government warnings, uncertainty abound surrounding the bureaucratic authority over 
labeling, the mechanism and extent of alcohol’s impact on development, and whether 
labeling could accomplish anything of value or if it simply represented a neo-
prohibitionist response to alcohol control. 
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The chapter begins with bureaucratic bickering over which agency had the 
authority to regulate alcohol labeling in, “Consumer Protection or Industry Burden: 
Alcohol Labeling and the Jurisdictional History of the FDA and BATF.” Alcohol is an 
odd exception to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) oversight, instead 
falling under the purview of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF). As 
consumer advocacy organizations and the FDA petitioned for the inclusion of alcohol 
ingredient labels in the 1970s, the conversation soon morphed to include alcohol health 
warning labels in response to the public health risks posed by FAS. When that occurred, 
the BATF took the opinion that labeling in response to such a complex syndrome would 
create burden on the industry and increase the stigma of alcoholism. The FDA had a 
long-standing reputation for protecting the public from emergent fetal risks posed by 
pharmaceuticals and food, but alcohol warning labels were a much different political 
beast than reviewing a new drug application or regulating ingredients. 
The need for labeling was also questioned by both industry and advocacy 
organizations in the 1978 congressional hearings that addressed the risk of fetal alcohol 
syndrome and what an appropriate public health response should entail. The second 
section of this chapter, “‘Alcohol Labeling and Fetal Alcohol Syndrome’: Congress 
Engages with the Problem,” examines the arguments elaborated upon in that hearing. 
Convened in response to Senator Strom Thurmond’s re-introduction of a bill to require 
alcohol health warning labels, the hearing entrenched the FDA and NIAAA as pro-
labeling and the BATF, industry, and patient advocacy organizations as anti-labeling. 
Those positions remained fairly intractable into the early 1980s, until the election of 
Ronald Reagan, which refocused the national agenda surrounding alcohol policy. 
  112 
In the wake of those 1978 hearings, administrative turmoil plagued the NIAAA 
and Senator Thurmond responded by taking a different approach to labeling. Instead of 
submitting a bill during the congressional session, he proposed a labeling amendment as a 
rider to a larger health bill. It surprised everyone when the amendment passed by voice 
vote in the Senate. As the bill advanced to the House of Representatives for 
consideration, the alcohol industry mobilized significant opposition to kill the labeling 
amendment in the bill. Following that, the chair of the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and 
Drug Abuse promised more hearings on the possibility of labeling. A second 
congressional hearing was held specifically to address health warning labels, the topic 
discussed in “‘Labeling of Alcoholic Beverages’: Congressional Action as a Remedy to 
Administrative Turmoil.” 
As those hearings drew to a close, Congress ordered the BATF and FDA to 
collaborate on a joint report expounding on the current state of science regarding FAS 
and the pros and cons of labeling in response to that risk. What arose from that report is 
discussed in “Surgeon General Warning: Pregnant Women and the Risks of Drinking 
During Pregnancy.” Even as the Surgeon General released a warning cautioning against 
drinking during pregnancy in response to incontrovertible evidence of alcohol’s 
teratogenicity, federal concern with alcohol soon shifted to incorporate a broader number 
of disordered drinking habits. As federal responses to driving drunk, youth drinking, and 
FAS converged in the mid-1980s, it led to a broader base of social support for labeling as 
a means to both educate and codify such behaviors as socially unacceptable.  
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Consumer Protection or Industry Burden: Alcohol Labeling and the Jurisdictional History 
of the FDA and BATF 
Following the 1976 congressional hearing on the special risks faced by female 
alcoholics, certain members of the Senate began to coalesce around the need to warn the 
public of the risks associated with fetal alcohol syndrome. Strongest among those 
supporters was Senator Thurmond (R-SC), who continually introduced bills to require 
health warning labels on alcohol, starting as generalized health warnings that focused on 
distilled spirits. That focus on hard alcohol as the culprit of alcoholism harkens back to 
the temperance era, when proponents made the distinction between ardent spirits and less 
dangerous forms of alcohol such as beer and wine. But as FAS emerged as a substantial 
threat to development, the language in such bills narrowed to focus on specific 
populations, and broadened to include all alcohol as a potential risk. The warnings 
focused on pregnant women and the risk of drinking during pregnancy, but later 
expanded to incorporate drunk driving as warning label legislation moved into the 1980s. 
Overwhelmingly, the language of such bills proposed in the Senate identified the 
FDA as the regulatory body that should have jurisdiction over labeling. That distinction is 
important, as the FDA previously had no formal regulatory jurisdiction over alcohol, but 
Congress perceived that agency as most appropriate to implement health warning labels. 
That decision highlights how well the agency had established their reputation as a 
consumer protector of adverse drug effects on fetal development, which emerged as a 
result of the thalidomide epidemic a decade earlier in the mid-1960s. Many European 
women who took the over-the-counter drug thalidomide during pregnancy gave birth to 
tens of thousands of children with dramatic birth defects. The US avoided such an 
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epidemic of thalidomide-induced birth defects because of stringent requirements 
instituted by FDA officials charged with reviewing the drug for approval to US markets. 
That decision set a precedent for the agency as a consumer protector, both of pregnant 
women and fetal development, and represents the first regulatory expansion into the 
womb of pregnant women surrounding the safety of food and drugs. 
Alcohol was a rare exception to the FDA’s food and drug jurisdiction, as the 
Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1940 had established a joint relationship with the 
Treasury Department’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) regarding 
regulatory oversight. In 1972, the Center for Science and the Public Interest, a non-profit 
consumer rights agency, approached the BATF with an appeal to include ingredient 
labels on alcohol, which they suggested be overseen by the FDA. (Cooper 1979) The two 
agencies worked toward developing ingredient regulations and signed a memorandum of 
understanding to establish jurisdictional boundaries in an attempt to keep from 
overlapping work between agencies. The memorandum stated that the FDA “will defer to 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for primary regulation of the labeling of 
alcoholic beverages,” with the stipulation that the BATF would adhere to the standards 
for ingredient disclosure already established by the FDA. (U.S. Department of Treasury 
1974, 39 Fed.Reg. 36127) 
Despite continuing pressure from industry groups, the BATF spent more than a 
year approaching how to formulate ingredient labeling requirements before declaring the 
process too burdensome. The agency published notice of proposed rulemaking in the 
Federal Register on February 11, 1975, which solicited public engagement and reactions 
to the proposal, and after reviewing the evidence the BATF rejected ingredient labeling 
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nine months later. (40 Fed.Reg. 6349-6360) In their published explanation, the BATF 
described weak public support for the measure, and made the argument that adulteration 
of alcohol was already heavily regulated. They also stated that labels could impact trade 
and may be misleading to the consumer, who gained very little compared to the cost of 
enacting such a measure. (40 Fed.Reg. 52513) Not surprisingly, the BATF later used 
those same arguments in congressional hearings surrounding health warning labels on 
alcohol. 
Viewing the BATF as breaching their previous agreement, the FDA revoked their 
memorandum of understanding with the BATF and declared their intent to put a health 
warning on alcohol. In response to the FDA’s assertion, by March of 1976 eight distillers 
and one winery, accompanied by three trade organizations (Distilled Spirits Council of 
the United States, National Association of Alcoholic Beverage Importers, and the Wine 
Institute), filed Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Mathews against Forrest David 
Mathews, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) 
under which the FDA resides. The primary objective of industry interests was to set a 
legal precedent that the FDA had no jurisdiction regarding alcohol labeling.  
Three months later, Judge James F. Gordon of the US District Court in Western 
Kentucky heard Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Mathews (1976), and ruled in favor of 
industry interests, granting exclusive control of labeling to the BATF. In the ruling, US 
District Court judge James F. Gordon in the Western District of Kentucky examined the 
legislative materials that enumerated the duties of the FDA. Those included the 1906 
Pure Food and Drug Act that established the FDA and the 1938 Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act that built upon and strengthened regulatory responsibility beyond the 
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primary goal of preventing product adulteration. The Federal Alcohol Administration Act 
passed in 1935 in the wake of Prohibition had established beer as a food product, but not 
whiskey, wine, or cordials. In a 1940 provision the FDA had stated that, “…we expect to 
continue our policy of not duplicating the work of the Federal Alcohol Administration 
with respect to the labeling of such products.” (Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. 
Mathews 1976)  
Taking into account that missive, in addition to numerous other institutional 
documents and congressional appropriations, Justice Gordon ruled that a conflict existed 
between the 1935 Federal Alcohol Administration Act and the 1938 Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act. While alcohol was defined as a food in terms of those acts, and the FDA 
was responsible for addressing issues of adulteration of alcohol, their jurisdiction stopped 
short of any form of alcohol beverage labeling. Later examination of the ruling called it a 
“‘sweetheart’ decision rendered ‘in the heart of Bourbon Country [by] a Kentucky 
judge...’” but for the purposes of ingredient labeling, and subsequent alcohol warning 
labeling, that “sweetheart decision” effectively revoked the FDA’s jurisdictional 
authority over the issue. (Abel 2012: 220) 
Although the FDA decided not to appeal Judge Gordon’s decision, an 
unpublished excerpt from a discarded draft to petition the decision highlighted the 
institutional tensions between the FDA and the BATF, particularly as the BATF was 
perceived as taking the side of the alcohol industry. “The courts are not at liberty to pick 
and choose between congressional enactments, and when two statues are capable of 
coexistence, it is the duty of the courts absent a clearly expressed congressional intention 
to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” (U.S. Senate 1979: 92) Rapidly running out 
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of options to enact ingredient labeling, FDA Commissioner Donald Kennedy appealed to 
the Executive Office of the President through the Office of Management and Budget in 
July of 1977, which ordered the BATF to work with the FDA toward labeling (U.S. 
Senate 1979: 82). Following such a circumvention of the District Court ruling, the 
alcohol industry interests from the Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Mathews ruling 
attempted to sue Kennedy for contempt of court, but the challenge failed and the BATF 
again began to address labeling jointly with the FDA.  
The adversarial relationship between the two agencies continued through the late 
1970s as the FDA kept pressure on the BATF regarding ingredient labeling, and soon 
expanded ingredient labeling to incorporate health warnings regarding the risk of FAS. 
Following the June 1977 FAS warning released by the NIAAA, which advised pregnant 
women to exercise caution in how much they drank during pregnancy, FDA 
Commissioner Kennedy contacted the Director of the BATF, Rex D. Davis. In a letter 
dated 15 November 1977, Kennedy alerted Davis to the fetal risks posed by alcohol 
consumption during pregnancy, and urged the BATF to “initiate immediately whatever 
procedures are necessary to require the placement on the labeling of alcoholic beverages 
of a warning against consumption of excessive amounts of alcohol by pregnant women...I 
hope that BATF, which now has exclusive responsibility for such labeling, will move 
promptly to address this serious health risk.” (U.S. Senate 1978) 
As the agency charged with jurisdiction over labeling, BATF director Davis 
responded to the FDA’s call for labeling with an open bulletin published to the Federal 
Register on 16 January 1978 titled “Warning Labels on Containers of Alcoholic 
Beverages, Proposed Rulemaking.” The published bulletin solicited opinions from public 
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agencies and private parties regarding aspects of alcohol warning labeling. The missive 
asked for pragmatic considerations such as the appearance and wording of prospective 
health labels, in addition to more difficult questions such as consumer impact of the 
labels. Those concerns focused specifically on whether such a warning would even be 
helpful in deterring pregnant women from drinking, and whether alternative public health 
initiatives should be undertaken to better educate the public to the risk of FAS. The 
BATF also solicited basic research information regarding FAS, evidence that supported 
the causative relationship between alcohol and birth defects, and more importantly 
contradictory evidence “refuting the existence of fetal alcohol syndrome.” (U.S. 
Department of Treasury 1978) Concurrent with that call for comment, Congress held the 
first hearings devoted specifically to the issue of alcohol labeling in response to the risks 
of FAS, but it would not be the last. 
 
“Alcohol Labeling and Fetal Alcohol Syndrome”: Congress Engages with the Problem 
As the BATF dragged its feet on agreeing to alcohol warning labels, and 
government agencies were releasing initial warnings to educate pregnant women to the 
risk of FAS, Strom Thurmond reliably introduced his traditional alcohol health warning 
bill following the assembly of the 95th Congress on January 24, 1977. The bill (S.414) 
sought to revise the Federal Alcohol Administration Act in order to require a warning 
label on the health hazards and habit forming nature of alcohol that was more than 48 
proof. That bill was the same he had previously introduced twice only to have it die in 
committee without a vote. Thurmond also declared his intent to append a warning label 
amendment to the Health Planning Act of 1977, but was persuaded to withdraw his 
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amendment when William Hathaway, chair of the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and 
Drug Abuse, promised to hold hearings on the subject in the following congressional 
session. (U.S. Senate 1978) 
Senator Hathaway was on the record as being weary of the BATF’s opposition to 
warning labels, stating in an interview that there was a “disturbing tendency of a 
regulatory agency to develop what amounts to an advocacy position for the industries 
they regulate.” (Lewis 1977) The committee had changed its name and reorganized to 
just three members from the original eleven at the beginning of the 95th Congress, when 
new rules on how many committees and subcommittees a congressman could serve went 
into effect. (Lewis 1977) Despite the cut to membership and staff resources, fifteen days 
after the BATF published their solicitation in the Federal Register regarding alcohol 
warning labels, the Senate Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse convened in a 
session devoted to “Alcohol Labeling and Fetal Alcohol Syndrome” on January 31, 1978. 
The specific goal of the hearing was to examine the scientific evidence for FAS and 
weigh whether alcohol labeling should be adopted to alert the public to the risk of 
drinking during pregnancy, with representatives from the FDA, NIAAA, BATF, and a 
variety of researchers and practitioners in attendance. 
Senator Thurmond’s 1978 bill (S.1464) was the first that he modified to include 
reference to the risk posed by drinking during pregnancy. The proposed warning read: 
“Caution: Consumption of alcoholic beverages may be hazardous to your health, may be 
habit forming, and may cause serious birth defects when consumed during pregnancy” 
(U.S. Senate 1978). During the hearing Thurmond proposed extending the regulation to 
all alcohol rather than just hard liquor, and also to include the warning on alcohol 
  120 
advertising. While he described his belief that “government cannot dictate the personal 
habits of the citizens of this country,” Thurmond viewed labeling as an educational tool 
to help citizens come to their own decisions about whether to drink. (U.S. Senate 1978: 5) 
The hearing also included information on the most recent research agenda of the 
NIAAA regarding FAS, presented by the Administrator of the ADAMHA, Gerald 
Klerman. He described the numerous scientific studies being conducted, with 11 FAS-
specific projects totaling almost a million dollars funded in 1978. Those studies included 
epidemiological prospective studies at three teaching hospitals (Loma Linda University, 
University of Washington in Seattle, and Boston University’s City Hospital), as well as 
animal studies to determine the specifics of alcohol’s teratogenicity. Further, Klerman 
introduced the intention of the ADAMHA to double the funding for fetal research to $2.2 
million in order to determine how often FAS occurred, whether there was a safe level of 
drinking, what sort of drinking patterns produced FAS, specific public health programs 
for women, and “proper methods of intervention to safeguard the fetus.” (U.S. Senate 
1978: 16) 
Klerman also introduced the first evidence of a spectrum effect of alcohol on 
development, recognizing that symptoms arose in infants exposed to alcohol that lacked 
the full expression of FAS. Elaborating on that public health concern, he noted that “it is 
reasonable to suspect that some adverse outcome less severe than the full syndrome may 
arise in other children of alcoholic women.” (U.S. Senate 1978: 13) Ernest Noble, then 
director of the NIAAA, was also at the hearing but presented very minimal commentary, 
speaking briefly on the NIAAA and presenting research that as little as one ounce of 
alcohol daily lowered fetal birth weights. For the most part, Noble deferred to his 
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superior, Klerman, to present the research and funding agenda of the NIAAA. Klerman 
assured senators and critics that the FDA, NIAAA, and ADAMHA were “in agreement 
that evidence is conclusive that alcohol has a deleterious effect on the fetus and there is a 
full-blown syndrome.” (U.S. Senate 1978: 97) 
In light of that proclamation, the FDA Commissioner Donald Kennedy described 
his experience pressing the BATF to adopt labelling, outlining the complicated legal 
landscape between the BATF and the FDA regarding who had jurisdiction on the subject. 
Required to defer to the BATF, the FDA was currently asking for both ingredient 
labeling to warn of potential allergens and a health warning label to warn of the risks of 
FAS. Kennedy then continued to outline the most recent scientific knowledge regarding 
alcohol’s teratogenicity and took a position characteristic of the FDA: “Wherever there is 
a special population at risk, as pregnant women, it seems to me that the government has 
an obligation to inform the population of their special risk, and that obligation exists 
independently of what sort of prior efficacy judgment one makes about the warning.” 
(U.S. Senate 1978: 84) That statement illustrates both the FDA’s role as a consumer 
protector, especially as it applies to issues of fetal risk, while casting aspersion on the 
BATF’s public proclamation in the Federal Register that called into question the 
scientific veracity of FAS. 
Also in attendance were BATF officials who took an opposing opinion from those 
agents in HEW that characterized FAS as a well-established risk. Director of the BATF, 
Rex Davis, was joined by Richard Davis, the Assistant Secretary for the Treasury 
Department that oversees all activities within the BATF. Both men took the opinion also 
supported by the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States (DISCUS) and the United 
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States Brewers Association that the scientific evidence for FAS was not conclusive and 
that warning labels were the wrong approach to the problem of women drinking during 
pregnancy. In a statement submitted to the hearing, DISCUS characterized labels as an 
overly simplistic solution to the complex problem of women who drink during pregnancy 
and outlined opinions of health professionals who disagreed with labeling. That included 
Morris Chafetz, former Director of the NIAAA, who characterized health warning labels 
as a “magic bullet” and a “cop-out,” suggesting that in excess even “water, oxygen or 
aspirin can cause death.” (U.S. Senate 1978: 257-258) Chafetz, a long-time advocate for 
responsible drinking over abstinence had since his resignation from directorship of the 
NIAAA become increasingly critical of the institute and a vocal opponent to warning 
labels, making claims like “paternalism is even more destructive than alcoholism.” 
(Olson 2003) 
Richard Davis began the BATF’s testimony, reiterating the Department of the 
Treasury’s jurisdictional authority over alcohol beverage labeling, and describing the 
notice of proposed rulemaking regarding labels to address FAS. The BATF had 
submitted that notice to the Federal Register fifteen days prior to the hearing on January 
16, 1978, and required a 60-day comment period in order to ascertain the “maximum 
amount of information in the most efficient manner so that the best judgment can be 
made as to the appropriate course of action.” (U.S. Senate 1978: 110) While text of the 
proposal published in the Federal Register called for evidence refuting the existence of 
FAS and alternatives to labeling as a means of educating the public to the risks of FAS, in 
the testimony Secretary Davis remained agnostic on the matter. He assured the 
Subcommittee that the BATF’s call for alternatives to labeling did not exclude labeling. 
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Senator Hathaway pressed Secretary Davis to better define when the BATF would decide 
on such a measure several times, but received nothing more than vague platitudes for his 
efforts. 
Rex Davis, Director of the BATF, then testified and followed his superior’s lead 
on alcohol warning labels, summarizing his prepared remarks and reiterating much of 
what Secretary Davis emphasized. Director Davis outlined how the BATF approved 
labels on all alcohol for sale, emphasizing the scale of their work with 74,500 
applications filed in 1977, of which 63,900 were approved. (U.S. Senate 1978: 127) He 
described the BATF’s previous decision to forgo labeling as a result of the Education 
Commission of the States Task Force that “no evidence was found that such warning 
statements would prevent alcohol-related problems.” (U.S. Senate 1978: 132) Senator 
Hathaway grilled Director Davis on labeling and alcohol advertising, questioning why a 
tax-collecting agency should be charged with health warning labels instead of the FDA.  
Also on the witness panel were five medical professionals who testified on the 
most current science surrounding FAS and the need for public health responses to the 
problem. Two of the individuals, Henry L. Rosett and Robert J. Sokol both headed long-
term, longitudinal studies to track the prevalence and symptomatology of FAS. Rosett, 
the first to testify, was an associate professor of psychiatry at Boston University’s School 
of Medicine, which was chosen as one of the three NIAAA-funded hospitals to conduct 
epidemiological studies to examine FAS. Rosett described a study conducted at the 
hospital, in which heavy drinkers who persisted in their drinking habits throughout 
pregnancy gave birth to children with anomalies at almost twice the rate of nondrinkers. 
(Rosett et al. 1978)  
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He described obstetricians’ general objection to asking pregnant women about 
their drinking habits, and described the need for rigorous, standardized means of 
screening for alcohol through an anecdote. He elaborated that, “…when one lady reported 
that she drank one glass of gin, a day, I asked, ‘how large a glass?’ She had been using a 
water tumbler.” (U.S. Senate 1978: 142) He also held a less restrictive version of warning 
labels that emphasized heavy drinking, what he defined as more than six drinks per day, 
because “it would be a mistake to make every woman who ever had a drink during 
pregnancy feel guilty that this might have caused the damage that her child is having.” 
(U.S. Senate 1978: 181) 
Sokol, the assistant professor of obstetrics and gynecology at Case Western 
Reserve University, then testified about the longitudinal study conducted at Cleveland 
Metropolitan General Hospital over the course of three years. Across 8,000 pregnant 
women and infants born at the hospital, 114 were noted with alcohol problems with five 
FAS-affected infants, but the study also confirmed a spectrum of effects outside of the 
strict definition of FAS. However, Sokol also cautioned against rushing to interpret his 
limited results as, “The whole story is not in.” (U.S. Senate 1978: 152) In terms of 
reducing FAS, Sokol suggested diagnostic education for practitioners and a public 
education campaign geared toward women most at risk of giving birth to a child with 
FAS. 
Following the presentation of those longitudinal studies, three medical 
professionals presented information on comparable animal models that induced FAS, 
neurological symptoms indicative of prenatal alcohol damage, and maternal nutrition. 
(U.S. Senate 1978) Carrie L. Randall, assistant professor at the University of South 
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Carolina, presented a series of visuals in a slideshow demonstrating the alcohol-based 
abnormalities observed both in children diagnosed with FAS and in animal models such 
as mice and dogs. Bennett A. Shaywitz, associate professor of pediatrics and neurology at 
Yale University, then followed and explained the compendium of neurological symptoms 
being identified from alcohol-effects, including hyperactivity, inability to adapt, poor 
cognitive performance, concentration, impulse control, and attention span. The last 
witness, registered nurse Barbara Luke, a clinical specialist in maternal nutrition at the 
Sloan Hospital for Women at the Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, reiterated that 
FAS was a distinct entity beyond any maternal effect. Luke recommended a series of 
initiatives to address the problem, including congressionally approved health warning 
labels, better training for physicians, a more robust federal public health campaign, and 
potential warning labels on advertisements as well.  
The 1978 hearings concluded with the decision that as the BATF was the 
government agency with the authority to institute labeling, the subcommittee would 
reconvene after the 60 day call for comments on proposed labeling, with adequate time 
for the BATF to interpret the commentary and make recommendations on proposed 
alcohol beverage labeling. At the conclusion of the comment period, the BATF compiled 
and addressed labeling concerns in a publication titled “The Fetal Alcohol Syndrome 
Public Awareness Campaign: Progress Report Concerning the Advance Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking on Warning Labels on Containers of Alcoholic Beverages, and 
Addendum,” released in February of 1979. (U.S. Department of Treasury 1979) 
The report contained transcripts from the parties who submitted information, the 
analysis of which concluded that while a public awareness campaign regarding the risks 
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of FAS was needed, “because of the nature of the evidence now available as to the 
possible dangers, it is not yet clear that warning labels on alcoholic beverage containers 
would be the best tool to educate the public.” (U.S. Department of Treasury 1979) 
Shortly thereafter, DISCUS formed the Licensed Beverage Information Council, along 
with nine other industry entities with the stated intent to implement the sort of public 
education programs for FAS in lieu of labeling. The FDA had been unsuccessful in 
urging the BATF to implement alcohol beverage warning labels cautioning against 
drinking during pregnancy, and the alcohol industry seized the opportunity to influence 
the narrative with their industry-funded education initiatives. 
 
“Labeling of Alcoholic Beverages”: Congressional Action as a Remedy to Administrative 
Turmoil 
The NIAAA had a notorious reputation for being an unstable agency constantly 
on guard from budget cuts and administrative efforts to dissolve or transfer the duties of 
the NIAAA to other agencies. Federal alcoholism reporter Jay Lewis described the 
bureaucratic situation as follows, “…if the NIAAA alcoholism programs have not always 
worked well, it might be because the previous administrations did not want them to work 
at all” (Lewis 1979a). As such, pushing for labeling tended to garner less agency support 
than efforts to keep current research and treatment efforts solvent. 
To illustrate that tension, following the 1978 hearings on alcohol warning labels 
and fetal alcohol syndrome, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Joseph A. 
Califano, initiated a sweeping review of the ADAMHA under the direction of Gerald 
Klerman. Given that directive, Klerman identified grant review as an area ripe for 
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streamlining and argued that the combination of independent grant review processes 
across all three institutes in the ADAMHA would save time (those institutes being the 
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism [NIAAA], National Institute on 
Drug Abuse [NIDA], and the National Institute on Mental Health [NIMH]). A memo 
regarding the plan leaked and spread like wildfire across the institutes. (Olson 2003) For 
institutes like the NIAAA that had spent their entire existence trying to assert 
independence in the face of budgetary cuts and attempts to appropriate it within other 
agencies, such suggestions were met with open hostility. Employees later characterized 
the process as ignorant to how Washington functioned, and as such the “brutally frank 
suggestions about how to manipulate the issue in order to circumvent resistance” failed 
before gaining any traction. (Smith 1978b) 
That did not keep Klerman and Califano from shaking things up, though. Within 
five months of being appointed to the position of ADAMHA director, Klerman had fired 
all three Institute directors who reported to him: Bertram Brown from NIHM, Robert 
DuPont from NIDA, and Ernest Noble from NIAAA. Earlier that December, following 
his confirmation as Director of the ADAMHA, Klerman had fired Bertram Brown in 
what Califano claimed was an attempt “to invigorate the agency with new blood,” a move 
that earned the two the nickname vampires among the press. (Smith 1978b) (Olson 2003) 
In March of 1978 Noble discussed the NIAAA with federal alcoholism reporter Jay 
Lewis, and signaled his intent to stay on as director for an additional two years—one 
month later Klerman had fired him. (Lewis 1979b) 
Many in the department viewed the firing as retribution for Noble’s opposition to 
Klerman’s attempt to centralize grant review, while others cited industry pressure 
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because Noble had shifted the NIAAA’s agenda into industry-unfriendly territory. (Smith 
1978b) (Olson 2003) Prior to resigning, Chafetz, the previous director of the NIAAA had 
funded a study to examine “responsible decisions regarding the use or misuse of alcohol” 
habits through the Task Force on Responsible Decisions About Alcohol on the Education 
Committee of the States through a $1,626,674 NIAAA grant. (Lewis 1980a) The results 
of that study were published April 1977, a year after Noble had accepted the directorship. 
Instead of adopting those recommendations that echoed Chafetz’s previous agenda on 
“responsible drinking,” Noble shifted the NIAAA toward prevention. And the way he 
characterized prevention caused discord among both industry groups and alcoholism 
advocacy organizations. He advocated for measures such as alcohol beverage labeling 
and defined the measure of successful alcoholism programing as a reduction in overall 
per capita drinking, leading both industry and advocacy groups to unite in characterizing 
such measures as “neo-prohibitionism.” (Lewis 1980a)  
Alcoholism advocacy groups and industry were unlikely partners, but they shared 
a goal of not wanting to backslide into abstinence only prohibitionist arguments, for 
economic reasons in the case of industry, and for social reasons in the case of advocacy. 
The two entities had historically intermingled as well, with industry sitting on the board 
of directors for many alcoholism advocacy groups and infusing the organizations with 
money. Alcoholism advocacy journalist, Jay Lewis described the relationship as never 
being “seriously questioned until the warning label and related issues cropped up at the 
national level.” (Lewis 1980a) Many advocacy organizations adopted an agnostic or 
openly hostile position toward labeling, arguing that labels would increase stigma and 
shame among a vulnerable population that they had worked so hard to normalize as 
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patients afflicted with a disease. Initially, far from using a warning label to indemnify 
themselves from legal challenge as the alcohol industry later learned from the example of 
cigarettes, industry groups opposed labeling on the grounds of its cost to implement and 
low perceived efficacy. Any decrease in sales arising from a health warning label likely 
also motivated such a positon. 
Industry and advocacy again combined forces to criticize Califano’s release of the 
“Third Special Report to the U.S. Congress on Alcohol and Health,” dated June 1978 but 
in fact released on October 17, 1978. Unlike previous reports in which the NIAAA had 
hosted press conferences and traveled around the country to publicize the findings, 
Califano had quietly released the report without alerting the media, and two days after 
Congress had adjourned in anticipation of congressional elections. (Olson 2003) That 
appears to be a calculated move considering how strongly industry and advocacy groups 
criticized the report. Sam Chilcote, Jr., President of DISCUS, perhaps best describes 
industry’s general response, characterizing the report as a “blueprint of the neo-
prohibitionists…a litany of gloom reminiscent of the darkest propaganda about demon 
rum.” (Lewis 1980a) Likewise, the National Council on Alcoholism, the National 
Coalition for Adequate Alcoholism Programs, and the Alcohol and Drug Problems 
Association all criticized the report, taking umbrage at the suggestion that alcoholics cost 
the US $43 billion annually as a result of their disease and limiting availability of alcohol 
was the solution over medical intervention. (Lewis 1980a) 
As the 96th Congress convened in January of 1979, new leadership shifted the 
status quo in alcohol labeling legislation. After Senator Hathaway suffered defeat in 
reelection, Donald W. Riegle, Jr. Under his energized leadership, the Subcommittee 
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within a single month introduced the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 
Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1979 (S.440) to approve 
continued funding for the NIAAA. (Olson 2003) That was much different than the first 
month of Hathaway’s tenure several years earlier, when he had allowed the 
appropriations bill to lapse upon his assignment as subcommittee chair. Around the same 
time, Senator Thurmond again introduced his traditional health warning label on 48 proof 
and higher alcohol (S.427) on February 2, 1979. As usual, the bill was referred to 
committee where it died without garnering a hearing or a vote. 
Senator Thurmond then approached labeling from another perspective, by 
proposing an amendment to Senator Riegle’s NIAAA reauthorization bill during 
hearings. (U.S. Senate 1979a) After Thurmond had read his statement in support of 
Amendment No. 125, which was co-sponsored by Senator Orrin Hatch, Senator Riegle 
surprised those in attendance by accepting the amendment. (Wall Street Journal 1979) 
Instead of deferring the amendment until a hearing on the matter could be conducted, as 
was the expected response to such a proposal, he considered the 1978 subcommittee 
hearings on FAS and alcohol beverage labeling to serve in that capacity. Senator Riegle 
seemed particularly disturbed that the alcohol industry had not accepted the invitation to 
attend those hearings, as “sending a statement is not the same as being there in person to 
testify,” and promised hearings within the next congressional session on the subject 
regardless of the outcome of the amendment. (Olson 2003)  
Following the assurance that more hearings regarding alcohol beverage labeling 
were imminent, Thurmond’s amendment survived a motion to table with 68 senators in 
favor of allowing the amendment to stand and 31 voting to scrap the proposal. The 
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amendment then advanced to the House of Representatives, and the Subcommittee on 
Alcoholism and Drug Abuse published a comprehensive report that gathered scientific 
evidence and opinions on labeling to serve as a resource for the House. (U.S. Senate 
1979c) However, labeling proved to be a symbolic victory that was soon discarded in the 
House as industry representatives had more time to lobby for its removal than they had 
during the Senate hearings. Alcohol beverage labeling legislation had “passed” after a 
decade of work on Thurmond’s part, but the victory was short lived and soon congress 
returned to hearings on the matter. 
Also emerging from the NIAAA reauthorization hearings was an appointment of 
a new director of the NIAAA, following Senator Riegle’s questioning of Klerman during 
testimony. (U.S. Senate 1979a: 36) After almost a year of acting director Loran Archer, 
on April 15, 1979, John A. DeLuca became the new Director of the NIAAA. DeLuca, a 
young 35-year-old without a medical or scientific degree, was the former acting director 
of the New York State Division of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse. He had previously 
encountered controversy in that position surrounding grant review, with some accusing 
him of favoritism and using “fear tactics” regarding funding for alcoholism rehabilitation 
programs. (Rule 1978) In an interview shortly after his appointment, DeLuca elaborated 
on the shift in policy at the NIAAA and distanced himself from Noble’s previous 
ambitious agenda to limit alcohol stating that, “The public health model approach should 
not be defined in any way as a neo-prohibitionist approach.” (Lewis 1979c) 
With HEW still feeling the pushback from alcoholism advocacy groups and 
industry following their publication of the third special report on alcohol to Congress, 
shifting away from accusations of neo-prohibitionism by appointing DeLuca was a 
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politically expedient position. However, that measure came too little too late for Califano, 
who was asked to resign shortly thereafter, along with the Secretary of the Treasury, W. 
Michael Blumenthal. The Carter administration had initially stressed “the independence 
of Cabinet secretaries, many of whom had almost total freedom in choosing their top 
assistants.” Yet, for senior White House aides, that approach was viewed as “a costly 
mistake that left the White House impotent to implement presidential decisions.” (Walsh 
1979) That mistake the Carter administration hoped to rectify by orchestrating the 
resignation of more than just those two secretary positions, with multiple other 
individuals resigning because as one White House source noted, “nothing short of a 
wholesale revamping of his administration would salvage his Presidency.” (Smith 1979) 
The general attitude surrounding both the firing of Califano and the 
reorganization of the Carter administration was one of anxiety and worry among 
individuals and organizations recommending alcohol policy at the federal level. (Olson 
2003) Califano had angered not only the powerful alcohol industry but the tobacco 
interests as well, prompting Senator Silvio Conte (R-MA) to described Califano as 
having “the temerity to place the health of our citizens above the financial interests of the 
people, the States and the political power brokers who stand to gain from the continued 
production and consumption of tobacco and alcohol.” (Olson 2003) In short order, 
Patricia Roberts Harris, former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development was 
announced as Califano’s replacement.  
In spite of administrative turmoil, the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug 
Abuse soon followed through with its promise of hearings devoted to alcohol warning 
labels and on September 14, 1979 held “Labeling of Alcoholic Beverages.” (U.S. Senate 
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1979a) Because Senator Thurmond’s alcohol warning bill had technically passed as an 
amendment to NIAAA reauthorization, Senator Henry L. Bellmon (R-OK) introduced 
S.1574, “A bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the Federal Alcohol 
Administration Act, to provide for Health Warning Labels on alcoholic beverages,” to 
serve as the pending bill under question in the hearings. The hearings represented a more 
labeling-centric discussion, with several industry interests on hand to discuss the 
prospects of labeling. While the risks of drinking during pregnancy were still addressed at 
length, unlike with previous hearings they did not comprise the sole motivation for 
labeling. In fact, as the hearings demonstrated, the deviant form of drinking that required 
public health intervention in the form of labels expanded to include youth drinking and 
drunk driving in addition to FAS. 
Senators on the Subcommittee demonstrated the pro- and anti-labeling arguments 
well in their opening statements. Senator Howard M. Mezenbaum (D-OH) highlighted 
the $43 billion national cost of alcoholism, stating that “no dollar figure can reflect the 
human suffering that the abuse of alcohol has brought to millions of Americans” and that 
“if a label persuades one pregnant mother not to drink—if it prevents the birth of one 
retarded child—then I think that such a requirement is worthwhile.” (U.S. Senate 1979c: 
5) While Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH) facetiously suggested the label read: 
“Warning: The US Senate has determined that alcohol may be hazardous to your health” 
(U.S. Senate 1979c: 3). And Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), characterized labels as “a 
quick fix and legislative cop out” that “portends unnecessary over-government regulation 
at a time when the government needs to back off from its stranglehold on business and its 
paternalistic attitude toward consumers.” (U.S. Senate 1979c: 4) 
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Following those introductions, newly appointed director of the NIAAA, John R. 
DeLuca, testified in his first appearance in the position. He presented the opinion of the 
NIAAA that after rigorous study of how alcohol impacted animal models and long-term 
epidemiological studies, the NIAAA had concluded that FAS existed. The only 
ambiguity that remained was whether there was a safe level of consumption during 
pregnancy, as there were difficulties determining how dosage and timing, or maternal and 
environmental effects of consumption impacted pregnancy. As there was no way to 
figure out a safe level of consumption or how much was too much, the NIAAA cautioned 
against consumption during pregnancy. From that perspective, he advocated for labeling 
as a result of the evidence, stating that “we require warnings on many drugs and other 
products with less dramatic effects and less potential for harm than alcohol.” (U.S. Senate 
1979c: 21) DeLuca was also quick to stress the cooperative attitude of industry interests 
who were launching education initiatives regarding youth drinking, drunk driving, and 
the risks of drinking during pregnancy.  
The chief counsel for the FDA, the ironically named Donald Beers, was also in 
attendance to offer a legal opinion on the jurisdictional authority of the two regulatory 
agencies that had been deadlocked over implementing alcohol beverage labeling. Beers 
adopted the formal position of the FDA, that alcohol warning labels were needed, and 
that it was the responsibility of the BATF to implement that warning either voluntarily or 
as a result of congressional requirement. Beers viewed the BATF, an agency whose 
primary goal is tax collection, as incapable of addressing the debate over alcohol warning 
labels because they did not have a strong stake in the protection of health like the FDA. 
Both departments had just lost their secretaries under the Carter administration 
  135 
reorganization, and despite Beers’ testimony to the contrary, the differences between the 
two departments on the goal of labeling would soon dissipate in a 1981 joint report. 
In addition to the regulatory agency representatives, the medical experts 
advocating for warning labels included Dan Beauchamp, professor of public health at the 
University of North Carolina medical school, Sheild Blume, director of New York State’s 
Division of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse, and J. Takamine, an internist from Lost 
Angeles presenting the American Medical Association’s recommendations. Beauchamp 
highlighted the fact that he could not recall a “single case where the claim that the public 
has a right to know is seen as a paternalistic interference with the public’s individual 
liberty,” and recalled his own family’s struggle with a child born disabled and the self-
blaming questions that arose under those circumstances. (U.S. Senate 1979c: 141) Blume 
railed against the prevailing theme of the hearings, which characterizes government 
paternalism in a much different light, that women are fragile, guilt-ridden sex who “must 
be protected from reality.” (U.S. Senate 1979c: 308) While Takamine characterized the 
need for alcohol warning labels as paramount, “not in terms of dollars and cents, but in 
terms of human lives.” (U.S. Senate 1979c: 325) 
Also notable in the 1979 hearings were the number of expert witnesses with 
medical backgrounds testifying against alcohol warning labels. That included Chafetz, 
former Director of the NIAAA, who since his resignation had founded the Health 
Education Foundation, a non-profit that examined issues related to alcohol and health, 
funded in part by the alcohol industry. (Grimes 2011) Chafetz took the same position on 
responsible drinking that he had advocated as director, characterizing the concern over 
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limiting and regulating alcohol as a “hysteria,” stating that “alcohol abuse and alcoholism 
is a people problem, not a substance problem.” (U.S. Senate 1979c: 78) 
That concern with a product and placing limitations on alcohol adhered to the 
same argument that many of the private industry interests also advocated: alcohol can be 
beneficial in moderation, treatment and recovery are personal and individual, and 
warning labels exacerbate stigma and do not work. Chafetz was joined in his dissent by 
David Pittman, professor of sociology at Washington University, and Jack Mendelson, 
professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School. They were both against adopting 
warning labels to alert pregnant women to the risks of FAS, citing the need to treat 
alcoholism as a disease and not a moral failing on the part of the alcoholic woman to 
control her drinking. Although, the theme of consulting with an individual’s physician 
suggests that there was also an unspoken fear that authority and knowledge surrounding 
alcohol-related issues were being usurped at the federal level instead of dealt with on an 
individual basis in the confines of a doctors’ office. 
Among the industry representatives present and several Congressmen arguing 
against the need for labeling, the theme of government paternalism and infringement on 
personal liberties was prevalent. Representatives from the U.S. Brewers Association and 
the Wine Institute echoed concerns presented by Sam Chilcote, President of the Distilled 
Spirits Counsel of the United States (DISCUS), who characterized the issue as such: 
“Will our nation’s fight against alcoholism be focused on helping people or labeling 
products?” (U.S. Senate 1979c: 159) He then went on to describe the 20 years of 
research, 372 projects, and 150 research centers who received funding from DISCUS’s 
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scientific advisory council, and the 7 million dollars spent last year on public service 
announcements.  
Although the argument was one that was characterized as having a positive 
impact, the parallels between private industry’s “manufacturing consent” and 
“manufacturing controversy,” as viewed in the previous decade with tobacco, is 
unmistakable. The comparison is notable as Chilcote also served as the chairman of the 
Beverage Alcohol Information Council, formerly the Licensed Beverage Information 
Council, which represented ten alcohol-related interests and served as the primary means 
of funding and disseminating more industry-friendly education campaigns. 
At the end of the highly contentious, industry-driven 1979 subcommittee 
hearings, Congress required the FDA and the BATF, the two agencies who had been 
dueling on the subject of alcohol labeling, to collaborate on a joint research venture. 
(Public Law 96-180, 45 Fed.Reg. 12557). Both the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare were directed by Congress to report on “(1) 
The extent and nature of birth defects associated with alcohol consumption by pregnant 
women; (2) The extent and nature of other health hazards associated with alcoholic 
beverages; and (3) The actions which should be taken by the Federal government.” (45 
Fed.Reg. 12557) That required the FDA and BATF to collaborate on a report to 
definitively establish which agency was responsible for alcohol labeling. It also required 
the two agencies to aggregate the current state of science related to all health impacts of 
alcohol, not just FAS research, and to devise adequate public health solutions. 
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Surgeon General Warning: Pregnant Women and the Risks of Drinking During 
Pregnancy 
In the years following the identification of FAS, scientists continued to refine the 
definition of the syndrome and its broader public health implications. Researchers 
accomplished this by publishing case studies to aggregate a more robust 
symptomatology, and address comorbid or rival causes for symptoms observed. They 
also reported on recent political developments in editorials, argued for public health and 
policy proclamations, and published review articles that aggregated the rapidly shifting 
state of science to reflect the most current research available. In the years following the 
initial diagnosis, longitudinal epidemiological studies funded largely by the NIAAA 
definitively confirm that alcohol acted as a teratogen during development and researchers 
began to examine data from experiments on animal models to help determine aspects of 
mechanism, timing, and severity of alcohol’s effect in utero. That certainty would be 
reported in the 1981 joint report between the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary 
of Health, Education, and Welfare, leading to a Surgeon General warning on the topic in 
1981. 
In the years directly following the initial publications on FAS, researchers 
published case studies in an attempt to substantiate or repudiate the existence of the 
syndrome. (Bianchine and Taylor 1974) (Ferrier et al. 1973) (Tenbrinck and Buchin 
1975) However, starting in 1976 few articles focused on the existence of the disorder, as 
researchers came to a consensus that alcohol caused a specific set of birth defects in 
children exposed in utero. Instead, dissent flourished over the particulars regarding the 
mechanism of alcohol’s effects on prenatal damage and how aspects of maternal biology 
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and environment may overlap with or impact the expression of symptoms. Disagreement 
over the prevalence of FAS and whether fetal alcohol effects could be observed in 
children born to moderate and light drinkers also increased. That healthy caution and 
fact-checking, while essential to producing robust and trustworthy scientific findings, 
complicated the potential for an early scientific consensus surrounding whether policy 
and public health measures should be aimed solely at female alcoholics or whether health 
warning labels were appropriate to reach a broader public audience. Rightfully so, as in 
the early 1970s scientists had not figured out what impact drinking had on pregnancy 
with respect to dosage, duration, frequency, or timing related to different stages of 
development, or differences between and across women.  
Even as Noble, Director of the NIAAA, offered testimony regarding FAS in a 
1976 congressional hearing specific to problems faced by female alcoholics, researchers 
were already shifting toward identifying overlooked symptoms of the syndrome. Many of 
those early articles published to medical journals in the mid-1970s later became 
incorporated into larger areas of alcohol-related research such as alcohol-related brain 
wave activity, defects of the liver, ophthalmic impacts, and urogenital abnormalities. In 
1976, The Lancet published an article on the EEG patterns displayed in FAS-affected 
infants with abnormal brain waves, closer to epileptic patterns than normal rest patterns. 
(Havlicek and Childaeva 1976) Researchers working in that area later used EEGs as a 
tool for examining what areas of the brain were functional in FAS-affected versus non-
affected infants and children, noting similar disrupted rest patterns in the brain. (Mattson 
et al. 1992) A variety of alcohol-related birth defects were also reported around the same 
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time related to the liver, eyes, urinary tract, and genitals. (Hornstein et al. 1977) (Habbick 
et al. 1979) (Khan et al. 1979) (Gonzales 1981) (McGivern 1984)  
For every publication presenting a potentially new characteristic of the syndrome 
in major medical journals, there were studies scrutinizing the diagnosis and suggesting 
alternate possible explanations for certain symptoms observed. (Qazi and Masakawa 
1976) (Hurst 1982) (Qazi and Milman 1983) Issues of malnutrition and marijuana were 
two such concerns that later appeared in congressional testimony, along with a 
contentious article on a reported case of FAS in a child whose parents had stopped 
drinking. (Scheiner et al. 1979) That article presented the possibility that alcohol may 
impact sperm and ova in the long-term, persisting even after parents ceased drinking. The 
case study involved two former alcoholic parents active in AA who claimed to have 
given up drinking a year and a half prior to the birth of a child with FAS. Those scientists 
embraced a similar line of reasoning as researchers of the early twentieth century who 
used animal models to classify how alcohol caused feeblemindedness over generations. 
While the authors speculated on the veracity of the mother’s claims of abstinence, they 
also suggested that perhaps alcohol affected the germ plasm, causing hereditary damage 
in the absence of uterine exposure to alcohol.  
The purported case of FAS in a child born to former alcoholics set off a flurry of 
activity in the letters to the editor section, with letters questioning both the honesty of the 
woman reporting abstinence and the competence of the researchers classifying FAS. One 
letter addressing the study was published by physicians John M. Graham, Jr., and David 
W. Smith, who was one of the two physicians that originally defined FAS. (Smith and 
Graham 1979) In the article they recalled hearing the authors present the same work at 
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the National Foundation Conference on Birth Defects a month earlier in Chicago, where 
they also took issue with the diagnosis and conclusion. In the letter they explained their 
disappointment at the publication of such half-truths: “We consider it most unfortunate 
that single cases of this type are published when the clinical diagnosis is insecure but 
which may lead to a conclusion that the risk of fetal alcohol syndrome can persist beyond 
the alcoholic status of the mother and/or that the alcoholic status of the father may cause 
the fetal alcohol syndrome.” (Smith and Graham 1979) While the possibility was 
rigorously refuted in counter letters, that did not stop expert witnesses testifying during 
congressional hearings from latching on to the implications of a child being born with 
FAS in the absence of alcohol. Such a case study was later used by industry 
representatives in congressional hearings to help manufacture uncertainty surrounding the 
robustness of FAS as a diagnosis and the need for alcohol warning labels as a public 
health solution. 
Review articles began to appear in medical journals as early as 1978, aggregating 
the current state of FAS-related science for a broad body of practitioners (Clarren and 
Smith 1978) (Streissguth et al. 1980) (Eckard 1981) (Kalter and Warkany 1983) One 
rebuttal to a 1978 review article suggested that there was still too much uncertainty to be 
circulating such a diagnosis as fact, referring to FAS as “polydrug-abuse-nutritional-
deficit-stress-induced fetal syndrome” to which the authors of the article asserted that the 
“fundamental fact should no longer be doubted in the medical or lay community.” 
(Mendelson 1978) (Clarren and Smith 1978) That growing certainty surrounding the 
existence of FAS as a standalone entity irrespective of other maternal or environmental 
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effects continued to grow as testing in animal models duplicated much of what physicians 
observed in the clinic.  
The teratogenic effects noted in laboratory models of animals tested increased 
through the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the first review article on those studies 
published in 1980 which illustrated a dose-response curve of fetal alcohol effects. It 
showed that the more alcohol introduced, the more severe the expression of FAS-related 
symptoms. (Streissguth et al. 1980) Scientists had demonstrated the toxicity of alcohol 
both in vitro and in vivo, and by 1981 researchers had published the first mouse model 
illustrating how alcohol impacted embryogenesis. (Brown 1979) (Diaz and Samson 1980) 
(Sulik et al. 1981) (West et al. 1981) (Mukherjee and Hodgen 1982) In that publication, 
the researchers noted fetal alcohol effects in mice in the developmental stage equivalent 
to three weeks in humans, noting that many women may not even know they are pregnant 
at that stage. (Sulik et al. 1981) They also noted that based on their patterns of alcohol 
distribution among developing mice, binge or social drinking patterns may prove as 
detrimental to fetal development as heavy, sustained drinking. 
The certainty surrounding FAS as a diagnosis was further substantiated by the 
release of numerous epidemiological studies being conducted at the same time period as 
those animal models, which confirmed a higher number of birth defects in children born 
to heavy drinking mothers. Three initial longitudinal studies were funded by the NIAAA 
at Loma Linda University in California, the University of Washington in Seattle, and 
Boston University’s City Hospital in Massachusetts, and those were joined by studies in 
Cleveland. (U.S. Senate 1978) (Sokol et al. 1980) Results of those studies indicated that 
FAS occurred in from 0.6 to 3.1 infants per 1,000 born, while alcohol-related birth 
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defects and neurodevelopmental disorders bumped that number as high as 5.9 births per 
1,000. (Hanson et al. 1978) (Hingson et al. 1982) (Ouellette et al. 1977) (Sokol et al. 
1980) (Sokol et al. 1986). The American Medical Association published a notice in 1977 
that even moderate drinking could impact fetal development, but by the mid-1980s 
research had confirmed that even one to two drinks a day led to a substantial increase in 
an infant being diagnosed with symptoms of FAS. (American Medical Association 1977) 
(Mills et al. 1984) Those measures called into question the idea of a “safe level” of 
drinking that industry interests had been using as an argument against future research into 
alcohol’s effect on the fetus and adequate policy recommendations. 
In 1982, the American Medical Association’s Council of Scientific Affairs urged 
physicians to do a better job of screening women for alcohol problems and referring 
appropriate treatment when necessary, as a means of decreasing the incidence of FAS. 
(Council on Scientific Affairs 1983) The AMA cited their open letter from 1979 where 
they joined with the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists in endorsing 
the NIAAA’s physician-based education treatment. The AMA offered the advice that 
doctors should “encourage them [pregnant women] to decide about drinking in light of 
the evidence and their own situations,” while also being “explicit in reinforcing the 
concept that, with several aspects of the issue still in doubt, the safest course is 
abstinence.” (Council on Scientific Affairs 1983) The report ended with the call for more 
long-term longitudinal studies, educational campaigns, and increased physician 
involvement in educating the public.  
Indeed, while screening remained the best way of identifying an at risk population 
and prenatal counseling for heavy drinkers had proved successful at reducing their intake, 
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physicians continued to express reserve about asking patients about their alcohol 
consumption habits and referring them to appropriate treatment centers. (Rosett et al. 
1983) (Weiner et al. 1983) In 1984, then director of the NIAAA, Robert Niven, published 
a piece in the Journal of the American Medical Association urging physicians to create a 
more robust means of identifying and treating women at risk of giving birth to a child 
with FAS. (Niven 1984) Niven pressed physicians to increase their screening, make 
connections among treatment programs to refer women in need, encourage alcoholics to 
join AA and Al-Anon, and even to screen for drinking problems in teenagers given the 
risk of unplanned pregnancy. Also, Niven advised physicians to avoid telling pregnant 
women that abstinence is the only course of treatment, as even a reduction in drinking for 
those addicted was beneficial to no action. He admonished physicians who “prescribed” 
alcohol as a therapeutic aide, and those who even in the face of increasing evidence, still 
did not inform their pregnant patients about the risks of FAS.  
Among the many journals reporting on FAS at the time, Science holds the 
distinction of also running articles written by science journalists that addressed health 
warning advisories surrounding FAS. (Smith 1978a) (Smith 1978b) (Smith 1979) (Kolata 
1981) As the voice of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the 
largest and broadest scientific society, Science represents a prestigious and exclusive 
publication. That they would use their limited print space to update their general 
membership on the status of alcohol beverage label warnings multiple times speaks to 
their perception on the importance of the topic.  
In 1978, the journal criticized the BATF in “Agency Drags Its Feet on Warning to 
Pregnant Women,” reiterating a point many in the FDA and Congress had made earlier 
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that an agency charged with taxation is at odds with regulating a health warning label as 
well. Shortly thereafter, the journal turned its ire to the Department of Health and Human 
Services in “Political Fracas over Peer Review Is Factor in Firing of NIAAA Director,” 
in which it described the “bitter” political fight between Carter administration appointees, 
such as Califano and Klerman, and directors of substance abuse research institutes, like 
Noble of the NIAAA.  Looking for an “infusion of new blood” the pair became known as 
“vampires,” after firing the directors of the NIAAA, NIDA, and NIHM in retribution for 
opposition to centralized peer review of all agencies under the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and 
Mental Health Administration.  
Following those early proclamations, the journal reported on the repeated failure 
of agencies and congress to label alcohol. In 1979, the journal described the BATF’s 
decision to forgo labeling but engage in an educational campaign to “indemnify 
themselves against lawsuits.” (Smith 1979) Two years later, the journal expounded upon 
the “slippery slope” reasoning many used when discussing the Surgeon General’s 1981 
warning that pregnant women abstain from drinking. (Kolata 1981) 
Much of that scientific information and history about labeling was included in the 
1980 joint report released by the Department of Health and Human Services and the 
Department of the Treasury. The report represented a rare moment of unity between the 
two departments whose agencies had debated for years on the need for alcohol ingredient 
and warning labels. Instead of continuing their adversarial position on the matter, the two 
agencies found common ground: not labeling. “Given these considerations it appears that 
the risks may be too complex to communicate on a label.” (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1980: 40) The Carter 
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administration had succeeded in reorganizing their administration to eliminate discord, 
but failed in moving the agencies toward a better reflection of the administration’s 
platform. The Carter administration prefaced the joint report with a disclaimer that the 
policy recommendations did not reflect the position of the administration, which 
considered labeling to be “a useful and cost-effective means of informing the public 
about health hazards in appropriate situations.” (U.S. Department of Treasury and U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 1980) 
To reach their final decision against labeling, the departments consulted with 
experts across various topics from medicine to communications and industry to advocacy, 
to hear from a variety of viewpoints and areas of expertise. (U.S. Department of Treasury 
and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1980) Those meetings helped to 
aggregate the current state of science, with irrefutable evidence of FAS with lesser 
alcohol effects emerging from even moderate drinking. The report highlighted the need 
for more study on the dose-response relationship, the effects of different patterns of 
drinking, specific periods of increased vulnerability during prenatal development, and 
any genetic or maternal influences on symptoms. The report also elaborated on a variety 
of other alcohol-induced health hazards such as cancer, cirrhosis, pancreatitis, depression, 
malnutrition, hormonal issues, cognitive impairment, drug interactions, and traffic deaths, 
while also making note of a lowered instances of heart disease in moderate imbibers.  
Among the series of recommendations that arose to address those health issues, 
both departments agreed to improve their public education campaigns, through the 
NIAAA’s Clearinghouse for Alcohol Information and the BATF working in conjunction 
with the Beverage Alcohol Information Council’s Fetal Alcohol Awareness Campaign. 
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(U.S. Department of Treasury and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1980) 
The Department of Health and Human Services also agreed to combine forces with their 
newly separated partner, the Department of Education, to devise curricular materials on 
problem drinking. Also, the Department of the Treasury would pressure industry to revise 
their voluntary code of conduct for advertising, relying on compliance instead of 
suggesting regulation. And both would work with the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration in the Department of Transportation, to address the problems of drunk 
driving, a problem that would soon see the formation of a Presidential Commission on 
Drunk Driving in 1982 to “fight against the epidemic of drunk driving on the Nation's 
roads.” (Reagan 1982)  
The Department of Health and Human Services also reinforced their commitment 
to ensuring that those public health campaigns reach medical professionals in a more 
focused manner. (U.S. Department of Treasury and U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 1980) To accomplish that they agreed to develop alcohol-related health 
curricula for continuing education, create standards for certification, and evaluate 
screening methods to detect alcoholism and potentially intervene. Further, the FDA 
would shift their focus on alcohol warning labels to address adverse interactions from 
prescription and over-the-counter drugs. In terms of policy, the authors recommended 
that Congress pass a bill to amend the Federal Alcohol Administration Act and require 
clearer labeling for the percent alcohol by volume. They also suggested that the Surgeon 
General issue an advisory if necessary based on the health problems enumerated in the 
report. (U.S. Department of Treasury and U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 1980)  
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Conspicuously absent from the final recommendations was anything related to 
health warning labels on alcohol for sale, as the authors took the opinion that a concise, 
clear, specific recommendation was impossible given the complexity of FAS and alcohol-
induce health issues. And that creating labels would be costly and increase guilt and 
stigma among drinkers. Shortly following that report, the Office of the Surgeon General 
released the warning cautioning pregnant women to abstain from drinking: “According to 
the Surgeon General, women should not drink alcoholic beverages during pregnancy 
because of the risk of birth defects.” (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
1981) The highest medical official in the nation had announced that FAS existed, and that 
women should abstain from drinking to avoid giving birth to a child with defects. 
However, it would take an additional seven years for labels with a similar warning to 
appear on alcohol for sale in the US. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE MORAL AGENDA: FEDERAL ALCOHOLISM POLICY AND THE FINAL 
PUSH TOWARD LABELING 
 
As the Reagan administration replaced the Carter administration in the early 
1980s, the character of the federal alcoholism agenda morphed to incorporate a new 
preoccupation with the morality of the drinker. A new presidential agenda had always 
bought change to the federal landscape, and federal alcoholism programs were no 
stranger to budget cuts from fiscal conservatives. But the brand of social conservatism 
that characterized President Reagan’s platform created an environment ripe for federal 
expansion into alcohol-related areas that focused more on the victims of the alcoholic’s 
behavior than the personal reformation of the alcoholic. 
Prioritizing small government through aggressive cuts to social programs, and 
focusing on the deregulation of industry also had complicated the implementation of 
health warning labels on alcohol. Health warning labels were a paradox in the Reagan 
administration, both rebelling against de-regulation tenets of fiscal conservatism, while 
adhering to socially conservative impulses to legislate morality. Labeling representing a 
paternalistic intrusion into an individual’s autonomy, but served to codifying socially 
unacceptable drinking behaviors. 
The chapter begins by examining the historical lead up to that phenomenon, in 
“The Rise of Reagan: The New Right and the Focus on Alcohol as a Social Vice.” For 
much of the 1980s, alcohol health warning labels as a public health response did not 
garner broad support. Severe budget cuts, disinterest at the subcommittee level, and 
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fracture among advocacy organizations all impacted the previous decade’s agenda to treat 
and destigmatize alcoholism. The power vacuum created in the absence of a strong 
national agenda for dealing with issues of alcoholism allowed the New Right to look 
beyond FAS to identify and react to other types of problematic drinking. Among those 
issues, driving drunk, youth drinking, and FAS among indigenous populations joined 
FAS as issues that required engagement with social and moral evidence to craft 
appropriate public health policy.  
The early to mid-1980s also saw controversy arise over levels of drinking, both 
whether alcoholics required complete abstinence from alcohol to recover, and whether 
pregnant women had to completely abstain from drinking or if a threshold existed below 
which there was no measurable developmental defects. The second part of this chapter, 
“Controlled Drinking and a ‘Safe Level’ of Drinking During Pregnancy” examines those 
controversies, particularly as such issues arose during the last FAS-specific congressional 
hearing in 1982, “Effects of Alcohol Consumption During Pregnancy.” That hearing best 
demonstrates the “manufacturing controversy” that characterized industry-obfuscated 
cigarette research in the mid-twentieth century. Among industry objections to health 
warning labels, they claimed that the uncertainty was simply too complex to convey in a 
label, and would lead to confusion and anxiety among pregnant women. 
That 1982 hearing represented the last time Congress engaged with warning 
labels or FAS until a final legislative hearing titled simply, “Alcohol Warning Labels” in 
1988. The final section of this chapter, “To Educate and Protect: How Industry Ceded the 
War on Labeling to Buffer against Legal Challenges,” examines how industry interests 
accepted labeling as a means of insulating itself against legal redress. The concerns 
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addressed in the proposed five rotating alcohol warning labels expanded public health 
concerns to include FAS, driving while drunk, drug interactions with alcohol, youth 
drinking, and general health concerns such as cancer and cirrhosis of the liver. Despite 
the erosion of industry opposition, successful labeling required a non-partisan group of 
four senators consistently petitioning from 1986 onward. Among those legislators was 
Senator Strom Thurmond, whose twenty year petition for health warning labels on 
alcohol finally came to full fruition in 1988.  
  
The Rise of Reagan: The New Right and the Focus on Alcohol as Social Vice 
President Ronald Reagan won election over a second Carter term, and the broad 
dissatisfaction with the Carter administration also had the effect of ushering in a wave of 
socially conservative Republican congressmen. Following 26 years of democratic 
leadership, the Senate flipped to Republican control in January of 1981. That rise of the 
“New Right” within the Republican Party, focused on social issues along with economic 
conservatism, is exemplified by President Reagan’s agenda as he engaged with issues 
surrounding drug and alcohol abuse.  
That also meant the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse welcomed the 
appointment of a new chair, Republican Senator Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire, 
longtime opponent of health warning labels on alcohol. Senator Humphrey, chair of the 
Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, cited his motivation for entering politics 
from a career as a former pilot to be “disillusionment with the Great Society and all the 
programs it had spawned” that had led to more “government intrusions into our lives 
right down to the family.” (Kaiser 1979) Because federal alcohol control arose following 
  152 
President Johnson’s Great Society initiatives, Senator Humphrey represented an odd 
choice for the position. As the only member of the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and 
Drug Abuse to vocally oppose requiring health warning labels on alcohol, Senator 
Humphrey predictably focused the Subcommittee in different directions throughout his 
tenure as chair.  
One of the first subcommittee hearings Senator Humphrey held in 1981 examined 
federal drug and alcohol programs and exemplified his “New Right” skepticism of 
government. Motivated by his commitment to be the “toughest skinflint in the Senate” 
and “bring under control spending and inflation,” Humphrey held an oversight hearing 
that focused on both the NIAAA and NIDA. (Kaiser 1979) Held July of 1981, the hearing 
examined the agencies’ financial and programing commitments, and followed in the 
wake of the Surgeon General’s FAS advisory released earlier that month.  
Related to the risks of FAS identified by the Surgeon General, Senator Humphrey 
conceded that, “research can be important in the formulation of new policies and in the 
creation of new prevention and treatment approaches.” (U.S. Senate 1981: 2) Senator 
Humphrey took the opinion that the “federal government does not have a monopoly on 
the wisdom needed to address major national problems” and looked to the states, 
universities, and industry to supplement or replace NIAAA initiatives. (U.S. Senate 1981: 
3) That push toward diverting authority from the federal government to the states 
dramatically affected the NIAAA and the push toward labeling.  
Loran Archer, filling in as the Acting Director of the NIAAA, justified the 
programs funded by the NIAAA at the administrative oversight hearing under pressure of 
looming budget cuts. Former NIAAA director John DeLuca had resigned after President 
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Reagan’s win, citing his lack of scientific or medical credentials as the reason for his 
resignation. He claimed that his background was incompatible with Reagan’s vision for 
the NIAAA, which shifted away from alcoholism treatment programs and research 
surrounding social issues and toward more biomedical research. (Olson 2003) At the 
hearings Archer discussed the NIAAA’s programs to target women and educate them to 
the risks of drinking during pregnancy, a strategy he hoped to able to modify in order to 
address other high priority alcohol issues such as youth drinking, driving drunk, and 
alcohol’s interaction with other drugs. 
Among the approaches to combatting those high priority alcohol issues, health 
warning labels had lost political traction following the 1980 joint report to the President 
and Congress by the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Health and 
Human Services. (U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 1980) The agencies authoring the report agreed that FAS presented a 
substantial public health risk, but that health professionals should be the population 
targeted for education rather than the general public. The agencies did suggest that the 
amount of alcohol by volume be reflected on labels as a percentage, and that instead of 
including a FAS warning on alcohol, the Surgeon General should release a warning about 
drinking during pregnancy. The agencies’ joint recommendations proved contentious 
enough that the Carter administration included a preface to the report explaining that such 
opinions did not represent the administration’s stance, though that soon changed with the 
incoming Reagan administration. 
The Reagan administration not only took the opinion that labeling was an 
unnecessary regulatory oversight that should generally be avoided, but that the agency 
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responsible for alcohol labeling, the BATF, should be abolished. The administration cited 
budgetary restrictions and attempted to dissolve the agency, shifting its law enforcement 
responsibilities to the Customs Office and Secret Service, and requiring states to assume 
full regulatory oversight of alcohol. (U.S. House of Representatives 1981) (U.S. Senate 
1982) However, that motion was blocked by Congress as unfeasible after a series of 
hearings and the administration dropped their vendetta. Instead of shrinking the budget, 
by 1985 the BATF had grown to an agency with a $179 million dollar budget, up from 
$150 million in 1981. (Maitland 1985) Other proposed budget cuts to federal agencies did 
not fare as well, particularly in the sector related to social research. 
Among those budget cuts to programs that it decreed “social research,” were 
numerous initiatives funded by the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health 
Administration (ADAMHA). Initially the Reagan administration conceived of all 
ADAMHA research activities as social, but after negotiating with the new Department of 
Health and Human Services Secretary, Richard Schweiker, they settled at 15 percent of 
the agency’s budget. The eliminated programs focused in areas of alcoholism treatment, 
including training personnel and funding prevention programs. (Reinhold 1981a) The 
decision forced the NIAAA to adapt to new budgetary constraints and revised the 
agency’s mission, creating more of a research institute that funded biomedical, 
physiological, and epidemiological research. As a result the NIAAA began to resemble a 
research institute rather than the combined research and service agency, and by 1992 the 
NIAAA had become a research institute within the National Institutes of Health (NIH), 
along with the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) and the National Institute for 
Mental Health (NIMH). (DuPont 2010) 
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The role of hatchet man at the HSS was forced upon Secretary Schweiker 
throughout his three year tenure as President Reagan’s first Secretary of Health and 
Human Services. As a career politician and moderate conservative Secretary Schweiker 
tempered the dramatic budget cuts the Reagan administration called for in the area of 
government-funded social programs. Secretary Schweiker reduced federal funding for 
welfare, food stamps, Medicare, and Medicaid to the states, while simultaneously 
defending Social Security and research funds for health and medicine to the NIH and 
Public Health Service. (McFadden 2015) (Pear 1982) Senator Robert Kennedy later 
described the mixed legacy of Schweiker, “The country may never know how much 
greater the damage to social programs would have been without Dick Schweiker as 
secretary.” (McFadden 2015) 
In addition to budget cuts, controversy plagued the Department of Health and 
Human Services surrounding its social agenda and those appointed to enact such policy. 
Secretary Schweiker faced public criticism for pushing legislation surrounding 
reproductive health. He defied former Secretary Harris’s assertion that the “country faced 
a disaster” without adequate sex and contraceptive education, stating that the family and 
not the government was responsible for such measures. (Rosenbaum 1981) He also 
supported legislation to require clinics receiving federal funds to notify parents of a 
minor’s desire to obtain birth control, described by Senator Henry A. Waxman as “Big 
Brother getting into the bedrooms of people,” and took the opinion that “the fetus has the 
same rights as the mother.” (United Press International 1981a) (United Press International 
1982) That apparently contradictory view was broadly supported by the Reagan 
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administration; that the government should stay out of issues of reproductive health while 
simultaneously enacting intrusive legislation into such private decisions.  
Controversy followed more than just Secretary Schweiker, with the first chosen 
Assistant Secretary of Health resigning from the nomination process, and the choice of 
Surgeon General arousing widespread unease. Secretary Schweiker had previously been 
named a prospective Vice President candidate in Reagan’s unsuccessful primary bid in 
1976 against Gerald Ford, although George W. Bush replaced him as Vice President in 
the successful 1981 election. As a career politician, Secretary Schweiker’s political 
positions were well known. However, other nominees in the Department faced more 
scrutiny, including Warren Richardson, Schweiker’s first nomination for Assistant 
Secretary of Health. (United Press International 1981b) In April of 1981, after a 
protracted congressional approval process, Richardson removed himself from the process 
after accusations of anti-Semitism arose. Richardson had served as the primary lobbyist 
for the Liberty Lobby from 1969 to 1973, an organization with a long history of racist 
and anti-Semitic views.  
In the midst of that controversy and against Schweiker’s desires, the Reagan 
administration pushed for the confirmation of C. Everett Koop as Surgeon General, who 
had previously been serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health. Koop represented a 
choice that many regarded as a political appointee to satisfy conservative and anti-
abortion groups supporting the president, because Koop had previously published such 
opinions in his 1976 book Right to Live, Right to Die. (Koop 1976) During Koop’s 
congressional hearings, Schweiker revealed that he did not support the choice but agreed 
with the administration on the condition that he could choose a higher ranking physician 
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as Koop’s overseer in the newly reopened position of Assistant Secretary of Health. 
(Reinhold 1981b) That position was awarded to Edward Brandt, Jr., who both the 
American Medical Association and Association of American Medical Colleges supported 
for the position. Brandt was appointed in May of 1981, and served as acting Surgeon 
General until Koop was sworn in January of 1982.  
The early 1980s represented a time of change among alcohol advocacy 
organizations as well, with mass resignations occurring in the wake of advocacy groups 
so opening aligning with industry interests. The National Council on Alcoholism in 
particular had numerous individuals walk out of an April 1980 meeting, leading to the 
resignation of the National Association of Alcoholism Counselors from the organization 
because of how the National Council on Alcoholism chose to handle warning labels. 
(Olson 2003) Likewise, the National Coalition for Adequate Alcoholism Programs lost 
the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors for their opposition 
to labeling as well. Both the larger federal alcoholism agencies, the National Council on 
Alcoholism and the National Coalition for Adequate Alcoholism Programs, had industry 
board members and received substantial industry funding. Such a relationship was 
increasingly becoming more of an issue among general members of the organizations as 
the extent of the industry ties continued to be revealed in congressional hearings and 
reports, but critics of the closeness between the two would have to wait another couple 
years for the breakup. 
Controversy among alcoholism advocacy organizations continued following the 
publication of the Fourth Special Report to the U.S. Congress on Alcohol and Health as 
well, released January 19, 1981, the day before President Reagan was sworn into office. 
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(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1981) The third report on the same 
subject was controversial among alcoholism advocacy groups, with the American 
Council on Alcoholism, the National Council on Alcoholism, the Alcohol and Drug 
Problems Association of North America, the North Conway Institute, and the Salvation 
Army expressing offense at the report’s findings that alcoholics cost the nation $43 
billion a year and that restricting alcohol would lead to less alcoholism. The National 
Coalition for Adequate Alcoholism Programs went so far as to vote in favor of drafting a 
letter to then Secretary Califano expressing their outrage over the report, at the 
recommendation of board members from the alcohol industry Wine Institute. (Olson 
2003)  
In response to many of the concerns with the third report, the NIAAA sent the 
fourth report out for review among several advocacy actors prior to publication. In a clear 
political move, the NIAAA chose individuals from groups that had previously voted to 
leave the National Council on Alcoholism after industry support influenced an anti-
warning label stance. That led to still more accusations that the report was not properly 
vetted in the field among alcoholism interests. Namely among two of the most powerful 
and industry-friendly groups, the National Council on Alcoholism and the National 
Coalition for Adequate Alcoholism Programs, each of which received industry funds and 
had members from the alcohol industry in positions of administrative power. (Olson 
2003) 
In reporting on the current state of science surrounding FAS, the authors of the 
fourth report discussed a more expansive definition of alcohol-related birth defects than 
in the past. They made note of the clear spectrum of effects that “may range from mild 
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physical and behavioral deficits to the fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS)” and described how 
even women who drank moderately put their developing fetus at risk of symptoms on the 
lower end of that spectrum. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1981: 5) 
The authors also presented the epidemiological studies that had by then definitely 
confirmed the existence of such a syndrome, and discussed how scientists were 
continuing to refine the mechanism and impact of alcohol on development through 
animal models. What had not changed in the report were the areas for further research 
regarding FAS. The authors cited the need for more studies on variation among 
individuals, how different patterns of drinking impacted development, when during 
development the fetus was most vulnerable, and what sort of maternal effects existed. 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1981: 5) 
As scientific consensus surrounding FAS began strongly to coalesce, fracture at 
the level of alcoholism advocacy groups and severe budget cuts impeded a robust federal 
alcoholism agenda. The combination led federal alcoholism reporter Jay Lewis to 
characterize 1981 as the year that “saw the severe contraction of the federal effort as it 
was constructed during the 1970s.” (Lewis 1980a) What the NIAAA could achieve as an 
institute was dramatically slashed, with the full elimination of all state-level formula and 
project grants that had been funneling $120 million to local programs focused on 
treatment, rehabilitation, and prevention. (Lewis 1980a) Those grants were diverted to a 
broader program of block grants shared among NIDA and NIMH, which decreased the 
amount of federal money for those causes and increased the competition for such 
resources. In the course of a year the staff was reduced by almost 40 percent, and their 
budget stagnated at $21.7 million instead of the Institute of Medicine’s recommendation 
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of $50 million. The NIAAA had essentially become a research institute, with difficulty 
even keeping the public-facing National Clearinghouse for Alcohol Information running.  
In the absence of a strong institution to set a federal alcohol policy agenda, a 
federal alcohol advocacy constituency that had also begun to implode, and a 
Subcommittee on Alcohol and Drug Abuse more interested in oversight than a 
“paternalistic” regulatory agenda, public health problems surrounding alcohol were 
reshuffled and reprioritized. Treatment programs for alcoholics went under- or un-
funded, and in the case of federal employees the programs were quietly revoked by the 
Office of Personnel Management after years of negotiation on the part of alcoholism 
advocacy groups, the NIAAA, and congressmen like Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) to get 
inpatient treatment covered by private insurers. (Olson 2003) Prevention efforts relied 
more on private industry like the Beverage Alcohol Information Council, the industry-
funded education initiative that had recently welcomed on as chairman the former 
Secretary of the Department of Treasury, Rex D. Davis. 
The scaling back of those activities previously core to the NIAAA and alcoholism 
advocacy groups created a power vacuum in the area of federal alcohol policy, one ripe 
for vocal special interests to emerge that embodied the social and moral decline which so 
worried the “New Right.” Chief among those concerns was President Reagan’s desire to 
curb traffic fatalities associated with drunk driving, guided by the Presidential 
Commission on Drunk Driving in 1982 and addressed through congressional hearings by 
the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse. Also important among the emerging 
areas of social concern were special populations of drinkers, including minors engaging 
in dangerous drinking habits that led to the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 
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1984, the surge in alcoholism and FAS among indigenous residents addressed mainly by 
the Indian Health Bureau, and women who drink during pregnancy and endanger their 
fetuses. 
 
Controlled Drinking and a “Safe Level” of Drinking During Pregnancy 
Federal discussion surrounding alcohol beverage warning labels had stymied in 
the early 1980s. However, concern surrounding FAS remained high following the 1981 
Surgeon General’s warning. The highest medical official in the land asserted that FAS 
presented a risk to pregnancy and that abstinence was recommended in light of some 
uncertain scientific issues surrounding the risks of drinking during pregnancy. The 
controversy surrounding a safe level of drinking was carried into prenatal education 
initiatives enacted by both the government and industry, through the NIAAA and 
Beverage Alcohol Information Council, respectively. 
That controversy was accompanied by new evidence being collected in the field 
of alcoholism studies that called into question the need for a far-reaching health warning 
label. That evidence included studies indicating that moderate alcohol consumption had 
health benefits, and may be more successful at rehabilitating alcoholics than abstinence. 
The health benefits of alcohol in moderation had existed for years and continued to be 
cited as a reason against a general health warning. (Baum-Baicker 1985) The controlled 
drinking controversy was more recent though, and had gained popularity as an alternate 
to abstinence. (Davies 1962) The topic gained prominence in the research community 
after a government-funded report presented the alternative in 1976. (Armor et al. 1976) 
(Roizen 1987) 
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Conducted by the Rand Corporation in 1976, the report “Alcoholism and 
Treatment” examined the progress of patients from across 44 NIAAA-funded treatment 
centers 18 months following their treatment. The authors of the report suggested that 
moderate drinking rather than abstinence may present a more successful model for 
alcoholism rehabilitation than sustained non-drinking. (Armor et al. 1976) However, soon 
after the 1981 hearings on FAS, Science magazine substantially rebutted such notions of 
controlled drinking as beneficial, demonstrating that “normal” drinking patterns appeared 
unattainable in a ten-year follow-up of patients. (Pendery et al. 1982) The moderate 
drinking controversy had persisted in opposition to traditionally funded government 
treatment programs that prioritized abstinence from drinking, and the 1982 publication in 
Science rebutting the original analyses and experimental data only entrenched positions 
and furthered the controversy. (Roizen 1987) 
In light of recent publications describing the benefits of moderate alcohol 
consumption, the Subcommittee for Alcoholism and Drug Abuse met to discuss FAS and 
the risks posed by such a suggestion. Senator Humphrey, chair of the Subcommittee, 
organized hearings on the “Effects of Alcohol Consumption during Pregnancy.” (U.S. 
Senate 1982) In the opening remarks, Senator Humphrey described the goal of holding 
such hearings to “clarify the results of recent research so a clear message can be sent to 
women on the specific nature of the risks of alcohol consumption during pregnancy.” 
(U.S. Senate 1982) And to “present a clear picture of the nature of the effects of maternal 
alcohol use and abuse during pregnancy, and provide for us an understanding of the 
measures needed to achieve a more complete public awareness of the risks involved.” 
(U.S. Senate 1982)  
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At the hearings, subcommittee member Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) spoke to the 
importance of the Surgeon General’s 1981 warning, highlighting the dependence of the 
fetus on the pregnant woman for nutrition. He emphasized that when a mother got drunk, 
so too did her fetus through the exchange of alcohol in the blood stream and across the 
placenta. He even pointed to a particularly vulnerable time of development that had been 
identified by the use of animal models, the first trimester, when the body plan and major 
organs are being decided. (U.S. Senate 1982) He also made mention of a newer statistic, 
that FAS-related expenses cost the federal government upward of $1.5 billion a year, but 
highlighted the “emotional drain” of FAS as immeasurable. 
The first panel to present at the hearing consisted of government officials who 
described the research currently being conducted surrounding FAS. They included 
Edward N. Brandt, Jr., the Assistant Secretary for Health of the Department of Health and 
Human Services, and William Mayer, the newly appointed Director of the Alcohol, Drug, 
and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA). Brandt, serving in his capacity as acting 
Surgeon General, had released the 1981 report that called for pregnant women to abstain 
from alcohol. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1981) He stated a 
conservative estimate of yearly FAS-affected births between 1,800 and 2,400, with over 
360,000 births with some sort of alcohol-related impact on development, or 1 in 100 
births in the US. (U.S. Senate 1982) That expansive number was also accompanied by a 
revised level of safe drinking that was dramatically lower than in the decade past, as little 
as two drinks a day to cause problems related to birthweight and spontaneous abortion. 
Mayer echoed the chronic nature of the disorder and the cognitive handicaps which were 
beginning to be more fully understood.  
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Among the varied members of the panel of medical experts who presented, few 
took the position that there was not enough evidence to warrant action on even moderate 
levels of drinking during pregnancy. The one exception was Serio E. Fabro a professor of 
gynecology who presented the position of the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists that, “At present time, there is not sufficient evidence to substantiate or 
refute that moderate intake of alcohol is harmful to the fetus.” (U.S. Senate 1982) Fabro 
went on to discuss the controversy surrounding a safe level of drinking and increasing 
evidence for a threshold effect instead of a linear dose-response curve, where the fetus 
needed to be introduced to a certain amount of alcohol before birth defects manifested. 
Also notable were the women testifying who objected to the notion that had been 
broached in previous hearings, that labeling should not be adopted because it would 
increase the feelings of guilt and shame among women who drank during pregnancy. 
LeClair Bissell testified as a representative of the American Medical Association, and 
railed against the archaic attitude that women are nervous and “cannot be trusted with the 
truth and make their own decisions based on fact.” (U.S. Senate 1982) She also 
emphasized that the evidence of FAS was concrete and that doctors should recommend 
pregnant women abstain from alcohol rather than the more ambivalent positions of 
encouraging women to decide how much to drink based in light of evidence and their 
own situation. Sheila Blume, member of the advocacy organization National Council on 
Alcoholism and past president of the American Medical Society on Alcoholism, also 
supported labeling. In particular, she advocated for labeling, because while public and 
professional education campaigns faced funding and time limits, labels were an ongoing 
measure that helped to increase general knowledge about the risks of FAS.  
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The following panel exemplified the sort of manufacturing uncertainty that 
characterized labeling discussions about cigarettes decades prior, primarily consisting of 
industry-funded organizations. Following the previous discussions of how women 
deserved to be treated like fully actualized humans in the medical process, Arthur J. 
Salisbury of the March of Dimes stated that “at the risk of being called a male chauvinist 
pig by the women who just preceded me” the March of Dimes’ advice that women 
abstain from drinking during pregnancy caused “anxiety, guilt, and disbelief,” and that 
labeling may have a similar impact. (U.S. Senate 1982) Former Secretary of the Treasury 
and current Chairman of the Licensed Beverage Information Council, charged with 
industry-funded public education initiatives, offered the caution that “warning label 
legislation would denigrate this successful, cooperative program” and that “effective 
education and not simplistic scare tactics” would work much better than a label on 
alcohol. (U.S. Senate 1982) Among those “effective education” projects that the BATF 
pursued, were Rex Morgan comics on the topic of FAS and a video public service 
announcement titled “Two Tummies,” while the Licensed Beverage Information Council 
focused more on catch phrases to brand educational materials: “Friends don’t let friends 
drive drunk,” “Know when to say when,” and the classic, “Enjoy in moderation.” (U.S. 
Senate 1988)  
Surprisingly, Henry L. Rosett, one of the original researchers who had conducted 
the prospective epidemiological study establishing the syndrome among patients at 
Boston Hospital, also testified in the anti-labeling panel. Rosett argued that because there 
was no measurable effect on development with small amounts of alcohol, physicians did 
a better job explaining the complexity of FAS than a public education campaigns or 
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warning labels. He also further elaborated on a running theme of the hearings, that 
women are anxious and fearful, and required special treatment to avoid feelings of guilt 
that arise from drinking during pregnancy. He went so far as to state that “scare tactics” 
surrounding information about FAS were “detrimental to mother-child relationship and 
marital relationship.” (U.S. Senate 1982) 
While some experts characterized the scientific findings surrounding FAS as 
substantial and worthy of a broad scale public health campaign to educate the population, 
like health warning labels on alcohol. Others found the degree of uncertainty surrounding 
a “safe level” of drinking to be too complex and contentious to be captured on the side of 
a bottle of alcohol. In the wake of the 1982 hearing on the “Effects of Alcohol 
Consumption during Pregnancy” the only certainty was that neither federal agencies nor 
Congress was adopting labels in the near future.  
The societal risks posed by women who drink during pregnancy did not cease to 
influence alcohol policy discussions, however. Instead, the risk figured prominently in 
other legislative discussions surrounding other types of problem drinking. FAS appeared 
in reports of the Presidential Commission Against Drunk Driving, appointed in April 
1982, which conducted well over 100 hours of hearings across 8 cities. FAS also emerged 
during the October 1983 hearings for the 1984 National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 
which replaced the patchwork of state regulations with an age of twenty-one. Bills 
addressing alcohol regulation shifted instead to the issue of advertising in alcohol, with a 
series of hearings in the mid-1980s that scrutinized the idea of the industry defined self-
policing morality code. While bills and hearings addressing special populations affected 
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by alcohol shifted to the Indian Health Service, as indigenous populations experienced 
the highest rates of FAS in the nation. 
 
To Educate and Protect: How Industry Ceded the War on Labeling to Buffer against 
Legal Challenges  
After years of inaction on alcohol beverage warning labels, Senator Strom 
Thurmond organized a non-partisan coalition of senators consisting of himself, Orrin G. 
Hatch (R-UT), Ted Kennedy (D-MA), and Christopher Dodd (D-CT) who banded 
together in order to petition for legislative hearings regarding alcohol warning labels and 
to propose amendments to health bills. On May 20, 1986 they succeeded by attaching an 
amendment to a reauthorization bill for the NIAAA, but the bill languished on the docket 
and died at the end of the congressional session. The bill required a series of rotating 
labels on all alcohol for sale, with information about not just FAS, but the risk of drinking 
and driving, mixing alcohol with drugs, and specific health problems, similar to warnings 
on later bills (U.S. Senate 1988).  
The group continued to petition for warning labels, and in the next health bill that 
appeared they recorded a resolution asking the Public Health Service to conduct a study 
on the efficacy of warning labels. The group appended their “Sense of the Senate” 
resolution to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (S.2878), which was introduced on 
September 25, 1986. While not a legislative law with the legal power to compel an 
organization to action, the Sense of the Senate resolution instead acted as formal record 
of the group’s mission recorded in the legislative record (U.S. Senate 1988). The National 
Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, headed by newly appointed director Enoch 
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Gordis, accepted the request and began to compile a comprehensive literature review on 
the subject. 
As a government agency assembled evidence that would be used in alcohol 
warning label discussions, the typical pro- and anti-labeling positions were clearly 
outlined in a 1986 article in the New York Times that pitted Senator Thurmond against 
then President of the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States (DISCUS), Frederick 
A. Meister. In the “60-Second Debate” Thurmond presented statistics highlighting three 
afflicted groups that had come to represent the most commonly grouped trifecta of 
victims afflicted by the harm of alcohol, those impacted by drunken driving, FAS, and 
youth drinking. Thurmond cited statistics in the debate which included that 53 percent of 
traffic fatalities were caused by alcohol, that damages from FAS comprised the third most 
common birth defect, and that 3.3 million underage drinkers were on the path toward 
alcohol dependence in the US in 1986. (Thurmond and Meister 1986) His industry 
counterpart, Meister, rebutted by citing the joint report by the Department of Treasury 
and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare back in 1980 that decided against 
warning labels, and emphasizing that industry already spent $10 million annually on 
public education programs in lieu of labeling. (Thurmond and Meister 1986) 
The year 1986 also marked one of the first lawsuits brought forth by a customer 
against the alcohol industry, alleging that industry was liable for the plaintiff’s 
alcoholism because no warning label existed to alert to the dangers of alcohol. (Lewin 
1986) Wayne Hoover, a 24-year-old alcoholic for the past seven years, sued the G. 
Heileman Brewing Company and the Brown-Forman Distillers in an attempt to seek 
compensation for his disease, and to require that alcohol warning labels be added to 
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alcohol to warn others of the addictive nature of the product. Although the challenge 
failed, the spirit of the lawsuit was continued by the advocacy organization Council for 
Law and Education on Alcohol Risks, who stated that their mission was adapting 
“product-liability law and using it on alcohol-related problems.” (Lewin 1986) The liquor 
industry had continually stifled legislation requiring alcohol warning labels, but that 
position began to shift as corporations realized that left them open lawsuits. 
 When the 100th Congress convened on January 3, 1987, Senator Strom 
Thurmond once again introduced labeling with five rotating labels and some of the 
strongest language yet, going further than just suggesting that alcohol is addictive and 
referring to it as a the “most abused drug in America.” (S.2047) Thurmond’s bill would 
serve as the legislation around which the 1988 hearing, “Alcohol Warning Labels” 
revolved. Later that year, the NIAAA acting on the direction of the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Health, published A Review of the Research Literature on the 
Effects of Health Warning Labels on August 3, 1987. (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 1987) The report concluded that health warning labels did have a 
positive effect on impacting consumer behavior, and provided the most up to date 
challenge to anti-labeling proponents that no measurable change in behavior could be 
observed from warning labels. 
A couple months later, plaintiffs in Seattle, Washington, filed the first lawsuits 
against a distiller for failing to disclose that alcohol could cause birth defects. While 
courts had previously ruled that warning labels on cigarettes protected the companies 
from being sued for harm that arose from the use of their product, no such label existed 
for alcohol. (Associated Press 1987) Among the three lawsuits filed on November 5, 
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1987, only one, filed by Candace and Harold Thorp on behalf of their then two-year-old 
son Michael Thorp progressed to trial. (Golden 1999) In Michael Thorp v. James B. 
Beam Distilling Company (1989), Michael’s mother Candace argued that because labels 
did not exist on the whiskey she consumed while pregnant, she did not know about the 
risks of FAS. The James B. Beam Distilling Corporation countered with a series of 
argument casting aspersion on the full extent of alcohol’s effect on pregnancy, and 
launched a campaign to assassinate the character of Candace Thorp as a competent and 
caring mother. Candace may not have been on trial, but a jury would be hard pressed to 
tell the difference. 
Public opinion on labeling had begun to shift and with it so too did the industry’s 
willingness to concede labeling as a means of protecting themselves from legal challenge. 
The inevitability of labeling made the final congressional hearing on the matter “Alcohol 
Warning Labels” in August of 1988 more of a piece of political theatre than an actual 
inquiry into the feasibility of warning labels. (U.S. Senate 1988) No industry interests 
even showed up to the hearings, and those that did take an anti-labeling position were 
skewered by Senator Albert Gore, Jr., (D-TN) the Chairman of the Subcommittee on the 
Consumer, who seemed to delight in verbally sparring with his opposition and picking 
apart the logic of their arguments.  
The bill under examination in the hearings, “S. 2047 To Require a Health 
Warning on the Labels of All Alcoholic Beverage Containers” was previously introduced 
by Senator Thurmond and cited a laundry list of rationale for its creation: decreased 
productivity, traffic fatalities, FAS, accidental deaths, suicides, homicides, crime, teen 
drinking, youth drug abuse, and more. To address that litany of social harms the bill 
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required an amendment to the Public Health Service Act to include five rotating warning 
labels.  
One of the first witnesses to testify, Senator Thurmond elaborated on how he had 
been introducing labels for almost twenty years, citing the “strong power of the liquor 
interests” as the reason why such legislation repeatedly failed to gain traction (U.S. 
Senate 1988). Senator Wendell H. Ford (D-KY) explained his “somewhat mixed 
emotions” on the bill as “one part bourbon and two parts water.” Among several senators 
testifying, Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC) elaborated on what seemed to explain the 
prevailing attitudes about labeling: “The argument ensues that labeling does not help. But 
I have not seen that it will hurt.” (U.S. Senate 1988) 
Deputy Director of the BATF, William T. Drake, testified at length about why his 
agency had not adopted labeling much earlier. He cited the joint report between the 
BATF and FDA that had decided against labeling as setting a precedent, and cautioned 
against the newly compiled evidence by the Department of Health and Human Services 
that stated warning labels were effective. Drake ended on an appeal that labeling wait 
until a BATF study on consumer attitudes to labeling finished, prompting ire from 
Senator Gore who mocked the BATF’s “bloomin’ polls” even in the face of 
overwhelming evidence that alcohol is a danger to health, “you want to go out just 
generally and start taking a political poll?” (U.S. Senate 1988) 
Gore’s exasperation was gentle compared to that of William Jerry McCord, from 
the South Carolina Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse who followed Drake’s 
testimony with a scathing indictment: “In ten years of inaction—and please do not take 
this personally, but the waffling, wimpish, leadership stance we have had from the federal 
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regulatory agencies is significant testimony that they are under the influence themselves 
of the regulated industry.” (U.S. Senate 1988) 
Representing the American Academy of Pediatrics, Kenneth L. Jones, presented 
the current state of science surrounding alcohol’s impact on development. As one of the 
first physicians to identify FAS, Jones was uniquely qualified to speak to how the field 
had changed over time. He characterized how harmful alcohol is to development by 
listing street drugs, “cocaine, heroin, methadone, PCP, marijuana,” and assuring those in 
attendance that “none of them holds a candle to alcohol and to its effects on the unborn 
baby.” (U.S. Senate 1988) Physicians Sheila Blume and LeClair Bissell also offered 
testimony in favor of labeling, reprising their roles following the 1982 hearings where 
they rebelled against the notion that women could not handle the truth about FAS.  
A representative for the National Council on Alcoholism (NCA), Christine 
Lubinski, was also present at the hearing and described the strong pro-labeling stance of 
the oldest alcoholism advocacy organization. When pressed by Senator Gore for details, 
she explained that it was not until the NCA rejected industry money and removed those 
board members that the organization could come out in support of regulating alcohol. She 
also presented a long list of other substances already being labeled, such as cigarettes, 
aspirin, and saccharin, highlighting that only in one agency does a warning label elicit 
“cries of Prohibition from industry.” (U.S. Senate 1988) 
There were industry interests represented at the hearing, and the three industry-
recommended witnesses faced substantial criticism from Senator Gore. Kip Viscusi a 
Duke University economist presented a semantic argument that warning labels did not 
meet the qualifications he enumerated for a successful hazard warning program. Senator 
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Gore cross-examined his argument and picked apart the reasoning at length. Another 
industry-recommended witness, Robert Lloyd, Vice Chairman of the American Council 
on Alcoholism, cited his volunteer work with the council and his background as a retired 
school teacher in opposing warning labels which he did not believe to be educational. 
Further, he described individuals who supported labeling as a reversion back to the era of 
Prohibition, inciting the ire of Gore who responded: “I think it is ridiculous, with all due 
respect. I just think that is ridiculous to have a spokesman for a group funded by the 
industry come in here and make a statement like this. I mean, you talk about insulting the 
intelligence of people with warning labels. A warning that we are headed down the 
slippery slope back to Prohibition is something that fits into that category as far as I am 
concerned. You are welcome to respond if you want to.” Lloyd offered no counter 
argument. (U.S. Senate 1988) 
The last witness suggested by industry interests, August Hewlett, President of the 
Alcohol Policy Council, touted his 30 years of experience in alcoholism policy 
leadership. He elaborated on the standard anti-labeling arguments that alcohol may have 
some measurable health benefits and that labels may cause fear and guilt among 
alcoholics. When Senator Gore queried his relationship with the industry and what 
funding he received, Hewlett reassured Gore that he operated totally independent of 
industry money. “I am the only person in the Alcohol Policy Council headquarters. It is 
my home.” (U.S. Senate 1988) Industry interests had essentially ceded their opposition to 
alcohol health warning labels.  
Following the hearings the bill was revised and added to a larger omnibus drug 
bill, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The Act passed on November 18, 1988 with a 
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proud Senator Thurmond at the signing ceremony. The final language issued by the 
BATF in February 1990 asserted the authority of the Surgeon General in the language 
and focused on both the harms to pregnancy, motorists, and general health: “Government 
warning: (1) According to the Surgeon General, women should not drink alcoholic 
beverages during pregnancy because of the risk of birth defects. (2) Consumption of 
alcoholic beverages impairs your ability to drive a car or operate heavy machinery, and 
may cause health problems.” (Public Law 100–690, 102 Stat. 4181) On November 14, 
1990 warning labels were required by law, seventeen years after physicians first 
identified that alcohol impacted the normal course of fetal development.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the early 1970s, fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) emerged as a public health 
concern and identified alcohol as a teratogen capable of causing birth defects. Alcohol 
was previously thought to be largely benign to pregnancy, but the concern surrounding 
the risk of birth defects among women who drank during pregnancy redefined America’s 
relationship with alcohol in medical, political, and social contexts. The most visible 
among regulatory responses to the risks posed by FAS, alcohol beverage labeling, took 
fifteen years to implement and forced discussions that transformed FAS from a medical 
disorder between practitioners and pregnant women, to a broader social and moral 
disorder that some characterized as resulting from women who willfully chose to 
endanger the development of their fetuses. FAS and alcohol warning labels became 
political objects around which discussions of the paternalistic state, individual agency, 
and scientific authority were occurring, and upon which social anxieties and shifting 
national priorities were pinned.  
That tension between the paternalistic state and the autonomous individual 
reflects the American cultural tradition of pitting individual agency and responsibility 
against government intervention and social welfare. (Conly 2012) By drawing a 
distinction between the good of the individual versus the collective good of society, the 
degree of government interference into daily decision making often drives oppositional 
camps of thought. There are opponents who may characterize the legislative response as 
patronizing, paternalistic, or the result of “big brother” intervening unnecessarily on the 
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private lives of citizens, instead of allowing those citizens to exercise free will and make 
an informed and educated decision. While supporters may see the intrusion as a necessity 
to ensuring the protection and well-being of society’s most vulnerable citizens, while 
compelling more privileged actors to comply with decisions that prioritize the good of the 
whole over individual or group interests.  
Such an intersection is at the heart of the moral entrepreneurship movements that 
construct social deviance and usually lead to social policing, casting private behaviors in 
an increasingly public light. (Becker 1963) Successful moral entrepreneurship seeks to 
publicize policy prescriptions for their particular definition of a social problem. As 
maternal and fetal health risks became characterized on the national scale through moral 
entrepreneurship movements and political engagement, fetal alcohol syndrome took on a 
moral and political identity in addition to its diagnostic, medical identity. (Gusfield 1984) 
(Glazer 1994) Consider youth smoking or drinking, driving while drinking, smoking 
indoors, or smoking and drinking during pregnancy, all of which were commonplace at 
points in the twentieth century but are now widely considered moral failings on the part 
of the individual who engages in such behavior. 
Defining that moral failing surrounding what pregnant women imbibe and its 
impacts on the fetus happens more frequently in the absence of a well-defined, acute 
medical understanding of how a teratogen impacts pregnancy. (Armstrong 2003) When 
the teratogenic potential of a substance is unknown but clear, as was the case with 
thalidomide, pregnant women were socially absolved of guilt and moral failing as they 
did not knowingly impact the normal course of fetal development. However, when a 
pregnant woman willfully engages in behavior that experts have identified as potentially 
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dangerous to fetal development, such as smoking or drinking during pregnancy, the 
mother may be perceived as acting immorally. (Gomez 1997) When the causative 
relationship between the proposed teratogen and the observed risk is under scrutiny, that 
uncertainty makes it difficult to craft appropriate public health policy.  
However, that uncertainty arises from more than just a deficit in scientific 
knowledge, as those regulatory tensions reflect the inherently gendered nature of policy 
crafted to address fetal risk during pregnancy. The social expectations and responsibilities 
of the pregnant woman, her fitness as a mother, and her moral responsibility to raise the 
next generation of productive citizens are latent and inextricable from decision making. 
Failure on the part of the pregnant woman to adhere to well-established social norms 
transforms the medical risks and diagnosis into a social disease with a moral component. 
When women knowingly endanger the development of their fetus, some decision 
makers view it as a personal moral failing, and craft legislation that motivates legislation 
in response to that perceived culpability. Those concerns at times lead legislators to favor 
punitive measures that punish the pregnant woman for transgressing society’s rules 
instead of more long-term public health initiatives to educate, prevent, and reform. 
However, if the goal of such legislation is risk reduction and increased quality of life, 
punitive measures fail to accomplish either. (Campbell 2000) Particularly as public health 
measures are currently executed there has been little change in the number of women 
who drink during pregnancy from the 1980s to present, which has held steady at ten 
percent of pregnant women. 
As the fifteen year history of this narrative progressed, the public health response 
to FAS forced regulation to shift from restricting the substance, alcohol, to targeting more 
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discrete populations and behaviors. In regulating the substance, government actors 
pressed for labeling as part of a public health agenda to decrease overall drinking and 
reduce associated health risks. That move in the late 1970s led industry actors to decry 
neo-prohibitionism and patient advocacy organizations to worry about an increase in 
stigma among alcoholics, a population that they had long sought to normalize as patients. 
In targeting populations, government actors aimed their public health interventions at 
traditionally underrepresented groups, including the first meaningful interaction at 
serving female alcoholics. Public health efforts targeted indigenous populations, the 
elderly, minors, prescription and street drug abusers, and most importantly, the dual 
public health population of the pregnant woman and her developing fetus. In targeting 
specific behaviors, government actors purported to target women who drink during 
pregnancy but the dramatic budgetary cuts to social research in the 1980s all but 
eliminated potential research to examine the factors surrounding why women engage in 
such risky behavior. Instead, legislative discussions substituted all women of 
reproductive age who drink as a proxy for reaching that population.  
In order for alcohol beverage labeling to pass in 1988, several conditions were 
met that created a favorable environment in which to enact legislation that had toiled on 
the congressional docket for almost fifteen years. Other labeling initiatives normalized 
the practice of warning consumers about health risks, including cigarettes, saccharine, 
and numerous over-the-counter drugs. Industry also increasingly saw labeling as a means 
of adequately alerting the consumer to the risks of such a product and requirement, to 
protect against legal challenges that arose from adverse health effects. The case study of 
cigarettes was integral to this shift, particularly surrounding issues of fetal risk posed by 
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women who smoke during pregnancy, as labeling to convey the risk to fetal development 
occurred simultaneous in the 1980s with discussions of alcohol health warning labels.  
The federal alcoholism treatment agenda also shifted in identifying and 
responding to high profile, socially unacceptable behavior in the fifteen years from FAS’s 
emergence to the passage of alcohol warning labels. While it began by identifying 
alcoholism as a disease, the political agenda surrounding issues of alcoholism rapidly 
shifted in the 1980s to incorporate other types of drinking that also became abnormal and 
subject to social censure. Those included drinking during pregnancy, driving while drunk, 
and youth drinking. The infusion of industry money complicated the formerly unified 
patient advocacy branch as well, which had for years focused on garnering acceptance for 
alcoholism as a disease and the alcoholic as a patient in need of treatment. As they 
achieved that goal, organizations such as the National Council on Alcoholism began 
accepting substantial amounts of money from the alcohol industry, and detached through 
the early 1980s as a strong voice of action on matters of federal alcoholism policy. After 
revoking those industry board seats, the push toward labeling renewed with vigor in the 
advocacy sector. 
Labeling also required the creation of a new group in need of public health 
intervention, women who choose to drink during pregnancy and their fetuses who are 
harmed. In the history of FAS, the perception of that group changed over the 15 years 
between FAS’s medical emergence and the passage of alcohol beverage warning labels. 
Initial political discussions were concerned with instituting alcohol warning labels as a 
means of abating the ignorance of well-meaning mothers, who if they only knew of the 
risks, would abstain from drinking during pregnancy. Those discussions morphed over 
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time, and the group identity shifted from naïve future mothers to women who willingly 
disregarded prevailing medical and public opinion to subject their fetuses to harm. In that 
shift, alcohol warning labels were imbued with a social and political purpose, as they 
changed from an informative public health response to a public censure of aberrant 
behavior. By the time warning labels passed in 1988 they were a symbolic victory for 
those who had petitioned for their passage for so many years. Fetal alcohol syndrome and 
the women who chose to drink during pregnancy were already far more noticeable in the 
public sphere than a small warning label on a bottle of beer. 
Administrative consensus and congressional action also needed to be achieved, 
without open antagonism from the executive branch. While the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms and the Food and Drug Administration were initially at odds, they 
later united against alcohol warning labels, forcing the labeling discussion into congress. 
It took the 1987 NIAAA paper examining the efficacy of labeling, combined with further 
congressional hearings in the late 1980s to swing the parent bureaus of the BATF and 
FDA into collaborative action toward realizing labels. The Reagan administration’s 
support for regulations surrounding drunk driving, youth drinking, and eventually alcohol 
warning labels demonstrates an odd proclivity of New Right Republicans in the 1980s. 
Although they took the general political position that government should deregulate 
industry and not intrude in citizens’ personal lives, the group still used their political 
clout to prescribe legislation that adhered to a socially conservative agenda, and were 
integral in characterizing women who drink during pregnancy as immoral. 
This dissertation presented an historical case study of how the federal government 
envisioned and executed its responsibility to engage in risk abatement measures and 
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educational campaigns in response to FAS, an emergent, population-level health risk. But 
as this narrative demonstrates, those discussions are rarely simple and require the 
integration of evidences across sectors of scientific and social research, executive and 
legislative branches of government, private industry, patient advocacy, and public 
concern. And that regulatory complexity was only heightened by the population at risk, 
pregnant women and the fetuses they place at risk by drinking. 
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